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 In the interest of promoting a co-constitutive theory of democratic citizenship, this 
dissertation explores three questions. I ask how work is defined and how this definition 
creates a hierarchy of types of work, which then leads to my second question, which is 
how definitions of work or what is not work are carried over into the public space of poli-
tics and citizenship, such that even legal citizens may be marginalized by the type of 
work that they do. I first critique democratic theory, particularly as centered on the idea 
of the public sphere, for failing to think about work, especially the labor that is required 
to build these political spaces. I then show how the contemporary economy challenges 
the ability of citizens to engage in political work because it produces conditions of pre-
carious labor, ubiquitous work, the depoliticization of work itself, and incompatibility of 
wage labor and family life. I use two historical case studies to explore how groups have 
claimed collective rights housed in the substantive needs of communities when asserting 
the validity of their work for citizenship. I look to the Articles of Confederation and Dan-










temperance movements for a consideration of gendered reproductive labor. I then address 
my third question, which is whether it is possible to promote the political work of co-
constituting a shared public world without also denigrating the labor, particularly care 
labor, that is supportive of this project. I claim it is possible, with the aid of Hannah Ar-
endt’s understanding of the complex interrelations between action, work and labor and 
locating of citizenship in the work of world building. I argue for the support of this con-
ception of work and agnostic institutionalism, despite the challenges of the contemporary 
economy, by advocating for a coalition-based democratic politics aimed at supporting the 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF WORK UNDER DEMOCRACY 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem of Work under Democracy  
 
Democracy, from its minimalist to most direct forms, relies on its citizens, be-
cause democratic legitimation rests in the notion of popular sovereignty. To be democrat-
ic may mean many things, but all of them include normative ideas of citizenship, whether 
we are discussing a theoretical or actually existing democratic system. The people, if they 
are the roots of democracy, must do something political to make this system function. 
Theorists advocate for better democracy, whether better means stability, justice, equality 
or freedom, contest what this “something” should be. Are the tasks of citizenship to 
choose between different options at the ballot box? To volunteer or join a local group? To 
govern directly, at least one in a while? To fight for dominance in the public space? 
While arguments about citizenship as desirable or virtuous action of the citizen continue, 
another set of thinkers ask, and activists struggle, to see and change how the legal and 
social barriers to gaining formal access or social standing as a good citizen occur.  
 These conversations need to be merged, which would help show that there is a 
term missing from these discussions: work. It is missing in part because it is a slippery 
word, used in so many contexts that it elides scholarly definition. We all know what work 
is, because we do it everyday, although some of us may refer to our writing or art as our 
“work,” while others think of their careers as work; we might also do things like “house-
work” or the type of work we require in our prisons. Whether our daily activities are un-









system is incredibly important for our ability to act as democratic citizens- and this de-
termination is not up to us, but formed in a socio-historical context bound up in legacies 
of privilege. Work is associated with politics as a market of political viability, but we also 
speak about political work from time to time. This confusion of terms needs exploration. 
Yet “work” is not a key term in democratic theory.  
 To foreground the importance of work for politics, including how we define it, we 
come up against an old puzzle of Aristotle’s. In The Politics, he expresses the fundamen-
tal puzzle of good citizenship, although he may not understand it as a puzzle. It turns out 
that a virtuous polity, and good citizenship, requires the labor of slaves. More than that, it 
requires that we sort out those who are “natural slaves” and therefore incapable of the 
higher acts of deliberation and friendship on which the city relies, from those who are 
citizens. The labor that supports the city is incompatible with the political virtue of gov-
erning oneself. Aristotle is not concerned with the democratic implications of this divi-
sion of labor, even though his ideal regime is premised on “ruling and being ruled in 
turn,” a nice formulation of shared public life.   
The democratic implications are important for political theorists, and democrats 
who follow him have rejected the category of natural slave and advanced a more inclu-
sive politics, where all can be good citizens. In doing so, they have often allowed the 
question of whose labor is supporting and building the public space to go unanswered, 
because the actual existing answer is offensive to democratic sensibilities. If we are a so-









are those who will spend their lives laboring for very little or not material rewards, much 
less political standing. The formal expansion of democratic citizenship without a consid-
eration of division of labor in society, both in itself and as it relates to political activity, is 
problematic.   
If we reject Aristotle’s argument about the natural slave and claim that all labor is 
equally valid, we are still mired in a quandary. Perhaps this economic leveling, produced 
either through social or economic policy, solves the problem of exploitative labor. How-
ever, it may do so at the cost of hollowing out the concept of work such that it has no po-
litical valence, and sucking the possibility for shared public projects and solidarity away 
from work.  On this side of the quandary, we develop economic equality (or, worse, ex-
treme almost equality where most are equally wretched and a select few are wealthy) 
without nurturing our civic capacity, such that we lack anything or place that could 
properly be called politics, or the common good.  
Holding on to the importance of work without denigrating labor is thus the theo-
retical and practical task I have set for myself. To aid me in what is no doubt in part a re-
definition of this term, I am adapting Hannah Arendt’s distinctions between labor and 
work, although I think she has mistakenly categorized some activities in her attempt to 
revitalize Aristotle’s paradox. Labor is nutritive and metabolic life that we share with an-
imals, while work is that which produces a durable world outside ourselves in which hu-
mans are embedded.  Ultimately, I will argue for supporting excellence in political work 









1.2 Background of the Problem 
 
Democracy is the only game in town. Political theory has been highly focused on 
defining, defending and exploring its contours for the past thirty years, and in this en-
deavor developed related arguments about who citizens are and what they do. In particu-
lar, debates about the proper form, location and function of public debate in a democracy 
dominate contemporary political theory, which often comingle with the problem of dem-
ocratic justification and legitimacy. It is here that questions about democratic equality 
overlap with concerns about justice, redistributive or otherwise. While democracy and 
liberalism are theoretically separate, they are often joined in this work given the domi-
nance of liberal concepts of negative liberty and rights-centered democratic life. Yet the 
prominence of democracy as “a transhistorical and universal value”1 is not limited to lib-
eral theorists; critics of liberalism from many sides tend to advance a democratic politics, 
even if this politics is construed as an alterative to liberal democracy. It is possible that 
the lack of a strong competitor to democracy reflects ideological hegemony, or that the 
concept has been stretched so much that very different systems can now be described 
with the same word. It is also possible that democracy remains, despite it justificatory 
role, tantalizingly out of reach in theory and practice. 
 
1. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought, Expanded (Princeton University Press, 2006), 585. He argues that the dominance of democracy as 
a theory does not relate to the actual rule of the poor that Aristotle associated with it; indeed, it has instead 
produced what he calls “centrifugal” reactions in the form of identity politics and theory, which he rightly 










One way to differentiate between democratic theories is through the role of the 
citizenry in this democratic system: thus we commonly contrast deliberative democrats 
with participatory democrats and so forth. While these distinctions are useful, we should 
also ask who and where citizens are and do, when they are not in a political space both 
legally and in light of the skills they are expected to hold and places in which they are 
supposed to act. This involves an exploration of normative democratic citizenship and an 
explanation of how the real-life population can engage in this civic action.  
The most important piece missing from the discussion of normative democratic 
citizenship is the place of “work.” This term will take some defining, but for now let it 
stand for the productive activities of humans, organized via roles that may either be for-
malized as professions or jobs in public, or undertaken as part of associations, like fami-
lies, of private life. The work individuals do is the key to political membership in the 
United States and also a means by which those who do the wrong work, or have the sorts 
of bodies that qualify them for the wrong work, can be excluded. As legal barriers to citi-
zenship fall, so that the poor, chattel slaves and their descendants, women, some immi-
grants and those young people subject to mandatory military service gain suffrage and 
other legal protections, we might assume that work and its political role would have also 
democratized. However, this has not been the case, explaining in part why inequality 
among the formally equal persists. Normative associations of “good work” with “good 
citizenship” retain and sometimes enhance hierarchies, particularly those tied to race, 









nist and queer theory, seeks to take difference more seriously, it may still rely on ideas 
about good citizenship that assume a certain type of good worker, due to historical asso-
ciations and unquestioned assumptions. And, even more complexly, political theory has a 
deep tradition of itself differentiating between types of work, valuing the public effort of 
citizenship, the political, above other sorts of labor and mental labor over physical.  
Work is a contested concept in even the sociology of work, which struggles itself 
to escape suggesting that work is anything productive of anything.2 On one hand, sociol-
ogists of work tend to study paid employment and surrounding economic structures, even 
as they also acknowledge that the definition of work is itself formed through contestation, 
rather than reflecting objective definitions.3 One explanation for this is the historical de-
velopment of the concept of work as a discrete sphere in the 18th century, conceptually 
severed from politics or family.4  Even the traditional opposition of work and leisure in 
 
2. “Since social reality has to be worked at-that is, has to be brought off by knowledgeable beings 
who sustain meaningful exchanges with each other- it could be asserted that every human action is work.” 
Keith Grint, The Sociology of Work: Introduction (Polity, 2005), 14. 
3. “From the late 1970’s there has been a much closer interest in how ‘work’, ‘labour’ and ‘em-
ployment’ are in fact culturally defined,” particularly when we seek to understanding work from the per-
spective of workers, or “in studies of proto-industrialization and the links between waged and unwaged 
work, and between work, family market and community” Patrick Joyce, The Historical Meanings of Work 
(CUP Archive, 1989), 11. 
4.  Although he defines work as when “we extract from nature the means of our existence,” he ar-
gues that work itself develops as a separate sphere in the 18th century, as the economy assumed a central 
role in Western Society. Maurice Godelier, “Work and Its Representations: A Research Proposal,” History 









unstable, given work, such as farming, art or sports, that blend the two.5 In any case, the 
dominant understanding in sociology of work is that work cannot be defined through its 
objective components, but instead is inscribed in a social and political process which it-
self has ramifications for social structures and behavior. In a sense, this dissertation seeks 
to trace this act of definition as it occurs in political theory and American history.  
This tracing is important because work, in terms of employment (or its lack) is so 
central to the contemporary American experience of politics. Work is not only the activi-
ty in which most people spend the majority of their time awake, but also the primary lo-
cus of social standing and belonging.6 By working, we not only supply others and our-
selves with material and social goods, but also develop certain skills and habits while 
others atrophy.7 We pursue a certain view of our identity in relation to the others and to 
the world, as well as a view of the world itself through our workday.8 And, perhaps even 
 
5. These ways of life “offer no clear separation between non-work and work” claims Loudon as 
quoted in Sandra Wallman and Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth, “Social an-
thropology of Work” (Academic Press, 1979), 129.  
6. Put otherwise,  “what people produce and consume, and the social relations engendered by that 
production, remain at the present time primary constituent elements in defining the social and cultural rela-
tions of postindustrial societies as we currently observe them” Catherine Casey, Work, self, and society: 
after industrialism (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 25. 
 
7. Indeed, in the workplace “educative and work processes are tightly interwoven and difficult to 
disentangle, as shown in a study of work-based training reform. Sylvia Hart-Landsberg, Learning the 
Ropes: The Social Construction of Work-based Learning (National Center for Research in Vocational Edu-
cation, Graduate School of Education, University of California at Berkeley, 1992), 15. 
 
8. This holds true even if “what it means to be a worker is not as stable as it once was,” as argued 
by post-industrial theorists and those who question the notion of a stable identity that travels from context 
to context, still may see work as central to this contingent process.   Paul du Gay, Consumption and Identity 









more importantly, we come to understand how our work is (or is not) valued politically 
and socially; our work dictates to a great extent how easily we can get into the public 
sphere that is the starting point for many democratic theorists.  
That individuals are situated within historical social and political relations that 
promote or exclude certain types of work from public space, either explicitly or through 
excluding the sorts of skills and voices that come from this work, is one of the key claims 
of this dissertation. Closely related is my claim that, with a more attentive look at how 
people struggle to overcome these exclusions, we are able to build a more robust account 
of democratic public citizenship that refuses to privilege certain types of workers over 
others, and instead places the creative power of citizen workers at the heart of democratic 
action. To approach these questions, it is necessary to explore the relationship between 
labor as an economic or social practice and the work of citizenship, as it has been experi-
enced historically and understood theoretically. The first question is about the political 
relationship of work to labor, or, put another way, of hierarchy of work. The second asks 
how a work/labor hierarchy relates to political citizenship, in both a status and normative 
sense. This examination, as we will see, will also introduce a third question: can political 
work be valued without devaluing work that is not political, particularly physical or care 
labor that has been understood as its antithesis? If, as I think, it is possible to promote a 
democratic citizenship of political work without denigrating other labor, then it will also 










1.3 Literature Review: Democratic Theory, Marxism, Feminism and Public Work  
  
The current literature in democratic theory lack explicitly consideration of work, 
labor, professions or the like in relation to democratic normative citizenship. These as-
pects of human live are considered properly the realm of sociology, or perhaps anthro-
pology, given their historical development as disciplines. This is problematic if, as I will 
claim, core concepts in political theory such as citizenship and association are construct-
ed out of unquestioned assumptions about work. The intellectual history of good citizen-
ship bears tension over the place of work and leisure in relation to politics and desert, 
with an unacknowledged alliance with Aristotle on the incompatibility of paid, manual or 
house work with the duties and skills of citizenship.9 In the scope of republican political 
theory, either emerging from Roman roots10 or modern revival,11 the role of politics is 
elevated, but other productive activities are not. These twin tendencies, to craft citizen-
 
9. Indeed, Aristotle tells us amid a discussion of the virtues of citizenship as “the capacity of rule 
and be ruled” Aristotle. The Politics. Univ of Chicago Pr (Tx), 1984, 91 that there are “several forms of 
slave; for the sorts of work are several” (Ibid., 91). The work of craftsmen, slaves or women is done for 
others and thus means they are ruled as slaves, while citizens are ruled as a form of education towards rul-
ing. Thus he can famously conclude that, although necessary to the city, craftspeople are “incomplete citi-
zens” (Ibid., 93) at best and slaves by nature— that is “if their work is the use of the body, and if this is the 
best that can come by them” (ibid 41)—at worst. 
10. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Selected Works, trans. Michael Grant (Penguin Classics, 1960). 
11. John Greville Agard Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and 









ship around the skills of some types of work, even if that work is scare, and ignore the 
role of unpaid political work as potentially political is reflected in the prominent forms of 
democratic theory.  
 Citizenship theory is itself characterized by the overlapping, but not identical, use 
of the term to mean both “citizenship-as-legal-status” and “citizenship-as-desirable ac-
tivity.”12 Explorations of the former look to historical and contemporary expansions and 
contractions of citizenship, tracing the way that legal categories, and constitutional 
changes, have regulated who is and is not a full member of a political body.13  T.H. Mar-
shall’s classic, “Citizenship and Social Class,” illuminates that both types of citizenship 
are interconnected, writing that “[t]here is no universal that determines what those rights 
and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an 
image of an  ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards 
which aspiration can be directed.14 In Marshall’s broader claim that political rights are 
 
12.Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. (2nd ed. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, USA, 2001), 353. 
 
13. For example, see Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Ob-
ligations of Citizenship (Hill and Wang, 1999) and Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race 
and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor (Harvard University Press, 2002) for an exploration at 
the interrelated role of class, race and gender in early colonial and antebellum citizenship. John Torpey, The 
Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 
1999, undertakes a similar exploration through the development of state practices of textual control and 
Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton University 
Press, 2008) is a central study in the genre. Jacqueline Stevens, States Without Nations: Citizenship for 
Mortals (Columbia University Press, 2011) connects national boundaries with the historical exploration of 
gender and sexuality.  
 










interrelated with social and economic rights emerges a defense of the welfare state and an 
echo of Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms; however, it has not dominated the American experi-
ence, or theoretical exploration of citizenship.15 While the quest for citizenship as legal 
status has occupied social movements and prompted massive expansions of citizenship 
rights, even if these expansions are more characterized by fits and starts than steady 
growth, too much focus on formal membership can cover over the importance of norma-
tive democratic citizenship- citizenship as desirable activity. This is contained already in 
the ambiguity of the concept of “full membership” in a political community; is one a full 
member if one has legal rights, but social norms or material circumstances pervert their 
use? The violence of Jim Crow restrictions on legal black citizens is only a particularly 
telling suggestion that these two types of citizenship are related.  
I have formulated this as the problem of the relationship between work as an eco-
nomic or social practice and the work of citizenship, which is explored through the expe-
riences of citizens under the Articles of Confederation whose status citizenship was at 
issue because of their labor. Their experiences show work/labor hierarchies relates to po-
litical citizenship, both as sources of exclusion and as the motivation for struggle. To 
show that this struggle outlasted the Articles, I explore how the Aristotelian amalgama-
 
15. See N. Fraser and L. Gordon, “Contract Versus Charity,” Socialist Review 22, no. 3 (1992): 
45–67 for a powerful argument that the United States has limited practices of social citizenship because 
gendered notions of contract have  produced “considerable tension between the mythology of civil citizen-









tion of nobility, leisure and citizenship, although resilient, did not survive whole piece 
industrialization or the broadening of the franchise.16 Instead, it has been modified to fit 
the needs of a pluralistic, democratic society by progressive theorists and union activists 
at the turn of the 20th century, who tried to solve the “problem” of the incompatibility of 
the mass political subject with political excellence through education that verged on so-
cial control. Temperance activists, who in some ways took this tendency to social control 
to extremes and attacked the social practices of the lower classes and immigrants, also 
sought to insert the question of whether women’s work counted for citizenship into the 
debate. They serve as an illustrated case study here, which bears directly on my first 
question, that of the political relationship of work to labor, or, put another way. These 
historical moments help illuminate the complex problem that work poses for theories of 
good citizenship.                                                                   
Rather than exploring interrelationships between work and citizenship, the prima-
ry way in which work appears in political theory has been as a potential venue for democ-
ratization.  While workplace democracy has relatively radical roots in early socialism, its 
late 20th century proponents tend to make less revolutionary proposals. 17 Part of the in-
 
16. There is perhaps an Aristotelian legacy in the prominence of political discourse tied to ideas of 
“trickle-down” economics, or the deference (and bailouts) available to prominent financial firms; however, 
the view that the wealthy are job-creators is nobility filtered through a producerist logic; no longer is good 
citizenship about developing the virtues of a citizen, but about production and consumption. 
 
17. Proudhon’s early formulations of his mutualistic industrial democracy argues that management 












terest in workplace democracy stems from engagement and some frustration with calls 
for increased participation; the hierarchical nature of the workplace was a possible casual 
explanation for low rates of participation, and thus also a fulcrum from change.18  In 
Robert Dahl’s version, Economic Democracy emerges from a stronger claim: “If democ-
racy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing econom-
ic enterprises.”19 Disagreements on whether he can fully support this claim abound, but 
researchers quietly continue to explore this line of arguments.20 However, attempts to in-
stantiate these practices, the famed example of Mondragon notwithstanding, have largely 
been captured by movements within capitalist management culture, such that calls for 
workers’ ownership of firms and capital are transformed into workers’ responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
cial property, no one can be its exclusive provider.” 1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What Is Property?, New 
issue of 1898 ed (William Reeves Bookseller Ltd, 1969), 130, 137.  
 
18. Reasoning that “the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their 
ordinary employments,” and that division of labor renders these employments dull and anti-political, we 
must move towards a form of economic life that “is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, 
and workpeople without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on 
terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working 
under managers elected and removable by themselves. ” Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic 
Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970), 51, 34. 
19. Robert Alan Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (University of California Press, 1986), 
111. 
20. See the recent exchange on this very topic. Robert Mayer, “Robert Dahl and the Right to 
Workplace Democracy,” The Review of Politics 63, no. 02 (2001): 221–247, 
doi:10.1017/S0034670500031156. And  Robert Dahl, “A Right to Workplace Democracy? Response to 









outcomes and products.21  More recent work on this topic in political theory tends to have 
less revolutionary goals, perhaps reflecting a general acceptance of the dominance of cap-
italism.22  
Other exceptions to political theory’s shunning of work fall into three categories: 
Marxist thought, feminist theory and public work. To a certain extent, my project builds 
on the insights of thinkers in these categories, while also seeking to advance beyond 
some of the limitations each creates on its own. In particular, I am concerned about the 
lack of a concept of public work or the common good in Marx, an overly narrow focus on 
the struggles of upper-class women in feminist thought, and a refusal to change the pa-
rameters in which we work, including those related to gender and the family, in theories 
of public work. As a relatively friendly critic, I will draw on these three bodies of thought 
in formulating my argument that we can promote a citizenship of democratic work with-
out denigrating other labor 
First, Marxist thought is an obvious choice when looking for a political theory of 
work. Marx contributes a rich set of theoretical concepts related to work; alienation, sur-
 
21. This is part of a larger story about post-fordist development of the workplace, where many po-
tentially emancipatory ideas were coopted as new practices of disciplinary control and surveillance accom-
panied the rise of the service and knowledge economy, as I discuss in chapter two.  
22. It may be that “what happens in the workplace is extraordinarily important in a diverse demo-
cratic society, and should be explored and cultivated,” but suggesting that culturally sensitive workplaces 
can foster trust and support civil political discourse is a far cry from redistributing the means of production. 
Cynthia Estlund Professor of Law Columbia University, Working Together!: How Workplace Bonds 
Strengthen a Diverse Democracy: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (Oxford Uni-









plus labor value, class as an analytical tool and the conception of humans as fundamental-
ly materially productive creatures, at the level of what he calls “species-being”. Indeed, it 
is perhaps an affront to write a dissertation on work and not proceed first through Marx, 
who seeks to uncover the meaning, rather than just the workings, of political economy. I 
have done so not because I think that Marxist thought is exhausted, but because the im-
portance of work for normative democratic citizenship holds even if Marx’ understanding 
of the scientific progression of history are incorrect. Second, while Marx is clearly criti-
cal of the four-fold alienation experienced by wage-workers, expressed also in 
the exploitative cycle of surplus value, he does not recognize the importance of non-
market labor for producing a capitalist system.23 Third, it is the connection between the 
political and the economic, as manifest in the individual citizen, that interests me. It is on 
this point that I think Marx is most vulnerable to critique, even if we avoid an overly 
simplified base/superstructure reading of his ideas.24 The force of this critique is aimed at 
 
23. This is the critique of the Italian feminist Marxists, discussed at some length in chapter four. 
They argue that the “reproductive labor” of the household produces the worker himself, this producing la-
bor power and surplus value and upholding the entire system. Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The 
Power of Women & the Subversion of Community, 3rd ed. (Wages for Housework, 1975). 
24. Considering the role of the proletariat helps clarify this point. As the proletariat produces 
goods, he or she produces also a world of things, people and beings that are foreign, or estranged; this is 
Marx’s twist on Hegel’s understanding of the importance of work and creation of world to establish identi-
ty. This alienation is one reason why politicizing the masses is so difficult, even without the suggestion of 
false consciousness. Work, under capitalism, thus produces a revolutionary subject and yet produces also a 
situation of alienation where he or she is unlike to revolt. That he tells us “"What the Bourgeoisie therefore 
produces, above all, are its own GRAVE DIGGERS” to remind us that it is the (failure of the) capitalist 
system which will precipitate this change, not revolution from below. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Manifesto of the Communist Party (C. H. Kerr & Company, 1906) 32. Yet we know that political action, 












the division of labor, which some commentators see as abolished under communism 
while others read its shift as a call for universal meaningful work.25 Both approaches deal 
with the problematic use of work and class to order hierarchies, but leave little room for 
valuing political work or what we might call a public space. To focus on this aspect of 
work, I leave aside Marx.  
 There are post-Marxist theorists who look more directly at work that liberal theo-
rists or more traditional Marxists. One approach is the rejection of work as it is currently 
practiced, either through a refusal to work, the claim of the right to be lazy or, more radi-
cally, a politics of anti-work that rejects the intimate connection between production and 
species being laid out by Marx.26 Work is for these thinkers an essential object of study 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
in its political valence rather than its production of material conditions, meaning that revolution itself has 
been coopted. We might then see that shifts in the structure of power mean that, today, “revolutionary 
change is the achievement of corporate power.” Wolin, Politics and Vision, 581.   
25. For an exploration of divisions within contemporary Marxism, see Renzo Llorente, “Analyti-
cal Marxism and the Division of Labor,” Science & Society 70, no. 2 (April 2006): 232–251. 
26. Bernardi epitomizes autonomist Marxism; he argues that the “cognitariat” is emblematic of 
work in the 21st century, and in response to technological changes and workplace demands, “tend to con-
sider labor as the most essential part in their lives, the most specific and personalized” and indeed tend to 
perform tasks in their leisure time in the form of games. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, The Soul at Work: From 
Alienation to Autonomy (Semiotex, trans. Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia (Semiotext(e), 2009), 
76. Where the autonomists call for the collective seizing of happiness, and the means of production, the 
“anti-work” or “post-work” contingent, drawing at least inspiration from 1. Paul Lafargue, The Right to Be 
Lazy, trans. Len Bracken (Fifth Season Pr, 1999), argue for the turn away from values such as work ethic, 
production and productivity, with strong relevance to the labor politics of the 1970’s. See Kathi Weeks, The 
Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries (Duke University 
Press Books, 2011), for a recent renovation of this argument, suggesting a that even Marxism must be left 









and they ask questions about what current working conditions mean in terms of equality 
and justice. What they do not always ask is what they mean for democracy or citizenship. 
In the main, the goal of neo-Marxists is to “refuse both the institution of waged work and 
the model of the privatized family as the central organizing structures of production and 
reproduction.”27 While students of democratic work need to be cognizant of the relation-
ship between capitalism, family structure and work, they should think about how citizens 
could change waged work and the privatized family; a politics of anti-work is not politi-
cally engaged and without the teeth to prevent exploitative corporate systems with exploi-
tative public or private ones. 
 In terms of the relationship of work to gender, Marxist Feminism is another logi-
cal place to look for allies, even if these two terms have had an “unhappy marriage.”28 
While the roots of Marxist feminism come from Engels own work on the family,29 many 
feminists have been critical of the role, or non-role, that gender has played in Marxism.30 
Thus much of Marxist Feminism involves exploring the work of Marx and Marxists and 
 
27. Weeks, The Problem with Work, 111. 
28. Heidi I. Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Pro-
gressive Union,” Capital & Class 3, no. 2 (June 1, 1979): 1–33 
29. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (C. H. Kerr, 1902). 
 
30. Most notably, Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex,” 










seeking to put it in dialogue with feminist concerns,31 or to determine whether these theo-
ries are even compatible.32 While it may bear tangential relation to my theme, I am not 
interested in reopening this debate. However, the relationship between Marxism and fem-
inism does point to the importance of asking questions about work when we ask about 
political belonging, and of approaching social, economic and political oppression as 
linked.  
 Feminist thought in general explores questions of work, exclusion and the rela-
tionship between these “private” spaces and political equality. While the concept of 
“waves” of feminism has rightly earned criticism, as with any academic discipline there 
are paradigmatic shifts that illuminate the sort of approaches and questions popular at a 
given time.33 However, as in the history of feminist thought and activism, and even more 
 
31. For example, the 1970’s era movement towards wages for housework was based in an under-
standing of the role of (women’s) reproductive labor in the home in shoring up the exploitation of the 
(male) worker’s surplus value outside of it. 
32. On one side are thinkers who combine Marxism and feminism to develop an argument about 
“capitalist patriarchy”; see, for example, Hartmann, “Unhappy Marriage,” and, Women, Work, and Poverty: 
Women Centered Research for Policy Change (Routledge, 2012) or Zillah Eisenstein, Against Empire: 
Feminisms, Racism and “The” (Zed Books, 2004). On the other,  many Marxist feminists argue that it is 
still relationship to production that is the key to exploitation, even if capitalism exploits women (and oth-
er’s) subordinate status; see, Michèle Barrett, Women’s Oppression Today: The Marxist/Feminist Encoun-
ter (Verso, 1988), Molyneux, Maxine. "Beyond the domestic labour debate," New Left Review 116, no. 3 
(1979): 27 and, Patricia Connelly "On Marxism and feminism," Studies in Political Economy 12 (1983).  
  
33. While there is little agreement as to whether third wave is a good way to describe the last 
twenty years of feminism, there is overlapping consensus on the notion that it is characterized by a central 
focus on, and method, of intersectionality, which includes a deep dialogue with queer and postcolonial the-












so in political theory in the main, questions about work and politics tend to be framed in 
relation to the concerns of northern, upper-middle class straight white women. Beyond 
this, the trend in third wave feminism is to associate problems of work with problems of 
personal choice and agency.34   
This is even truer in the popular press and the feminist blogosphere, where 
“work/family balance” problems are explained through explorations of the mommy track 
or other struggles for professional women. Work and its position in a particular political 
and historical context are transformed into narratives about the personal choices of wom-
en in relation to careers, or the struggle for work/life balance.35 This is true despite the 
longstanding counter-tradition in feminist theory, often led by women of color, to recog-
nize that the housewife or stay at home mom is a privileged exception, and therefore ar-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
cal means like legal change. Third wave feminism is often seen as apolitical, in the sense that its general 
skepticism towards the ability of liberal equality to meet the demands of gendered relations of power and 
privilege. However, the oft-levied criticism that third wave feminism is apolitical can be another version of 
valuing formal politics over political work that is not overtly so. This can be seen in the fact that some of 
the more useful and productive feminist writing on work has indeed emerged from third wave concerns, 
particularly as influenced by post-colonial understandings and a new turn to materialism. For a good over-
view of the controversy, see C. R Showden, “What’s Political About the New Feminisms?,” Frontiers: A 
Journal of Women Studies 30, no. 2 (2009): 166–198. 
34. Nina Power, One Dimensional Woman (O Books, John Hunt, 2009) makes this critique direct-
ly of writers like Jessica Valenti of feministing.com and Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, Mani-
festa [10th Anniversary Edition]: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future (Macmillan, 2010). 
35. The latest in a long line of examples is Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will 
to Lead (Knopf, 2013), which acknowledges bigger challenges but quickly focus on the way that “women 
are hindered by barriers that exist within ourselves…by lacking self-confidence, by not raising out hands, 









guments about access to work outside the home ignore the women who already do. This 
is a reformation of the third problem that I began with above; how to gain promote mean-
ingful political work without dominating or denigrating those who do work that is per-
ceived as meaningless. So-called third wave feminism has been pummeled for this lack, 
as well as for promoting a consumerist version of feminist empowerment that aims at ac-
quiring “expensive handbags, a vibrator, a job, a flat and a man - probably in that or-
der.”36 This can change.   
It will change if we include work in the third-wave turn to intersectionality, even 
as this concept is contested. Intersectionality is a critique of essentialism, and an argu-
ment that gender interacts (or intersects) with other categories of difference, such as race, 
class, sexuality and nationality, and that analyzing any of these categories separately is 
likely to misunderstand the workings of power. 37 In part it is in response to the frequent 
critique that feminist theory and activism centers on the concerns and understandings of 
white, upper-middle class women in wealthy countries. Intersectionality, given its résis-
tance to the limitations of previous feminist and antiracist discourse that marginalized 
black women or those who did not fit the dominant modes of understanding, remains a 
 
36. Power, One Dimensional Woman, 1.  










dominant paradigm in feminist thought, even as it remains contested.38 Indeed, it retains 
it appeal precisely because of this contestation, in that it “encourages complexity, stimu-
lates creativity, and avoids premature closure, tantalizing feminist scholars to raise new 
questions and explore uncharted territory.”39 Adding in work at the complex intersections 
of identity is one of these diverse territories.  
While intersectionality counts “class” as a key mark of difference that interacts 
with other discrimination, its practitioners might fold work into class as if it were the 
same aspect of human life.  Indeed, class may be a difficult category for intersectionality 
to grapple with, because it is difficult to measure class in a global context, where its pro-
duction occurs not at a local or national level, but in relation to a complex system of capi-
tal and migration flows.  Thinking class and gender together is also complicated by the 
(interesting) problem of where women’s class comes from: childhood, husband, and oc-
cupation? Deepening the consideration and class and work will strengthen an already 
strong research agenda in intersectionality and global work that shows how work is not a 
neutral backdrop onto which political activity occurs, or from which workers transform 
into citizens, but rather the process through which both gender and models of good citi-
 
38. Perhaps it is “the most important contribution feminism has made so far,” according to Leslie 
McCall in Emily Grabham et al., Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location 
(Routledge, 2008), 49. Other contributors to the same volume, ask whether intersectionality has outlives its 
usefulness.   
39. Kathy Davis, “Intersectionality as Buzzword” in Helma Lutz, Maria Teresa Herrera Vivar, and 
Linda Supik, Framing Intersectionality (Epub) Debates on a Multi-Faceted Concept in Gender Studies 









zenship are reified into habit.40  
 The third body of literature that contributes to this study, but also needs to be put 
into dialogue with other perspectives, is that of public work, led by Harry C. Boyte. Pub-
lic work advances “a normative, democratizing ideal of citizenship generalized from 
communal labors of creating the commons, with roots in diverse culture.”41 This ap-
proach begins from the work individuals do, arguing that anyone can work towards the 
public good from whatever job they find themselves, whether lawyers or masons.42 Boyte 
provides a powerful defense of the idea of citizenship as “co-creation,” drawing on the 
civic minded traditions in American history as well as a broader theoretical defense of the 
need for democratic people to held mold the conditions under which they live. He also 
produces a critique of the “experts” driven approach to citizenship that dogs some theory 
and practice, arguing for the reception of ideas that the “masses” need to be made fit for 
 
40. Rhacel Salazar Parrenas, Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work, 
1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 2001).shows how workers’ Diasporas, in this case experienced primarily 
by Philippine women, produce what she calls “dislocations” for the subject themselves and also, at the 
macro level, the structure of what we call globalization. She builds on the earlier work of Saskia Sassen, 
The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo., 2nd ed. (Princeton University Press, 2001).who shows how 
the low-cost factory labor of women in developing countries has been instrumental in allowing for the pro-
liferation of neoliberal regimes of trade and migration. 
41 .Harry C. Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work Organizing the Literature,” Political 
Theory 39, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 630–660, doi:10.1177/0090591711413747, 1. 










normative citizenship because of the type of work they do43. Boyte focuses, as I do, on 
“resurfacing the concept of public itself,” through the development of programs that meet 
citizens where they already are, and transforming the work they can do to a public pur-
pose.44  
 Ultimately, this dissertation defends a type of public work argument, but asks that 
we think more about the “work” term. I think that this is necessary for three reasons. 
First, it may take more than public work to change the parameters of work itself, espe-
cially given Boyte’s clear opposition to technocracy, eroding the hierarchical distinctions 
between “professionals” and other workers and “silent civic disease.45” In other words, 
public work may be less transformative of the conditions of work itself, given the focus 
on supporting public projects that come out of one’s workplace skills, rather than ques-
tioning the workplace or its conditions. The slow and often dull smallwork that occupies 
political work is agnostic as to the content of the political work that is done, and silent as 
to whether the form of work (both in terms of paid employment and in its political defini-
tion) is itself is antithetical to the very public work politics he advocates. Boyte is not un-
 
43. To get beyond the cult of the expert, Boyte argues “Sustained interaction between different 
kinds of knowledge also requires reconceiving institutions as living communities and dynamic cultures” 
and seeking to make them responsive to the knowledge of everyday citizens (“Cult,”3). 
44. Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte, Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in Amer-
ica (University of Chicago Press, 1992), xvi.  
45. Harry C. Boyte, The Citizen Solution: How You Can Make a Difference, 1st ed. (Minnesota 










aware of this problem; indeed, he faults some community organizers for failing to recog-
nize how service industries “demobilize agency” and sees this as part of a larger failure to 
accurately conceptualize power realities.46 We are left with the question of “how to de-
velop a politics that can change the landscape of modern societies by reworking the cul-
tures and associated practices of diverse institutional settings.”47 This question, of how to 
rework cultures and practices, motivates my interest in work, which I suspect is important 
as more than a source of skills.  
Underlying political uses and definition of work might not be diminished by the 
cultivation of public work, and indeed may remain as stubborn blocks to democratic soli-
darity. As Public Work approaches continue to focus on the professional classes through 
engagement with education systems, the gap between the self-organizing capabilities of 
elites and everyday people continues. This is made even more pressing by the (intention-
al) avoidance of thinking gender in Boyte’s work. His critique of identity politics and 
“rights talk” demands as consumerist and individualist is well taken; indeed, it forms part 
of the impetus for this dissertation. But, we can perhaps think gender without doing iden-
tity politics. Work is too intimately tangled with gender production and politics in the 
Unites States for this to remain under theorized. In particular, without gender it is diffi-
 
46. Harry C. Boyte, “Harry Boyte Lecture at the Faith & Public Policy Forum, March 16th 2011 | 
Christianity & Contemporary Politics,” accessed April 2, 2013, 
http://christianitycontemporarypolitics.blogspot.com/2011/03/harry-boyte-lecture-at-faith-public.html. 









cult to see how public work can include those who are outside the realm of what is gener-
ally considered work, professional or no, such as unpaid or paid workers in the home or 
other providers of care work. If work is to be public it is not only the distinction between 
manual and professional labor that must be overcome, but also between care and mainte-
nance work and political work. It is this move that will help complete the task of recap-
turing the concept of “makers” from the continent of free market advocates who use it to 
denigrate the “takers” of welfare, so that making comes to be celebrated as contributions 
to the common good.  
 
1.4 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
 
Three questions center this investigation. What is the political relationship of 
work to labor, or, put another way, how can we understand hierarchy of work? This leads 
into the problem of whether and how work/labor hierarchies relate to political citizenship, 
in both a status and normative sense. Finally, can political work be valued without deval-
uing work that is not political, particularly physical or care labor that has been understood 
as its antithesis? 
This dissertation thus seeks to address the gap in political theory surrounding the 
status of work. First, to show that democratic theorist unthinkingly import assumptions 
about work into their concepts of normative democratic citizenship, which on the surface 
seem unrelated to the workplace. Second, that even those theorists who are more attentive 









erode the public dimensions of work. And, finally, that public work theorists need to 
think about the relationship of public work or the work of citizenship, to the everyday 
work that people do for money (or not). This involves critiquing the division of labor 
formed on the family, as well the challenges to the contemporary labor market and its 
practices pose for normative democratic citizenship. This project is necessary to advance 
this project of public work, and also to move beyond the current paradigms in democratic 
theory to produce a transformative “political theory of work.”  
 
1.5 Significance and Purpose  
 
 To address this problem, I take a two-pronged approach that converges into a sin-
gle normative argument. First, I address the democratic theory literature, looking for the 
unspoken role of work in arguments about what democratic citizens should do. I ask what 
theoretical assumptions theorists make about skills and motivations. Along with a ten-
dency to assume that citizens are professionals, democratic theorists often neglect to ex-
plain how the public space on which their theory is premise is itself created. I show how 
this lack emerges from the work of Jürgen Habermas, whose own arguments about the 
relationship between the economic and public spheres are lost as his ideas are adapted by 
participatory, deliberative and agonistic democrats. Second, I examine two historical case 
studies that expose the complex relationship between work/labor as productive human 
activity and the work of political citizenship. The first is the struggle over early American 









motivated to contest the basis for constitutional competency in their world because of 
their shared ideas about the polity’s commitment to a political economy that met the 
needs of citizens. I then trace how the independent yeoman model of citizenship that sub-
stituted for this populist citizenship of the Regulators was put into question again through 
industrialization and urbanization, which led progressive theorists to advance massive 
projects of social work. Their efforts led, perhaps unintentionally, to the exclusion of 
women from the public sphere, and they contested this exclusion in a variety of ways. I 
interpret the temperance movement as a key part of this contestation, not least because it 
served as a veiled demand for recognition and remuneration for the work of women. 
From these two events, and the legal cases that help illuminate their contours, I develop 
an argument for what sort of practices and strategies a political theory of work that does 
not reject labor. It must be attentive to need and the citizen made superfluous, and fo-
cused on the work of building public spaces. I then discuss contemporary challenges that 
further complicate the status of work and citizenship, in terms of the labor market and its 
anti-democratic potential. Finally, I argue that Hannah Arendt (with the help of feminist 
and public work theory) provides a useful theoretical basis for a normative democratic 
citizenship housed in work and the interconnections between labor and work, supported 
by the policy changes and practices. Arendt does so because she lays out the complex in-
terconnections between labor, work and politics.  
 This study is important because it intervenes in one of the few areas where politi-









States and abroad. Work, or lack thereof, is a central experience for most adults, and 
many children and elderly worldwide, and it is through exploring its political resonance 
that equality will be possible. Practitioners, particularly those working the community 
organizing tradition, will be able to use this knowledge to make better practical designs in 
their organizing. In particular, thinking about the systemic problems of work provides a 
vehicle for the large-scale transformation of society and social practices, which has been 
a problematic shortcoming for the locally oriented citizenship movements. Finally, this 
dissertation advances a novel reading of Hannah Arendt that, in the narrow world of aca-
demic theorizing, can produce exciting new conversations about the relevance of Arendt 
for actual political action.  
 
1.6 Theoretical Framework 
 
 The methods appropriate to studying such a problem combine theoretical argu-
ment, the socio-historical focus on the interrelation of historical event and theory that 
makes up the method of Hannah Arendt, feminist standpoint theory, and the use of case 
studies. In particular, this means starting from the self-understanding of participants in 
political events, and understanding historical events as casting particular lights on ideas, 









 Arendt says in The Human Condition that we must “think what we are doing.”48 
This seems rather blasé, but it contains a great deal of her method, which is often derided 
for lacking theoretical coherence. The first piece of is a claim that we do not typically 
accompany action, particularly political action, with thoughtfulness. Arendt identifies this 
practice as intimately connected to totalitarianism and loneliness, the twin phenomenon 
she links to the dehumanization that allows for genocide and the total destruction of the 
public space. The concept of “the banality of evil,” which is often misunderstood to mean 
that evil is a part of everyday life, refers instead to the inability to exercise judgment in 
any way, and therefore to recognize evil. To “think what we are doing” involves not only 
a reflective capacity, but also a political judgment that requires communal engagement 
and dialogue.  
It is in fact this capacity for judgment that is at the heart of Arendt’ interest in his-
torical study, which she does not approach lightly or without considering what it is to ex-
amine the past. Arendt’s broader theory is rooted in the concept of natality: the capacity 
of each human to begin something new. Her understanding of the place of history and 
social theory thus reflects this capacity and rejects causal determinacy. The cyclical pro-
cesses of the natural world are, for Arendt, opposed to the mortal linearity of individual 
human life, which can only punctuate itself, or move beyond pure bios, or bare life, 
 










through action.”49 Her argument is that the Greek concept of greatness performed this 
feat, at least for the Greeks, in that courageous acts were taken themselves to “shine” as 
provide a focal point for historical memory.50 In the contemporary world, this shining is 
not visible because we have lost the space of appearances in which it shows itself because 
“world-alienation” is, for Arendt, following Marx, the characteristic of our age.  
To do history in light of world-alienation, or what she calls the explosion of our 
concepts of western political theory, requires more than story telling.51 However, even in 
a world without these transcendental concepts where we must think “without bannisters,” 
a type of history, and theory, is possible.52 Arendt indicts modern social science for at-
tempting to treat humans as malleable natural material, because this misses the funda-
mental state of plurality and natality that characterizes human life. Even history, which is 
a type of fabrication, is mistaken when it imagines itself as a management process 
 
49. “The subject of history is these interruptions, the extraordinary, in other words.” Hannah Ar-
endt, “The Concept of History; Ancient and Modern” in Professor Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt Peter R. 
Baehr, and P. R. (Peter R. ) Baehr, The Portable Hannah Arendt (Penguin, 2003), 572).   
50. “The task of the poet and the historiographer...consists in making something lasting out of re-
membrance.” Ibid., 574 
51. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973). 
52. Arendt adapts this term from a question Nietzche’s Zarathustra asks, connecting her work to 
his crititique of the Western Tradition. Perhaps, “if political theory is to attempt to be adequate to the poli-
tics of the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century, it must think without a banister and without any 
nostalgia for one” in the light of Arendt’s claims. Tracy B. Strong, Politics Without Vision: Thinking With-









through which self-evidence historical truths are accesses.53 This is the sort of open-
ended historical work that Arendt advocates.  
Arendt practices this sort of history in her monumental exploration of totalitarian-
ism, and in doing so provides a model for understanding the conceptual history of work. 
The task of the historian, or political theorist, who come after totalitarianism, in which 
she says that “all traditional elements of our political and spiritual world were dissolved” 
is difficult.54 Origins does not contain a fully worked out defense of her method, which 
caused critics to complain that it was scattershot and without plan. They took particular 
umbrage are her refusal to imply causality, instead speaking of the ‘“subterranean 
streams” or “crystallizations” that provided the grounds for totalitarianism.55 Her interest 
in natality and beginnings is clear here, but so too in its “fragmentariness, historical dead 
ends, failures and ruptures.”56  Indeed, central to Arendt’s method is the connection be-
 
53. Instead, historical work is political  “only insofar as the end product of fabrication is incorpo-
rated in the human world, where its use and ultimate history cannot be predicted, does even fabrication start 
a process whose outcome cannot be entirely foreseen.” Arendt, Human Condition, 587. 
54. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, viii. 
55. Hannah Arendt, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,” The Review of Politics 
15, no. 3 (July 1, 1953): 303–304. “[F]or Arendt, an excessive concern with causal connections blunts our 
sense of the meaning of historical events, even in those cases where monocausal explanations are eschewed 
in favor of multicausal ones, and seduces us into imagining that events are merely parts of an interminable 
process.” Taran Kang, “Origin and Essence: The Problem of History in Hannah Arendt,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 74, no. 1 (January 2013): 144. 










tween ruptures, events, beginnings and the search for understanding and narrative, or, in 
Montesquieu's terms, the springs that sustain a regime.    
Furthermore, Arendt’s admonition that we begin from the self-understandings of 
participants resonates with feminist epistemology that advocates a type of modified 
standpoint theory.57 Standpoint theory is a method that rejects the idea of universal truth, 
and instead asks about what sort of multiple knowledges we can glean from various 
“standpoints,” which are usually associated with the marginalized.58 This approach reject 
essentialism, universalism and scientific positivism, but the best of them also go beyond 
the idea that women, or other non-white males, have a privileged and unique view on the 
world. Instead, standpoint theory has evolved towards something I might call more clear-
ly multiple standpoint theory, which has strong linkages with participatory research, oral 
history and community oriented research.  It also helps justify the use of past events and 
various perspectives on these events to provide a fuller picture of the genealogy of ide-
 
57. Standpoint theories are “[f]eminist efforts to identify criteria for theory choice drawn from dis-
ciplinary standards such as systematicity and comprehensiveness are themselves implicated in modernist 
practices that politicize science without disrupting the general privilege accorded scientific explanations in 
the broader world of scientized politics. They confirm the “quite modern political sensibility that casts the 
“political” as coextensive with the organization and management of a system of social relations and that 
consequently renders political action importantly dependent upon the production of properly scientific 
knowledge of that system.” McClure, "The Issue of Foundations: Scientized Politics, Politicized Science, 
and Feminist Critical Practice," in Judith P. Butler and Joan Wallach Scott, Feminists Theorize The Politi-
cal (Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Incorporated, 1992). 
58. Recent formulations have added “situated imaginations” to the list. Marcel Stoetzler and Nira 
Yuval-Davis, “Standpoint Theory, Situated Knowledge and the Situated Imagination,” Feminist Theory 3, 










as.  Standpoint theory asks about the interrelationships of ideas and social positions; my 
goal in looking at historical events is to trace some of this relationship, with particular 
attention to the experiences of women and workers.  
History is difficult to study responsibly. As feminist historiographers remind us, 
perhaps our interpretations of historical events tells us more about how we’d like to inter-
vene in our own presents than about history itself.59 Given my intent of arguing some-
thing about the present using, in part, historical events and interpretations, this warning is 
well taken. My argument that work is central for citizenship as conceived in political the-
ory, however, stands on its own without the additional exploration of the historical epi-
sodes of Temperance and Shays. However, given the role of each as a moment of consti-
tutional creation and their warnings about the complexity of the relationship between 
work, citizenship, gender and class, the light they shine is worth examining.  However, 
the use of historical event to inform theoretical work is in the tradition of American polit-
ical thought, where intellectual ideas are intimately connected to historical events.60 Fur-
 
59. It is possible that claims that “a corrective approach will be likely to erase the conditions of its 
own construction” and that feminist theory should be cognizant of the dominant narratives within its own 
construction. Antoinette Burton, “Thinking Beyond the Boundaries: Empire, Feminism and the Domains of 
History” (2001), 15.  
60. See: Judith N. Shklar, Redeeming American Political Thought, ed. Stanley Hoffmann and 
Dennis F. Thompson, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1998), which is conducted primarily as a de-
scriptive historical project. While she died before finished the project, Shklar demonstrates here (and in 
American Citizenship) the productive nature of joined historical and theoretical inquiry. She says, “apart 
from the early establishment of representative democracy and the persistence of slavery...American Politi-
cal Thought  is just an integral part of modern history as a whole” (Redeeming, xiii). Political theory “mani-












thermore, non-ideal political theory seeks to say something about the social and political 
world, and cannot be undertaken in good faith without attempting to connect reason and 
theory to actual events. Shays and temperance are ripe for this connecting, and historical 
inquiry is particular important, if also fraught, for political theory interested in social 
change.  
Why Shay’s Rebellion? Surely this is a small drama in a larger story of populist 
revolt, with events or movements that better illustrate my central contention that Shays 
exposes the connection between work and citizen claims to constitutional competence. 
One option would be to study the history of the American labor movement, or one of its 
episodes. I have not done so because I am interested in part in how citizenship is formu-
lated at the founding of the United States, and unions are not yet a key player. I also wor-
ry that an historical exploration of labor is a monumental task in itself, and obscures the 
purpose of using a case study.61 Shays is useful first of all because it occurs at a moment 
of possibility, under the Articles of Confederation, where alternative legal rules and cul-
tural practices were real. It also provides an interesting exploration of one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
American Academy and public life,” John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of 
an American Vocation (University of Chicago Press, 1993). His claim is that this relationship is often one 
of tension and separation; the discipline of political theory holding itself apart in order to attach itself to the 
vaunted tradition of western philosophy while remaining free of the mess of politics, but still consistently in 
contact with political discourse.  
 
61. However, a consideration of the relationship of work to politics in the United States does need 
to be linked up to the history of the labor movement, the primary vehicle for contesting the conditions of 









“streams,” in Arendt’s language, that flow throughout the American narrative; for Arendt, 
the moment of the revolutionary founding of the American polity is one of these histori-
cal ruptures or events that shows us possibility, but one in which the possibilities of 
founding freedom institutionally were not fully realized. If we take seriously the non-
causal method of Arendt’s historical theorizing, than we can look at Shays to understand 
other paths that could have been taken.  
 Temperance is even more fascinating because it contains the only example of a 
successful Article V repeal of one of the few successful Article V amendments. This con-
stitutional shift is linked to a broader constitutional change in the status of work and 
worker’s citizenship, and its failure is linked to the exclusion of women from the public 
space. While the world of temperance seems far removed from our own struggles with 
unemployment and global supply chains, dynamics around politics and family life are not 
so different. Indeed, a different and more historical way to put my claims is to suggest 
that the regime of citizenship put into place after temperance failed (and with the aid of 
labor unions) was and is incompatible with the full political membership of women, and 
perhaps even of workers as currently situated.  
 While there are certainly other ways to understand these historical episodes, my 
goal is not an historical argument about whether fights over the definition of work and its 
relation to citizenship were the explanatory elements variables that defined this history. 
Nor, while I do think it is likely, am I tracing the full genealogy of current understandings 









to light a neglected current of thought in each of these episodes, which does suggest that 
attending to work and how it is understood changes how we view historical episodes and 
the construction of institutions. 
 
 
1.7 Limitations to this Approach 
 
 There are no doubt many limitations to this study, but by far the most glaring are 
the provincial nature of the subject matter and the limits of discussing two historical cases 
and making broader claims in relation to them. This work is provincial first of all in the 
sense, despite interdisciplinary tendencies, of setting itself in relation to western academ-
ic political theory, particularly as dominated by U.S. academics and readers. My justifica-
tions for this are thin, although I suppose I could mount an argument that because it is 
this traditional that is deeply involved in the project of contemporary liberalism, than it 
make sense to approach the problem of work under liberalism by asking about its theory.  
 Secondly, and more problematically, the dissertation is hampered by an overly 
localized focus on the United States. All the world was America, or so I’ve read, and per-
haps if the homogenizing powers of global capital proceed unchecked, will be again. Cur-
rently, citizenship as legal status is still mediated by nation states, although citizenship as 
normative orientation is shifting somewhat to alternative loci, such as forum of global 
governance, diaspora networks or hybrid forms like the European Union. Work, while 









is also still oriented in relation to a localized regime of rule, regulations and cultural prac-
tices that interpret its status in particular ways. Indeed, if there is an American exception-
alism to be identified, it may lie in our particular orientation towards work and citizen-
ship.62 Certainly, even without arguments about the proliferation of American values via 
global capitalist expansion, we can see historical and theoretical engagement with the 
value of work in many contexts. So too would be a more globally oriented exploration of 
the way that migration, and the mobility of capital relates to the patterns of the global 
work experience and how it relates to emerging sites of citizenship. I hope to explore the-
se projects in my future work.  
 
1.8 Key Definitions: What is work? 
 
 
What do I mean by work? In physics, work is understood as a measurement of the 
action a force produces, but in the human context it is more complex. Commonly, we dis-
cuss work in three ways; as what is rewarded with a paycheck, as the product of an en-
deavor, or, more broadly, to refer to any productive effort. The last category often over-
laps the older concept of “labor,” which tends to refer to any toil or task, particularly 
when it is not seen to produce a product. In the market centered society, the first under-
 










standing of work as what is exchanged for a paycheck is dominant. Or, put another way, 
the labor that is seen as productive or useful is rewarded monetarily and socially and 
therefore counts as “work.” We might initially say that work produces something, and 
that is why it is monetarily rewarded, a paradigm that is easily to understand when think-
ing work that occurs within the realm of industrial fabrication, construction, or even art. 
But what does the so-called service economy produce? At best, we can say it produces 
the physical and mental well being of others, but this abstract quality is hardly the same 
sort of product as a car or house. It is not satisfying to say that work is simply the produc-
tion of goods, and the reception of other goods, because with this loose definition most of 
human life can be grouped into this category.   
 One way of categorizing work has been through measures used historically to un-
derstand the strength of various economies. Work would thus, in the modern age, be 
whatever is captured in the standard measure of Gross Domestic Product. We also, of 
course, measure unemployment rates, a statistic that is measured in the United States in 
an odd way, in relation to those who are reported as “seeking work”.  In all of these 
measures, some type of work is captured very clearly, and measuring via the market 
mechanism, which prices goods and services on a global scale. Other types of work, in-
cluded unpaid, illegal and other grey areas is more difficult to capture, although all seems 
reasonably part of what “work” is. To understand work as a specific category of human 










My working definition is that: work is purposeful human activity orientated to-
ward a useful outcome, particularly but not exclusively, activity directed towards the sat-
isfaction of human needs. The last term is defined very broadly, and in my interpretation 
linked back to the concept of “purposeful” and therefore moving beyond the respiratory. I 
also intend to follow Hannah Arendt in attempting to separate labor and work. The dis-
tinction will need to be explored and toyed with, but is ultimately useful, although ever 
problematic. For Arendt, work and labor are distinguishable by the products they do (or 
do not) produce. In The Human Condition, she tells us that labor is the reparative and an-
imal functions that keep us alive; here is consumption, metabolic activity and the push of 
necessity. It “corresponds to the biological process of the human body.”63 Work “corre-
sponds to the unnaturalness of human existence” and is what produces a world outside 
ourselves in which we can live, adding stability to our existence.64 This distinction, with 
its association of metabolic and nutritive processes with labor, has rightly struck many as 
highly problematic. However, as I argue in Chapter Five, the categories of activity should 
be understood as more of a complex spectrum than a stark delineation. The importance of 
both work and labor does not break down to an argument that each of these are necessary 
for the production of her third term, action, which is at the heart of political freedom. 
This is a true claim, particularly for the work that she notes is key for the production of a 
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common world in which we can act.65 Indeed, Arendt herself reminds us that  “this only 
means that man is never exclusively homo faber, that even the fabricator remains at the 
same time an acting being.”66 What is important for Arendt, and I think should be im-
portant for us, is the political salience of these categories and the political trauma that 
results when they are mixed up. The problem is not that labor is without dignity, but that 
when we mistake labor (and consumption) for that matter, for productive work or politi-
cal action, our lives are less rich. Another way to put this is to say that we cannot subsist 
on faux citizenship that is enacted through mere work or labor (i.e. wage labor or house-
work), but need a citizenship housed in communal endeavor.  
Currently, there is little work or action for most of us, even those in the so-called 
creative class who might perceive themselves as divorced from the labor of the working 
classes. So, a political theory that takes work seriously is not anti-labor, but rather asks 
that we work to distinguish labor from politics and work, perhaps not along the exact 
lines that Arendt does, but in hope of expanding our collective ability to work.  
 The heart of the debate, within social theory, has been whether work is a funda-
mental aspect of human existence, to be celebrated, or a drudgery to be escaped, if possi-
ble. For much of human history, the daily work of individuals was directly connected to 
 
65. For an introduction to the world making aspects of Arendt, see Linda M. G. Zerilli, Feminism 
and the Abyss of Freedom (University Of Chicago Press, 2005). 









contesting nature for sustenance, and thus the weight of toil was inescapable. The move 
that Marx makes is not to redeem this biblical suffering in work, but rather reject it as a 
model for (certain types of) how people live in a capitalist system. For Marx, at least in 
the 1844 manuscripts, the problem with modern labor conditions is the problem of alien-
ated labor and surplus value, which the owner of the means of production is able to ex-
ploit from his workers. This is based fundamentally in the idea that workers produce 
more than the equivalent of what they need to live, and yet are remunerated only at that 
base level. Indeed, the idea of “profit” is housed in the idea that you can generate more 
than you will need to pay out in wages, although of course finance capitalism complicates 
Marx's picture considerably.  
 There does, however, seem to be differentiations we make between work that is 
meaningful and work that is mere drudgery, or done only for a wage. I think that this dis-
tinction is ultimately very important, but that our current orientation is overly dependent 
along a set of ideas about “vocation” developed from Martin Luther, and perhaps even 
Max Weber's exploration of the relationship of Protestantism and work. For Luther, work 
is intimately tied to the idea of a God-given vocation. There is theological tension be-
tween the idea of work as a calling from god and the dehumanizing labor that many per-
form.67 There is also the odd tension between the idea that each person has one calling, 
 










for life, and the frequency with which most individuals switch jobs, careers and homes.  
 In other words, we still run up against Aristotle’s problem, or the problem with 
Aristotle, which is that valuing political work has often occurred at the expense of other 
types of work. Even if we move from a vocational understanding of work, we will still 
want to be able to distinguish between work which is beneficial for individual human 
flourishing, and work that is not. This statement is not as straightforward as it seems, as 
one way of understanding work is to see society or humankind as a larger project, and the 
division of labor within it as relatively unproblematic. Aristotle is the most famous and 
earliest proponent of this idea, arguing that each part of the city is important to the whole. 
Of course, even in Aristotle, the contradiction between the idea that each part is important 
to the greater whole and the fact that some are honored and rewarded more than others 
rears its head, in the form of slavery. This is the same argument employed frequently by 
those resisting the claims of the excluded to full citizenship, whether they are enslaved, 
without land, or the wrong gender. When the excluded espouse the same sentiments as 
Aristotle, they are usually dismissed as ideologically co-opted, or otherwise unreliable.  
We have not solved Aristotle’s puzzle; there are situations in which we accept 
that the work of some will be hard, dangerous and unpleasant, for the good of all. One 
obvious case is that of women in the home. While there are plenty who contest claims 
that housework is hellish drudgery, most who defend homemaking as a fully equal posi-
tion do so on the basis of the entire project of creating a domestic family space, rather 









most of the bridges, sewer systems and other engineering marvels of the 20th century 
came at great cost in terms of human life, which is no surprise given the local and engi-
neering difficulties of these projects. These speakers did not understand their work as 
meaningless drudgery, which was additionally dangerous, but rather saw the end of the 
work as a broader project, indeed as essential to the growth of the city itself. Furthermore, 
just as some women speak about the deep satisfaction of raising children or running a 
household well, these workers speak also about the jobs in the physicality of their work. 
 The harder question is not whether we want to adopt Aristotle's ideas of natural 
slavery, and consign certain sets of workers officially to it. (Certainly, we do this without 
noticing all the time, given the relative scales of quality of life along the global supply 
chain, or the closer to home example of labor by non-citizens, which frequently occurs 
without legal protections for these works.) What the real problem lies is in how to differ-
entiate between meaningful work and meaningless work without either dissolving into 
vocational relativism which relies on subjective happiness (any job is good if you like it) 
or, alternately, adopting a system which takes up the traditional privileging of intellectual 
over manual, men over women, master over slave, white over various shades of brown. 
Even assuming that work can be categorized in this way seems odd, as the massive 
growth in the service industry, as well as the many communicative industries surrounding 
media and internet activity, has made a larger and larger share of the global population 









the intellectual elite who are profiting. Instead, we might see entertainment as the privi-
leged set of jobs, including sports stars as well as those in media. 
 Arendt is helpful in providing a new formulation of Aristotle’s puzzle, because 
she introduces into the equation a third term, separate from labor or politics: work. As 
noted, I reluctantly retain Arendt’s adoption of the split between work and labor- that of 
what creates the shared world in comparison with that which merely keeps us alive as 
animals, although I want to problematize how she applies this distinction. Where we 
draw the lines between labor and work, and how we value them, is a central problem for 
political theory. Definitions of work have consistently delineated political and class 
boundaries, so that frequently “labor” is characterized not in relation to its product or im-
portance to the larger human community, but rather in relation to who completes it. In 
particular, work has played a central role in producing gender roles, which then are re-
flected through prisms of class, race and other identity factors. Arendt rejects these sorts 
of classifications in theory, even as she struggles to do so in practice.  
This problem is difficult because to debate what is and is not work is already to 
privilege one type of human activity over another. Although some privilege is inevitable, 
this privileging should take place with full cognizance of what is at stake. To illustrate 
this, we can look at debates around human activity that has long been conceived as a nat-
uralized piece of family life, appropriate for women, slaves or underclass. The tension 
around work in the home that has been a central concern of feminist politics and theories 









taken the shape of a difference/equality argument, with one side arguing the work in the 
home ought to be valued in its own right, with the other suggesting that all individuals 
should have equal access to the privileged sphere of work and less responsibility in the 
labor department. Both sides of the argument have strengths. A central approach to gen-
der equality, theoretically and by activists, has been full access to the professional work 
that that women were formally blocked from, including efforts to gain equal pay for 
equal work. Critics of this liberal feminism, particularly women of color and queer theo-
rists, note that access to work is an issue for upper class white women whose role as 
housewives is a class-privilege even as it is limiting in relation to privileged men. Access 
to professional jobs, and the incumbent struggle over work/life balance, is not then the 
extent of the dilemma facing feminists and work. Instead, it is important to recognize the 
historical and ongoing association between class, immigration status, gender and particu-
lar kinds of work, and how they are rewarded.  
The heritage of care theory is taken up in relation to work by thinkers who reject 
the drive to push women into the traditional spheres of male influence, and instead advo-
cate revaluing labor that is currently understood as “not-work,” either because it is unre-
munerated in the home, or seen as unskilled.68 If this work were valued more, in mone-
 
68. Angela Davis puts this point most forcefully in her criticism of the “wages for housework” 
movement, which she faults for not recognizing the experiences of black and immigrant women who have 
long worked outside the home and still experience low wages and weak bargaining positions. “Quite a dif-
ferent story is told by the age-old struggles of the paid household worker, whose condition is more misera-
ble that any other group of workers under capitalism.” Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, & Class (Random 









tary terms, perhaps those who perform it would also be afforded greater public respect. 
Along with calls for wages for housework, care theorists have also studied occupational 
segregation and advocated for “equal worth” legislation that attempts to moderate market 
based compensation by mapping out the value produced by various types of labor, and 
advocating that those requiring similar levels of skill or producing similar levels of value 
be paid the same. This aims to discontinue a situation where jobs that are still predomi-




 It is clear from the proceeding that labor and work are deeply contested concepts 
in the actual world, and studying their contestation needs to become part of political theo-
ry as well. What follows is a record of their contestation, first through the way of demo-
cratic theory and the contemporary challenges of work to these theories, then through his-
torical case studies which provide models for changing definitions of work and citizen-
ship, and finally via Arendt, who opens up new possibilities of building on these models 
to advance constitutive work while valuing labor.  I end with some arguments about the 
economic and social policies, as well as institutional arrangements, that will support such 









CHAPTER TWO: WHERE IS WORK IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY? 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Argument   
 
  
 To understand how work/labor hierarchies relate to political citizenship theoreti-
cally, I explore what sort of political work is promoted and assumed by prominent demo-
cratic theorists. I look not at theories that consider work, but rather those which ignore it, 
or, as I will claim, assume it takes a certain form without exploring what such a designa-
tion means for the those understood to be undertaking the wrong work. I look specifically 
at theorists of the public sphere, which I see as central to the main variations of democrat-
ic theory today. The strongest proponents of democratic theory are all guilty of this, to a 
great extent because they begin their investigations by assuming that there is politics on 
one side and the economy on the other. Or, even worse, that when they do meet, the polit-
ical is subsumed by the economic. This understanding of society is not neutral, but 
emerges in part from a neo-liberal naturalization of economics that holds onto the idea 
that politics is a human construct, under our control.69 Looking for the connections be-
tween the world of work and politics, even in theories that focus only on the latter, helps 
us see the importance of bringing these connections to light if we wish to understand ei-
 
69. This may be part of a larger epistemological problem, as explored in the critique of modernity 
in Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, 2012). Latour’s actor/network 
theory could provide fruitful resources for asking how the public is built, given his interest in hybrid forms, 










ther category, much less counter their false separation. What emerges is that work is al-
ready always part of democratic theories, in that each assumes that a space for democratic 
activity, as well as the reproductive labor that sustains citizens and constitutions, is al-
ready in progress.  
While contemporary democratic theory is often characterized as experiencing an 
“ethical”  “dialogical,” or “agnostic” turn, all of these trends take place within a broader 
paradigm of democratic public sphere. While the public sphere concept has been fruitful 
in many ways, it can easily fade into the background so that questions of the conditions 
of its appearance and maintenance go unasked. This chapter traces the place of the public 
sphere in three prominent forms of democratic theory, seeking to identify how public 
spheres are created in each. My claim is that democratic theorists too easily take for 
granted the existence and maintenance of public spheres, moving quickly into disagree-
ments on what happens within these spaces, and that attention to the work of building 
public spheres. Understanding where this work fits into contemporary democratic theory 
brings to the forefront the necessity of attending to it.  
 This chapter thus proceeds first by exploring the origins of public sphere concept 
in the work of Jürgen Habermas, as well as related lines of thinking that emerge from 
American sources. While Habermas himself problematizes the historically specific crea-
tion of the public sphere, at least in his early work, many adopters of his ideas leave be-
hind this problematic as they adopt the concept to suit contemporary idioms. Indeed, a 









ence of media networks and speedy information sharing, although Habermas’ concept is 
premised rather on complex (and contradictory) relationships between economic and po-
litical life. I then look at three core concepts of democracy key to current debates: partici-
patory, deliberative and agnostic, examining each for a conception, or lack of conception, 
of the origin of public spheres and for the type of citizenship work it understands as key. 
Each relies on a particular conception of the type of political work that is required; they 
all configure the normative citizens as one engaged in waged labor that gives him the 
skills, particularly language based ones, independence, signaled in terms of property and 
wealth, and pre-formed public space in which to act politically. Where is the citizen who 
is outside these spaces, or what happens when these spaces do not exist? These are the 
questions that remain in democratic theory without consideration of work. First, as politi-
cal work that creates, maintains or takes part in public spheres; second, work done to 
maintain life or for a paycheck, which provides an ethos and a status from which to claim 
political membership (or a space in the public sphere). Strangely enough, Habermas him-
self points the way towards an answer, in his understanding that public spheres are built 
both intentionally and to meet the needs of citizens who are conflicted between their so-











2.2 How Habermasian Public Spheres Are Built 
 
 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, since its translation into Eng-
lish in the early 1990s, has inspired a lively line of inquiry.70 Habermas’ early work at-
tracted many thinkers, who were not necessarily entranced by his recent writing that fur-
ther developed arguments about public reason, the European Union and religion.71 The 
reasons for this are complex, but in part emerge from the closer resemblance to critical 
theory in his early writing, even though Adorno and Horkheimer famously rejected Struc-
tural Transformation as a dissertation project as overly pessimistic about the possibilities 
 
70. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Cat-
egory of Bourgeois Society (The MIT Press, 1991). This was his habilitationscrift, or dissertation type pro-
ject, undertaken at the famed Frankfurt School under critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno. For a selec-
tion of essays that epitmoze this research, see Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT 
Press, 1992) or the more recent: Craig Calhoun, Eduardo Mendieta, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, eds., 
Habermas and Religion (Wiley, 2013) which goes beyond Structural Transformation, but also looks back 
at the place of religion in this early work.  
71. His masterworks are: Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1: Reason and 
the Rationalization of Society (Beacon Press, 1985) and The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 2: 
Lifeword and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Beacon Press, 1985), followed up by an applica-
tion of his discourse theory to religion in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy (Mit Press, 1998) and Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays 
(Polity, 2008). Religious questions are clearly important to him in part because of their role in discussions 
of the European Constitutionalism see: Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project (Polity, 2009). For ethi-
cal considerations, including religion, see The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. 









of democracy.72 Structural Transformation is central for understanding contemporary 
democratic theory not only because of its influence on other writers, but because it show 
how participatory and potentially powerful democracy is constituted in a particular his-
torical moment by a particular (bourgeois) class, and identifies this sort of democratic 
space as lacking in our own time.  
 The basis of Structural Transformation is the study of a particular “event” in the 
history of democracy, which serves to illuminate the broader meaning and possibility of 
democratic life. The concept of a public sphere emerges in a specific historical and socio-
economic context, and yet provides a certain model of discursivity and publicity that can 
serve as models for a robust public power today. In the idealized public sphere, all marks 
of status and identity are bracketed, and individuals met as equals in discourse. This lib-
eral public sphere, which formed in opposition to autocratic rulers, transformed political 
power from a top-down projection from the rules into a interactive discourse by the citi-
zens, who engaged in the unprecedented “people’s public use of their reason.”73 In his 
reading, this public sphere emerges along with market economies and the accompanying 
 
72 .There is some evidence that Adorno would have accepted it in order to keep working with Ha-
bermas, while Horkheimer was worried that Habermas’ work induced “a kind of class study in a tea cup” at 
the Institute. Rolf Wiggerhaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance (MIT 
Press, 1995), 555.  









flow of information, particularly written information, circulating through European socie-
ty.74  
This public sphere is inhabited by particular citizens who emerge also from the 
growing mercantile class and the erosion of the unquestioned identification of the monar-
chy with political power. This citizen is “bourgeois,” although the importance of this fact 
is that bourgeois life provides the incentives and conditions that produce critical orienta-
tions towards texts and, eventually, power. To a certain extent, Habermas must be relying 
on a Marxist understanding of the bourgeois as a class situated in a relation of ownership 
to productive capital, but he also seems to be drawing on a sociological understanding of 
the shift from feudalism to capitalism. The “thoroughly bourgeois idea of the freely self-
actualizing personality” typifies the general worldview of this subject, reflecting in Ha-
bermas’ understanding that non-nobles cannot rest on inherited status, but must produce 
themselves constantly.75 This means that the bourgeois citizen must be constantly on the 
offensive, working to protect his position or advance it. To this end, he participates in 
“the traffic in news” which circulates constantly, providing common language, narratives 
and even syntax for those who read them, so that these flows are the real carrier of the 
public, which from the outset was a reading public.”76 Information is important not for its 
 
74. Habermas develops these claims through a primarily genealogical project that traces the emer-
gence of a public sphere in Europe in the 16th century, and then briefly suggests the contemporary rele-
vance of the public sphere as an aspirational model for contemporary democratic governments. 
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own sake, but because, without the structure of feudalism, these elites depended in part 
on the actions of the government to preserve their places. Therefore, they needed to at-
tend (and eventually criticize, together) state policies, particularly in relation to com-
merce and consumption. 
Along with the imperative to consume and recirculate information, the bourgeois 
citizen is also a private family man, who comes into the public sphere from the safe space 
of the conjugal family, where Habermas also locates the precursor to the political public 
sphere: the literary public sphere epitomized by salon culture. In this arena, what matters 
is ones interpretation of the text or a clever bon mot, and social mobility is attached to 
critical ability and wit.  From literary and artistic culture emerge the distinctive character 
of the bourgeois (political) public sphere as a space where status is disregarded, contesta-
tion is the norm, centered around a principle of inclusiveness.77 This disregarding of sta-
tus and money is a fiction, yet a fiction that allows these spaces to flourish.  Certainly, it 
is the growing wealth and status of this class that allows for the production of salon cul-
ture, which also hinges on the productive ability of women. Similarly, the bourgeois fam-
ily is understood as a voluntary association, built on love and supporting the cultivation 
of an autonomous self.78 Yet families too are economic units, whose interests must be 
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advanced, even as they must be understood in non-economic terms to deserve the support 
of the head of household. This cocoon of family life nurtures the ability of public sphere 
citizens to see themselves as relating purely as humans with each other, outside of the 
bounds of commodification or ascribed status. The public sphere is thus based on a citi-
zen who is in self-contradiction: on one hand, a literary critic who relates to others purely 
as a human, and on the other as an economic being seeking to protect or advance his own 
interests and that of his family. He is, in a sense, the conflation of human interest, or pub-
lic interests, with private interest- and in the peculiar historical context of the fall of mer-
cantilism, this conflation is only self-contradictory in its (massive) exclusion of those like 
women and dependents. 
In other words, the public sphere citizen is a member of a relative elite, although 
perceiving this elite status as fundamentally self-made. He is presumed to be a literate 
head of household with a family, who has substantive interests at stake in the outcomes of 
political decisions. He has learned criticalness and the ability to speak on a plane of 
equality from literary public spheres, and applies this sort of procedure to political power 
without questioning whether the relationships of intimacy and interests of humanity con-
flict with political relationships or economic self-interest. In order to pursue these inter-
ests, the public sphere citizen engages in a critical publicity that makes visible and cri-









possesses “public reason,” of course, and engages in “critical-rational public debate.79 His 
first task is “critical public scrutiny,” of informing himself about political happenings and 
forming an opinion.80 His opinion is not merely private, however, but is understood as the 
raw material that, through discussion in public sphere, will become true public opinion 
through “the critical reflections of a public competent to form its own judgments.”81 The 
central activities of this citizen are critical discourse on public opinion. 
Habermas makes it clear that the emergence of this subject is concurrent with, and 
in fact dependent on, the market economy in general and specifically, the commodifica-
tion of wealth and property that severs their ties to status.82 Indeed, he notes that this pub-
lic sphere functioned on “the identification of “property owner” with “human being as 
such.”83 Thus those without property are merely potential citizens who “with talent, in-
dustry and luck” may sometime become full members of the political community, but 
until then are superfluous in terms of democracy.84 Along with his activities as a citizen, 
individuals must then also be active economically, either expanding or protecting their 
assets. Their political standing, while supposedly free of domination itself and seeking to 
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apply the same principles to the state, depends on their productive capacities, such that all 
those who are unproductive (and thus dependent) can be excluded without friction from 
the concept of the citizen. 
Along with who the citizen is and what he does, inside and outside of the public 
sphere, it is also important to consider where the bourgeois public sphere citizen speaks 
and deliberates politically. As implied above, the importance of perceived separation be-
tween private and public spheres is important for Habermas’ understanding of the spatial 
elements of publicity. As a sphere, it is an organ of the state, which needs a mechanism 
through which it can receive public opinion, but at the same time it is an organ that func-
tions, at least ideally, independently of either state or family. However, the public space, 
while modeled on the salons and perhaps occurring in salon like atmospheres, is not 
strictly physical, but should really be understood as a network, a word that Habermas 
does not use.85  It is properly understood as a network because it is the constantly circula-
tion of news and opinions that provides the material from which public opinion is fash-
ioned. The public sphere is a place in which status is bracketed, and humans interact with 
each other as humans, deciding on the basis of public rationality rather than an objective 
consideration. It is a free circulation of ideas. The naturalized conception of the free mar-
ket as a place of open competition was adopted in the space of the public sphere, which 











presumed natural status). The public sphere is built through the tension in its members, 
who have an interest in protecting their private interests, yet also a tendency to proceed 
via the norms of critical debate. Thus the citizen is, for Habermas, bourgeois, and the 
space in which he acts politically through discourse is made possible by and in some 
sense for the sake of economic activity, aided by the need of the newly destabilized state 
to respond to public opinion. 
The second half of Habermas’ book traces how this type of public sphere, which 
only served its critical function in relation to a certain type of social-political configura-
tion, is transformed through the development of pluralistic public spheres, mass media, 
the culture industry and general widening of the political space to include those classes 
and genders previously excluded. What results is a depoliticized public where tastes and 
opinions are exchanged, without the development of critical public opinion, and with the 
weak show of electoral politics standing in for representation. Habermas thus must ask 
whether the public sphere is possible as a model for democratic renewal in a world where 
the “mutual penetration of state and society” makes even the illusion of an independent 
public sphere unrealistic.86 
In order to hold up the model of the bourgeois public sphere citizen for contempo-
rary democratic theory, its accompanying exclusions merit consideration. First, the al-
ready mentioned classist nature of this sphere is particularly meaningful for societies that 
 









struggle with massive poverty and unemployment, which is most of the world. Even if we 
drew the line around property ownership very broadly, and allowed for debt-holders (who 
cannot emancipate themselves from dependence) into this group, a vast majority of the 
world does not possess the basic material or educational goods that would produce the 
tension that sustains debate in the public sphere. Second, the political public sphere had 
little space for women, and none for children. They are associated both with the private 
space of the household and by definition (and law) dependent. This exclusion of course 
reflects the association of the masculine body and mind with universality; it is seen as 
logical that a group of men can bracket identity, but womanness cannot be bracketed, as 
it is visible deviance from the norm. The same can be said of race, given the Northern 
European origins of this concept, or disability, or sexuality or any other marker of identi-
ty politics. While Habermas does not discuss it, we might also wonder what role the old, 
particularly given the association of age with infirmity and senility, would have in a pub-
lic focused on sharp debate. It is also assumed that the bearer of this citizenship has a le-
gal right to work and participate where he lives, unlike refugees or undocumented immi-
grants. The last exclusion is interesting, and betrays the cracks in the concept that eventu-
ally allow for some of the excluded groups to work their way in; without status, one 
earned his or her way into citizenship, rather than inheriting. Thus anyone devoted purely 
to leisure, such as those in the nobility or, now, the unemployed “slacker” or welfare 









Thus the key problematic for a contemporary revival of the public sphere is its or-
igins in the tension between life as a producer or as a private economic person and life as 
a citizen. As Habermas suggests, it is the ability in public life to ignore the sources of ma-
terial support that makes public sphere citizenship possible. The ability to gain wealth 
and property makes the maintenance of a household which can uphold the illusion of in-
dependence from need possible, which itself fosters the illusion that political space is 
self-sustaining, even as the impetus for entering political society is the advancement of 
economic interests, even if one then must bracket these interests in public deliberations. 
Even if Habermas is correct in supposing that a norm of ignoring status was possible in 
the public sphere, certainly the way that each citizen spends his life must have real effects 
on his skills, and even his physical presence, and perhaps also his political ideology. In 
the bourgeois example, there is the suggestion that the rather contingent situation where 
economic interests demanded an increase of freedom and the subordination of pure power 
to rationality- perhaps this same contingency meant that the occupants of the bourgeois 
public sphere were, given their small size and relative homogeneity, situated as equals in 
terms of skills, resources and ability to express their ideas in terms of public rationality. 
There is, however, no way to hold onto this homogeneity as a restricted public 









times in voices that are strange to the bourgeois ear.87 We might instead wonder about the 
formation of publics that have a contested relationship with the public sphere, which we 
might think of as multiple publics or, if opposed to the mass public sphere itself, counter-
publics.88 Even in this idea of counterpublics, however, the question of their formation 
lingers. If they are no longer about shared attempts to arrest and make visible the work-
ings of power, but instead culturally or socially diverse alternativeness to political public 
spheres, they may function to shore up identity and solidarity within themselves, without 
necessarily bearing much relationship to politics. The question of how to build networks 
between counterpublics becomes an important question for political theory. For Haber-
mas, the problem of linking counterpublics would be a nice problem to have; instead, he 
describes a world of mass citizens, or non-citizens, populating mass public spheres and 
responding to the advertising produced instead of rational discourse. And it is this citizen, 
as well as social space, which we must confront if we wish to hold a public sphere as an 
ideal. Indeed, Habermas himself gives us a great deal to think about in this vein, given 
that his overall portrayal of the current status of political life is rather bleak. In his later 
work, however, he does not pursue the problem of citizenship in mass democracies or the 
 
87. This is the powerful point of Nancy Fraser’s influential critique of Habermas, and particularly 
of uncritical adoptions of the bourgeois public sphere citizen model. She “entertain[s] serious doubts about 
a conception of the public sphere that purports to bracket, rather than to eliminate, structural social inequal-
ities” and thus proposes that public sphere thinking should uncover and display how inequality affects pub-
lic spheres  (“"Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actual Existing Democracy, 
in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. 121)  
 
88. These are referred to as “Subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel dis-
cursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to 









exclusions discussed above, but instead pursues the concept of critical rationality through 
a conception of “ideal speech”. A full reading of his later work would take up an entire 
dissertation; my overall argument is not, however, about the Habermasian citizen but ra-
ther how the problematic model of the bourgeois public sphere citizen is carried over into 
contemporary political theory, albeit under other names. After discussing this importation, 
I will return to Habermas’ own diagnosis of the problems with citizenship in mass de-
mocracies as an orientation forward. 
2.3 Participation without Transformation  
 
Participatory Democrats advance a broad set of ideas, but as the name suggests 
their central argument is that citizens should be more actively involved in democratic de-
cision-making and governance. This strand of democratic theory (re)emerges in the 
1960's, often taking its bearings from John-Jacques Rousseau or Alexis de Tocqueville.  
Given the low levels of voter turnout in the Global North, as well as consistently low rat-
ings of citizen efficacy, considering the importance of citizen participation in the formal 
political space makes sense. For some, this expresses a deep commitment to liberalism, 
seen as resting fundamentally on the participation and confidence of citizens. For others, 
participatory democracy is a full-blown critique of liberal thought, perceived as overly 
confident that citizens could devote their lives to non-political concerns, while retaining 
protection of the property and selves, and retaining limited government.  
Participatory democratic theory is part of the renaissance of political theory that 









Political Science as a whole and partly to role of social movements and citizen activism 
in society. In part, participatory democrats critique elitist models of democracy in favor 
of direct involvement of citizens, in part to correct inequalities evident in areas such as 
gendered pay gaps.89 Or, participatory democrats might advocate for “strong democracy,” 
which features “the participation of all of the people in at least some aspects of self-
government at least some of the time.”90 The focus is on increased democratization and a 
rejection of representation as sufficient for democratic life.  
     These and other neo-Tocquevillian approaches to participation accept liberal 
premises and political institutions in general, but argue that they can only function 
properly when citizens act in certain ways, and develop a commitment to shared political 
life.91 Some of these concerns find echoes in contemporary participatory democrats who 
 
89. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970) 
argues that liberal theory cannot justify the obligations it puts on citizens, in particular in its iterations via 
elite democratic theory such as that of Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Psy-
chology Press, 2012; Gaetano Mosca, Ruling Class (McGraw-Hill Inc.,US, 1960); and Robert Michels, 
Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Hearst’s 
International Library Company, 1915). She advocates instead a model of participatory government devel-
oped from the experience of worker’s councils, seeking “the feeling that political and social change is pos-
sible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” Pateman, Participation, 
46. 
90. Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, Twentieth-
Anniversary Edition, With a New Preface, 20 Anv (University of California Press, 2004), 44.  
91. Alexis de Tocqueville, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop, Democracy in America, 
2002. For Tocqueville, the tyranny of the majority is curbed when the populace engages in meaningful lo-
cal political affairs because their spirit nutures democratic life, spend time serving on juries which are “one 
of the most efficacious means society can make use of for the education of the people, cultivates an en-
lightened self-interest and commercial spirit, curbs his worst tendencies through the moderating influence 












explicitly draw on Tocqueville in their work, arguing for the centrality of mores and rela-
tionships.92 These approaches offer variations on participatory democracy focused on civ-
il society and activity that is not expressly political, but may be religious or social with 
side benefits for democracy. In this view, citizens cultivate community through voluntary 
associations; they gain trust and become more likely to participate. 
The who and what of participatory democracy seem initially to contain everyone, 
given that a primarily basis for criticisms of aggregative, representative and elite demo-
cratic systems are their rejection of democratic equality, and the requirement that good 
regimes require good (active) citizens. However, the citizen is still assumed to have a cer-
tain sort of skills, and be a certain sort of person. Above all, the citizen must gain the type 
of independence that allows for political activity, both in the material sense of providing 
the time for this action and in the sense of the mental capacities required for democratic 
judgment. The participatory citizen must also be able to reflect on his or her interests in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
proval and she raises children to cultivate good mores. His overall prescriptions are complex, so that while 
the message that citizen participation, focused on the town meeting, is often taken to be his central mes-
sage, this is less clear upon reviewing the entire text. (ibid., 63-65, 262, 275, 560).  
92. For an exploration of the complex relationship between communal and individual understand-
ings of the common good, softly suggesting that democratic renewal requires the cultivation of "habits of 
the heart" which are not merely those of private citizens, see Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life, Upd Sub (University of California Press, 1996). Or, re-
view Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, 1st ed. 
(Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster, 2001)., suggesting that trust is only possible in democracies 









way that goes beyond expressing preferences, and this habitual reflection may engage 
religious or philosophical doctrines.93  
The secondary activities of these citizens, or perhaps the assumptions about who 
they are, relate closely to the Habermasian arguments about the bourgeois public sphere 
citizen, although perhaps less restricted by race or gender. The participatory citizen is still 
assumed to be a legal member of the political community, with the free time and re-
sources to increase his or her involvement in politics. While the importance of political 
justification through the use of public reason is not central, each participatory theorist 
spends a great deal of time on education, noting that participatory politics hinges on hav-
ing politically literate citizens who can exercise judgment and speak their opinion. In this, 
they take the ancient ideal of the noble citizen and seek to apply it broadly, just as the 
progressive thinkers did in the 1920s. 
Indeed, we might take a cue from Habermas, who suggests that it is the very non 
public interest in advancing oneself economically and socially that moves individuals in-
to the public sphere; lacking this, what would induce a mass citizen to participate politi-
cally, inside or outside of the formal institutions of politics? A different way to put this is 
to suggest that the Habermasian solution to Aristotle’s problem is a tenuous one, which 
 
93. J. Mansbridge, “Does Participation Make Better Citizens?,” The Good Society 5, no. 2 (1995): 
1–7. argues theoretically that participation makes us better citizens as our activities refine and clarify our 
understandings of the world and our relationship to it, so it is possible that this problem is partially amelio-










has not yet been shown to function in the contemporary world of mass democracy. His-
torically, the labor movement has provided a vehicle for organizing and advancing the 
interests of the average worker in the political space, providing for the possibility that 
political activity came with the potential for efficacy. While labor unions are not as dead 
as some quarters might like us to believe, the clout they once had with government insti-
tutions has been eroded over the past thirty years, and trends towards eliminating collec-
tive bargaining rights for even public employees, expanding “right-to-work” states and of 
course bypassing unions altogether by offshoring production continue. Within the aegis 
of a Labor Union, workers were validated as political subjects whose status as workers 
meant they were equal within the political space, just as in the Habermasian space. How-
ever, this linkage also connected worth and political membership with waged labor and 
productivity, and thus linked unemployment, or work that could not be unionized, like 
domestic work, to the non-political space of the household. Without the creation of net-
works like the labor union, participatory democracy cannot sustain itself, given the con-
tradictions between advancing economic or other interests and building a status free pub-
lic sphere.  
 This lack is echoed in the focus of participatory democracy on taking part in al-
ready existing government institutions, although it is often suggested that participation 
will transform society as a whole- and some theorists offer alternative spaces, such as 
civil society or even the workplace. The participatory citizen acts through established po-









takes the form of voting, advocating for candidates or policies, attending town meetings, 
volunteering for elections or civic events and decision-making, either directly or through 
representatives. Note that this model is not the same as representative or elite democracy; 
the decisions of citizens must have efficacy for this system to work. Still, the importance 
of citizen-driven initiatives and public spheres (like Labor Unions), which balance the 
fragile tension between economic and political life is lacking from contemporary democ-
racy, limiting its efficacy.  
 
2.4 Does Deliberation provide a Transformative Alternative?  
 
 
Although critical of participatory democracy, its heir, deliberative democracy, 
borrows some of its worldview and goals. Deliberative democrats sought to set them-
selves apart from participatory types in the 1980s and 1990s. While deliberation divorces 
democratic theory somewhat from existing power hierarchies, it does not elucidate how 
to create robust spaces for democratic work, or address the problem of labor introduced 
by Aristotle. Their most common early critique centered around the feasibility of wide-
scale participation at various levels of government, an argument that suggested that the 
earlier theories lacked a realistic understandings of the complexity of governance and al-
so responding to the work of Habermas discussed above.  In a sense, deliberative theo-
rists question the attractiveness of participation at all levels or sites of governance, and 
instead argue for practices of democratic contestation that enhance citizen efficacy and 









sources, that humans desire to act politically and will do so once barriers to this action, 
such as lack of education or leisure time, are removed.94 In this view, quantity of partici-
pation should be seen as less important than the quality of the participation, and it should 
be focused where citizens can recognize a high degree of efficacy. Deliberative institu-
tions should contest the state, but not expect to radically transform either society or citi-
zen through their operation.95 Instead, they encourage the pluralistic sites of contestation 
appropriate for contemporary mass democracies.96 Along with interest in procedures that 
manage pluralism, deliberative democratic theory is motivated in part by concerns that 
participatory norms fail to address the power and resource inequality of actual citizens, 
particularly the place of marginalized groups to contest the coercion of the majority.97 
 
94. Mark E. Warren, “What Should We Expect from More Democracy?: Radically Democratic 
Responses to Politics,” Political Theory 24, no. 2 (May 1, 1996): 241–270. 
95 . See James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (The MIT 
Press, 2000)., where he argues that the idealized goals of participatory democrats emerging from the Frank-
furt School is thus much more harmful than the modest goals of deliberation.  
96. Seyla Benahabib, “The Democratic Moment and Problem of Difference” in Seyla Benhabib, 
Democracy and Difference (Princeton University Press, 1996,) 3-18. 
97. Jane Mansbridge “Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity” in Seyla Benhabib, Democracy 
and Difference (Princeton University Press, 1996), 46-66.  questions whether participatory norms signifi-
cantly address the power and resource inequality of actual citizens, particularly the place of marginalized 









John Rawls turn from defending a single theory of justice to discussing public 
reason and pluralism98 might rightfully be seen as the start of the turn to deliberative the-
orizing, echoed by the work on deliberation in Congress,99 especially as opposed to in a 
constitutional court in a society with fundamental disagreements.100 Even more common-
ly, deliberative democrats focus on popular adoptions of the idea, in "associations where 
affairs are governed by public deliberation of its members."101 Some explore this through 
experiments in direct consultation of the public through innovative processes like citizen 
juries or deliberative polling.102 The values of deliberative democracy center around "re-
sponsiveness", ultimately defined as "a form of government in which free and equal citi-
zens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one an-
other reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of 
 
98. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1995). For a consideration of 
public reason, if not for the text as a whole, see also, Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited”, 1st ed. (Harvard University Press, 2001). 
99. J. Bessette, “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government,” 
How Democratic Is the Constitution 102 (1980): 109–11; The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democ-
racy and American National Government (University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
100. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 1999. 
101. Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in James Bohman and William 
Rehg, Deliberative Democracy (MIT Press, 1997), 67. 
102. James S Fishkin and Robert C Luskin, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative 
Polling and Public Opinion,” Acta Politica 40, no. 3 (2005): 284–298, 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500121;FISHKIN, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public 
Consultation, Har/DVD (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009); Fishkin and Peter Laslett, Debating Delib-












reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge 
in the future."103 Thus it is at once a more and less demanding practice of democracy that 
participatory ideals are.  
To a great extent, deliberation is an epistemic ideal, which helps brings a polity 
closer to a truer or better answer, even if individuals themselves would be incapable of 
the same reasoning process.104 This process may expose shared moral commitments un-
derlying our deep disagreements105 and also develop the capacity of the citizen to take an 
impartial view of questions.106 This ideal can also be pursued in the legislature, 107 be-
tween institutions,108 or within one's own mind.109 What holds these approaches together, 




103. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Frank Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 11; Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University 
Press, 2004). 
104. Robert B. Talisse, “Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?,” Critical Re-
view 16, no. 4 (2004): 455–463, doi:10.1080/08913810408443619. 
105. Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
106. Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (Yale University Press, 
1998). 
107. “A central problem, therefore, in the design of democratic regimes is how to ensure that the 
lefislautre engages in delbiertive ways of lawmaking, not to the exclusion of other modes of lawmaking, 
but at least on those occasions when the public interest is at stake.” Stephen L. Elkin “” in Stephen L. Elkin 
and Karol Edward Sołtan, Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions, 1999, 388.  
108. Jeffrey K. TULLIS, Deliberating Between INSTITUTIONS IN James S. Fishkin and Peter 









besides the obvious ideal of deliberation, is attentiveness to process as key to democratic 
life.  
The deliberative citizen is unsurprisingly like the Bourgeois Public Sphere citizen, 
although these theorists are much more explicitly concerned with how to integrate differ-
ence and expose or question structural inequalities of power. While the participatory 
democrats called for participation by all at every level, deliberative democrats have a 
more modest requirement that some citizens deliberate sometimes, and only through as-
sociations or institutions which are responsive to this deliberation and also able to call the 
government to account. We still might wonder if it is easier for cultural and economic 
elites to occupy sites of deliberation than it is for the majority of citizens; or, alternatively, 
we might ask what incentive there is for deliberating (given the apparently unattractive-
ness of the Civic Republican ideal of placing the state above oneself). The deliberative 
citizen needs deliberation skills, and although the different theorists disagree as to what 
degree deliberation itself teaches these skills, there is an assumption that deliberators will 
be generally educated. Indeed, one of the problematic aspects of a democratic theory 
based in speech acts is the difficulty in fending off claims that language itself is inscribed 
with historical dominations and reflects the hegemony of certain classes, races and gen-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
109. Robert E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Delib-










ders. It is assumed that the deliberator speaks fluent English, or whatever majority lan-
guage of the country in question, and recognizes “reason” when he or she sees it. Without 
adopting a full-blown critique of language or reason, it is still easy to see how actual citi-
zens might differ greatly in their abilities to express their ideas in the mode of public rea-
son. 
Typical critiques of the deliberative turn often take up these issues of exclusion or 
buried structural inequalities, which are paralleled by the work of critical legal studies 
theorists who argue that the long history of jurisprudence covers over the acting of power 
and privilege through law and its assumptions.110 It also often criticized for lacking attun-
ement to the desires of actual citizens, despite its claims to democratic ideals111 or even of 
conflating democratic ideals with those of justice.112 We also might wonder if there are 
non-deliberative pieces of politics which are part of any democratic regime, deliberative 
or not, particularly political education, organizing, mobilizing, demonstrating, making 
statements, debating, bargaining, lobbying, campaigning, voting, corruption, scut work, 
 
110. See Jodi Dean, Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy (Cornell 
University Press, 2002) for claims that the drive for publicity and the model of rational deliberation is itself 
a derivative of capitalist technoculture centered on spectacle. 
111. Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 25, no. 3 (June 1, 1997): 347–
376. 
112. Peter Berkowitz, “The Demagoguery of Democratic Theory,” Critical Review 15, no. 1–2 










and ruling.113 This list is descriptive rather than normative, as evidenced by the mention 
of corruption, but points to the very real existence of "scut work"; that is, the boring and 
seemingly non-political tasks required for all human activity, such as reserving the room 
in which to deliberate. 
Just as with participatory and Habermasian citizenship, deliberative democracy 
cannot give an account for how deliberation as an epistemological practice or legitima-
tion device can function without considering the importance of economic life, and in par-
ticular the life of the workplace. The first reason why this consideration ought to be im-
portant for deliberative democrats is the central importance of who citizens are and what 
their capabilities may be for deliberation. Most deliberators do not adopt Habermas’ 
claims about the bracketability of identity, even if these were convincing. In particular, 
some competencies may be made particularly unlikely by the very systems they are 
meant to engage114.  
Furthermore, deliberation must take place in a space, both in the sense that it 
needs a physical or virtual locale where individuals can gather (a public, if you will) and 
this space must be meaningfully connected to governing bodies. It thus matters if the 
 
113. Michael Walzer, “Deliberation and What Else?” in Stephen Macedo, Deliberative Politics: 
Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), 58-69. 
114. James A Gardner, “Shut up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of 
Talk,” Tennessee Law Review 63 (1996 1995): 421. He argued early on that deliberation is likely to pro-









public spaces available are owned or controlled by commercial or government interests, 
or limited by judicial reframing of free speech rights, as discussed in the final chapter.  
However, deliberation is not impossible, and it does occur under certain circumstances; 
the key is to expand the space for deliberation in spaces where it makes sense, while 
avoiding eviscerating other methods of political activity, particularly dissent, which is 
most vulnerable to competition from consensus style decision making. 
 
2.5 Anti-Liberalism and the place of Emotions in Agonistic Democracy 
 
For some, this consensus is understood as impossible or rather not a goal at all, 
and they argue that the deliberative turn represents a milquetoast version of liberalism 
which lacks the fiber to produce either freedom or politics as a normative ideal.115  De-
scribed by some as “radical democracy,” I organize these oppositional approaches “ago-
nistic” because the term radical positions itself automatically outside, or perhaps to the 
left, of the others, without substantiating this claim. Agonism, as foretold by its roots in 
the Greek word for struggle, focuses on aesthetic, affective and practical conflicts as 
sources for democratic renewal and freedom. In particular, agonistic democrats attempt to 
 
115. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2000). She argues for “the incapacity of 










resist what they see as totalizing impulse of rational discourse and consensus making116. 
There is also a strong influence of critical theory in this body of work, linking the anti-
universalist orientation to analysis of culture and society, and to the task of developing 
ideas that are both explanatory and normative.117  
 In terms of democratic theory, the approach of agnostic democrats often starts 
from exposing or undermining the central premises of both deliberative democratic theo-
ry and the same theories deliberation sets itself against, such as participatory or repre-
sentative government, and constitutionalism itself. Much of their critiques are intelligent, 
and echo the concerns raised above about the potential of deliberation to cultivate the sort 
of citizenship we need (particularly given the lack of space for deliberation). For a politi-
cal theory of work, agonistic democrats are allies of a sort, with the caveat that beyond 
critiques, we also need to figure out what sort of institutions allows citizens to flourish, 
even if these institutions are understood as flexible and creative.  
The most prominent approach to agonistic pluralism is that of Chantal Mouffe, 
developed in part through her work with Ernesto Laclau, but more directly in her solo 
 
116. In this, they mirror what might be casually termed a postmodern orientation in continental 
and post-Marxist philosophy, particularly thinking that takes its bearings from Heidegger, Nietzsche, Fou-
cault, Derrida and Deleuze and reads back through these recent thinkers to figures like Kant and Hegel. 
 
117. Critical theory, in a strict sense, often refers to students and teachers of the Frankfurt School, 
most particularly Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin- and their student 
Jürgen Habermas, and his student, (current director of the Institut für Sozialforschung) Axel Honneth. 
However, it also shares much with other strands of political theory with less directly German lineages, from 
the Critical Legal Studies movement of the 1990's in law programs, to much feminist theory, , to some va-










efforts.118 What is important is that they insist that the formation of "antagonism", which 
is unpredictable and always socially concrete, occurs when identity is threatened.119 The-
se social antagonisms can be resolved progressively or not, and they ask leftists to link up 
these concrete struggles in a "war of position" and coalition building.120 Agonism is un-
derstood as inherent to a world of class conflict and struggles over what concepts will 
form our common political discourse.  
 
118. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. (Verso, 2001). This text contests the political primacy of class consciousness 
and instead advocating a practice of hegemony generated from the work of Antonio Gramsci. While the 
practical import of their argument is that a progressive alliance of various groups is made possible through 
the construction of shared signifiers, the technical arguments are highly complex and deeply housed in the 
theories of Heidegger and Lacan, the exploration of which is not useful for my project.  
119. For example, the disruption of Tsarist peasants as Russia became capitalist or workers when 
hours are extended during industrialization create friction and contestation. 
120. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 23. One might see this as the same 
task that feminist theorists of intersectionality, the linked and complex relationship between different op-
pressions, assume when they advocate coalition building. For example: Jill M. Bystydzienski and Steven P. 
Schacht, Forging Radical Alliances Across Difference: Coalition Politics for the New Millennium (Row-
man & Littlefield, 2001); Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, Strategic Alliances: Coalition Build-
ing and Social Movements (U of Minnesota Press, 2010); Thomas Wolff et al., Coalition Building: One 
Path to Empowered Communities (AHEC/Community Partners, 1992). For colitiion building across racial 
divides, try Taunya Lovell Banks, “Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala, 
Barriers to Coalition Building,” Asian Law Journal 5 (1998): 7; for class, Fred Rose, Coalitions Across the 
Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements (Cornell University Press, 
2000); gender, Janet Conway, “Transnational Feminisms Building Anti-Globalization Solidarities,” Glob-
alizations 9, no. 3 (2012): 379–393, doi:10.1080/14747731.2012.680731, and global divides, see Rodríguez 
Garavito, “Nike’s Law: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement, Transnational Corperations and the Struggle over 
Labor Rights in the Americans in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez Garavito, eds., Law 









Agonistic democrats also apply this sort of thinking directly to democracy, as in 
the later work of Mouffe.121 Deliberative democracy is overly focused on the twin norma-
tive goals of rationality and democratic legitimacy - and ultimately fails, and must by def-
inition fail in "circumscribing a domain that would not be subject to the pluralism of val-
ues and where a consensus without exclusion could be reached" given the messy bounda-
ries between public and private, or substantive and procedural issues.122 We cannot iso-
late a special mode of rational discourse from the pluralistic world of power relations; 
emotions and the wide range of alternative practices of politics.123 Her own alternative, 
which she calls "agonistic pluralism,” takes from Carl Schmitt an orientation towards a 
fundamental "us/them" distinction operative within the political. Instead of an enemy to 
destroyed or eliminated, "them" in this theory is to be seen as a worthy adversary, and the 
task of democratic theory is "not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public...but 
to mobilize them towards democratic designs.”124 Thus democracy becomes a sort of 
contest. 
 
121. Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (Verso, 2005). She sees Habermas as overly 
committed to an essentialist and universalist understanding of reason, which is inappropriate for the radical-
ly pluralistic social world in which we live, which she argues must be approached through a pluralism that 
is open to difference and contestation. 
122. Mouffe, Democratic Paradox, 2000, 91.  
 
123. Mouffe's concern is that the focus on legitimation and rationality misses the point; "what is 
really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that 
make possible the creation of democratic citizens" (Ibid., 95). 
 









William Connolly’s agonism, which he calls “deep pluralism” is situated in a par-
ticular historical context of late modernity, and emerges from a consideration of the fun-
damental uncertainty and flux of contemporary life, which is characterized as a constant 
state of becoming. For Connolly, pluralism requires an openness and “'fidelity to the 
world” that is risky given the high probability that others will not respond with the same 
openness. It is agonistic because each person has a duty to question his own worldview 
and test it against the worldview of others, a practice that builds solidarity despite the 
precarity of existence.125 Connolly spends a great deal of time on the metaphysical and 
ontological implications of a politics of becoming, but his contribution to agonistic theory 
is the advocacy of an ethos of engagement that is open to contingency and chance. 
          Both Connolly and Mouffe are interested in the relationship of emotions to the 
public sphere (and or deliberation), which has received treatment from a variety of ven-
ues; in a way, it even forms the basis of conservative critiques of democratic social spac-
es.126 While much deliberative democracy takes the lead of Habermas and excludes emo-
 
125. William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Duke University Press, 2005), 10.  
126. The concern about emotion and connection is not new, and forms the basis of Michael 
Walzer's attempt to recuperate liberalism, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism 
(Yale University Press, 2005).Some efforts have been made to widen the concept of the public sphere to 
include emotion, including through the medium of talk shows Peter Lunt and Paul Stenner, “The Jerry 
Springer Show as an Emotional Public Sphere,” Media, Culture & Society 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 59–
81, doi:10.1177/0163443705049058; church and religious moods Birgit Meyer, “‘Praise the Lord’: Popular 
Cinema and Pentecostalite Style in Ghana’s New Public Sphere,” American Ethnologist 31, no. 1 (February 
1, 2004): 92–110, doi:10.1525/ae.2004.31.1.92.and hip hop Gwendolyn D. Pough, Check It While I Wreck 









tions and rhetoric because of their origins in (and proper location) private life,127 not all 
deliberative thinkers are as strict. The role of affect and sentiment is, however, curtailed 
in most public sphere theory.128 The connection between morality and emotion is not seen 
as central, and emotions themselves are subordinate to reason. 
Although she is critical of the use of emotions in politics, Hannah Arendt has also 
inspired a variety of agonistic democrats, including William Connolly as discussed above, 
as well as Bonnie Honig and Jacques Rancière; each of these theorists might disagree 
with their placement in either the Arendtian or agonistic camp, although many refer to 
their thoughts as a variant on pluralism. Bonnie Honig has labeled herself an agonist 
openly, positioning herself against theories that close themselves off from future possibil-
ities of contestability. Honig argues that agonism is required because liberal categories 
cannot contain the multiplicity of identities subsumed under the idea of, say, ‘citizen.’129 
Rancière's agonism is more strategic than citizenship affirming, because he understands 
the world as a battle between what he calls police, the repressive systems which order the 
world, and politics, which is when the excluded “the part who has no part” insert them-
 
127.  Emotions are only properly public insofar as they "are intertwined with obligations that can 
be rationally redeemed." (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 34).  
128. We might call it "auxiliary", because it primarily leads us to moral conflict, aids us in vividly 
expressing our position and may help us understand the positions of others. Nino, The Constitution of De-
liberative Democracy. 
129. Agonistic contestation allows for the renovation of these categories without the wholesale de-
struction of existing systems, and also deepens our confrontations with our own deeply held convictions, 
which may not line up perfectly with the world around us. Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Dis-









selves into the political order.130 Thus the aesthetic question of what is visible, or what it 
is acceptable to show or see in public, is key. While his broader philosophy has implica-
tions for art and pedagogy, his agonism is relatively straightforward.131 The agonism of 
politics is the fight to have one’s noises heard as speech. 
        The distinction between an agonistic politics emerging from an Arendtian tradi-
tion- in which we might place the theorists from the last few paragraphs, and that from 
Schmitt (Mouffe, Connolly) is that the former is premised on the fundamentally world 
sharing possibilities of politics, while the later sees politics as grounded in constitutive 
exclusions. Both versions of agonistic democracy suggest that the terms and space in 
which deliberation occurs are themselves socially constituted; for Mouffe, the task is to 
take up this constitution on behalf of a united struggle of the oppressed. For the Ar-
endtians, it is to build this through the network of storytellers practicing an ethic of open-
ness. 
The agnostic citizen can theoretically be anyone, given that most of the thinkers in 
this area are explicitly concerned with pursuing equality in a fuller sense. This populist 
persuasion is very strong in Connolly and Mouffe. Of course, we still might ask who is 
likely to be best equipped with the sort of skills one needs for agonism, which can occur 
 
130. Jacques Ranciere, Disagreement: Politics And Philosophy (Univ of Minnesota Pr, 1998). 
131. Although he does contest the Arendtian association of the good citizen with the citizen who 









at both the symbolic level of art and the political world of electoral politics. Agonists 
have been accused both of rejecting utterly current political arrangements and capitulat-
ing too fully to them- is agonism merely partisanship by another name? Another way to 
put this is to ask if there is a where of agonistic politics, or if it occurs merely on the indi-
vidual level, or via the aesthetic and symbolic struggle for hegemony. Alternately, what 
would the institutions of agonistic pluralism look like?132  
In general, the agonistic democrats are far more sensitive to the problematics of 
“who” fits into politics, while still struggling to elucidate where politics occurs and how 
this place is created, nurtured and developed. Without a thick concept of a public space, 
agonism does risk sounding a lot more like individualistic partisanship than its propo-
nents would ever wish. Policies and institutions sound like the sort of brake on innovation, 
creativity and contest that agonists might reject, but they are required in order to differen-
tiate these ideas from Anarchism. Indeed, it is likely that most agonists are not hesitant 
about the need for institutional forms, but rather about the project of specifying them be-
forehand, seeing this as fundamentally undemocratic. 
 
132. Edward C. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and 
Political Liberalism (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011). He argues, to his own surprise, that they would es-
sentially resemble those of liberal pluralism, with attentiveness to contingency and a commitment to revis-
ability of any obtained decision. Such an agonism is prevented from descent into chaos and antagonism by 
starting from the existing liberal norms and public culture, but also seeks to move beyond. Wingenbach’s 
ideas are highly stimulating, and my own work is situated as an extension of his project. However, along 
with his institutional question, Wingenbach should more fully address how the competencies needed for 









The problem, then, is to develop the focus on popular control of public spaces as 
explored in participatory democracy along with the openness to difference and democrat-
ic contestation epitomized by Agonism. This problem needs to include considerations of 
institutional design, even if by this term we mean a much broader and more open process 
of political creation than the model suggested by the term. The theorist cannot write a 
blueprint for the final look or form of these institutions, but can provide arguments for 
what sort of policies would help support the efforts of individuals to make these institu-
tions themselves. I try to do this in chapter seven, but in general am an immanent critic of 
Agonism.  
2.6 The Who and Where of Public Spheres 
 
Each of these three central approaches to contemporary democratic theory are ei-
ther indebted to or in response to the Habermasian public sphere citizen, and they all fol-
low, to a certain extent, this citizen’s orientation as an educated speaking, universalized 
white male subject who acts in space designated by the state for political action, or with-
out a specified origin. This is an unrealistic, and undesirable standard for a pluralized cul-
ture. The problems with this from a position of intersectional experiences of race, gender 
and class have been touched on and are to a certain extent addressed by the variations of-
fered by participatory, deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy, all of which seek 
to think about and respond to difference. However, there is also an implied class, or even 
more clearly professional bias contained in this ideas, a bias which infects not only the 









will do it. Just as it is not realistic to ask that citizens conform to the standard of noble 
elites, it is also unrealistic to expect that their work experiences will match the early in-
dustrial figure of the white-collar worker. Most people, even those in what would be con-
sidered white-collar jobs or middle management, work in ways and contexts radically 
different from the language oriented, secure, and community bound citizen desired by 
democratic theorists. The next chapter will explore the tensions in the worker, seeking to 
see what skills are developed by the contemporary experience of work and how they fit 
into these ideas of citizenship. We can also find resources in Habermas’ own concerns 
about the relationships of markets and citizens.  
 
2.7 Adapting the Bourgeois Public Sphere to Mass Publics 
 
Habermas himself is not committed to the Public Sphere citizen as a direct model 
for our contemporary life; indeed, his Structural Transformation is expressly an explora-
tion of the decline of that moment of citizenship. Habermas himself is clear that the bour-
geois public sphere is an idealized concept that fails to live up to its promise as a check 
on state power, and eventually succumbs in the rise of class struggle and the welfare state. 
This concern is echoed in much of the critical literature on Habermas.133 Contemporary 
 
133. Some argue that the public sphere concept is itself built on constitutive exclusions of gender: 
Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution, 1988; Mary P. Ryan, 
“Women’s Politics in Nineteenth-Century America” in Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(MIT Press, 1992), 259-288. For a consideration of class, see Geoff Eley in the same volume, 289-339; for 












theorists who work in the vein of Habermasian public sphere attempt to translate his de-
scription of the bourgeois public sphere without preserving the accent on exclusion. Nan-
cy Fraser thinks about public spheres as plural and not always liberal, and argues that the 
“bracketing” of all social markers is impossible, as rewards for certain subject positions 
are built into discourse.134 This productive vein of public sphere research, which is often 
focused on subaltern publics, rejects the idea that within discourse status can be ignored. 
However, what is often overlooked in this research is the Habermasian claim, referenced 
above, that it is the development of certain skills and capabilities attached to an emerging 
way of life that allows the participants of his ideal public sphere to enter the discourse. 
Perversely, it is these shared capabilities and sensibilities that, in theory, allow the bour-
geois public sphere to function in an ideal speech situation. This makes the task of trans-
lating, or creating, the contemporary public sphere even more problematic; even if the 
access barriers are removed and the rules of discourse are adjusted to allow as much 
downplaying of status as possible, the problematic imbrications of identity and political 
action remains. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
says on Sex and Citizenship (Duke University Press, 1997); Eric O. Clarke, Virtuous Vice: Homoeroticism 
and the Public Sphere (Duke University Press, 2000)..  For most, these exclusions do not preclude the ad-
aptation of Habermas for contemporary, mass democracy, holding in mind “that the relationship between 
publicity and status is more complex than Habermas intimates, that declaring a deliberative arena to be a 
space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to make it so. 









This is another way of asking questions about how individuals become politicized. 
In the classic Habermasian story, individuals join together for social and competitive rea-
sons, growing in power as they deepen their positions through argument. The public 
sphere is not political, in a formal sense, but its discussions are political in that they trans-
form those who participate in them. And these discussions relate to formal political mat-
ters not because discourse is inherently political, but because of the relative tension be-
tween the development of trade and business and the state. That underlying tension pro-
vides some of the oomph which Habermas is likely to attribute to the publicity itself. 
Public sphere theorists should thus pay more attention to the creation of a public 
sphere type space and the accompanying transformations in identity and subject position, 
rather than debating the mechanisms for deliberation within any particular public sphere. 
It is unlikely that the type of independence granted by estate ownership available to the 
early bourgeois is possible for most of us. Instead, we must abstract the functional im-
portance of the bourgeois subject position to understand how public spheres might work 
today. Property and family are valuable because they affords its holders self-esteem, 
skills for citizenship and an interest in public affairs. How can we, holding in mind the 
goal of creating exclusive spaces, recreate these capabilities in individuals? Alternatively, 
what kind of worker works to build the public sphere? I will return to these questions ex-
plicitly in the final chapter, but first attempt to get on the table the challenges to finding 









CHAPTER THREE: HOW THE CONDITIONS OF WORK BLOCK US FROM 
BUILDING A PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
3.1 Introduction: Superfluous life and its relation to Work 
 
If what we need are an understanding of how the work of politics, which I’ve ex-
plored in the last chapter through the notion of public sphere building, fits into our broad-
er world, we should understand the parameters under which most people labor, and what 
that means for them politically. This will help us connect the question of the last chapter 
(what political work is needed for democratic citizenship), to the question of how hierar-
chies within work, or distinctions between work and labor, matter for our capacities as 
citizens. If work is consistently degraded such that it does not provide the status, skills or 
social and legal standing to allow citizens to engage in the democratic work of building 
the public sphere, then we are in trouble.  
Aristotle’s problem is thus twisted such that rather than many citizens benefiting 
from the labor of some slaves, many “slaves” labor without creating a public sphere by 
their. A different way to pit this is to see the growth of superfluous life, where the paucity 
of social and economic rights is linked to the erosion of political and civil rights, such 
that those who are status citizens lack the full benefits of citizenship, or access them with 
difficulty or stigma. The concept of superflousness comes from Hannah Arendt, who uses 
the idea to discuss the process by which refugees and victims of genocide are transformed 
from members of a political community into raw human matter that can be eliminated 









Arendt connects it both to the process the Nazi Regime undertakes with its Jewish and 
other suspect populations and with the status of refugees. The concept of superflousness 
comes in the midst of a critique of human rights, which for Arendt are meaningless at a 
global level because they are not guaranteed by any political power.135  
While Arendt is thinking through the problem of human rights guaranteed at the 
global level, we can extend her analysis and legal, status citizenship in relation to a na-
tion-state is equitable with “membership in a political community.” Arendt herself is 
aware that the guarantee of rights without a nation-state is not proof against genocide, 
otherwise the German Jewish population would not have been systemically deprive of 
their political rights and then humanity. Arendt does seem to suggest that political and 
civil rights, or voice, will be enough to prevent the slow degradation of persons into bare 
life. However, she is well aware, in her discussion of the importance of imperialism, capi-
talism and racism, that legal citizenship does not guarantee the “voice” that is so im-
portant to her understanding of political agency.  
In the United States, having a “voice” in the political space is intimately connect-
ed to producerist ideology that measures worth in relation to what individuals make. As 
political and civil rights democratize, the economic world retains privileges of gender, 
class, race and nationalities. One of the carriers of this privilege is the coding of some 
work as unproductive or meaningless, undeserving. The intimate connection between 
 









work and dessert has a long history, although it is probably intimately connected to the 
end of chattel slavery after the civil war, where anxiety over the dissolution of a caste 
system that distinguished even northern poor industrial workers from black slaves in the 
South enhanced the importance of doing the right work.136 The proliferation of share-
cropping as system of labor organization continued to enhance these distinctions, just as 
Jim Crow organized consumption and labor as well as social relations.137 Similarly, the 
contrast between first and second wave feminism illustrates this point; it was not suffi-
cient to gain formal political rights for women, but also to gain economic power in the 
workplace. This shift is often defended as providing the financial support necessary for 
women to retain their autonomy, particularly from husbands, but it also is linked to 
broader political power. The link between employment and political participation is em-
pirically strong, but this empirical relationship has been interpreted as resulting primarily 
from effects within the workplace, rather than a theoretically attachment of concepts of 
civic desert and worth with employment.138 
 
136. Shklar, American Citizenship, 44.  
137. Comer Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford University Press, 1955). 
138. This is true for both men and women, and may in part explain the persistent gender gap in politi-
cal participation. It is not merely working, however, but working in a position that requires some education 
and on the job training; this correlation holds while class is controlled for . We might be able to explain this 
gap through the idea of  “civic volunteerism,” which links the types of work that men are still most likely to 
do with the processes and incentives that make participation likely. Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, 
and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Harvard University Press, 
1995), chs. 10-13. Thus, “not only that what happens at work makes a difference for participation but that 
what happens at work is the result of a several-stage interactive process involving selection into the work-












 The idea that producerist ideology is a key part of the American political land-
scape has been eclipsed by social theories of the importance of consumption139. Consum-
erism is one of the more prominent bugaboos of democratic theory, as critics revive early 
20th century screeds against its practitioners as passive.140 Even if consumption became 
intimately linked with citizenship in the early 21st century, this was not without an inti-
mate relationship with producerism. For example, consumer citizenship is highly linked 
with the advocacy of women and African Americans, who advanced such slogans as 
“Don’t shop where you can’t work” to protest employment discrimination.141 That acts of 
consumption became associated with driving economic growth and recovery since the 
New Deal still means that work and producing is important for political membership; if 
consumption is an act of citizenship, it is so because it provides economic growth so that 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Lehman Schlozman, Nancy Burns, and Sidney Verba, “‘What Happened at Work Today?’: A Multistage 
Model of Gender, Employment, and Political Participation,” The Journal of Politics 61, no. 01 (1999): 29–
53, doi:10.2307/2647774, 30. 
139.  For an argument that 20th century intellectuals transformed our political culture through empha-
sizing consumption over production, epitomized in New Deal progressivism, see: Edward Gresser, Free-
dom From Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (Soft Skull Press, 2007). Her examination 
is most convincing when she shows how 19th century economics featured “a worldview that was not only 
profoundly producerist but also one in which both consumption and consumer were replete with pejorative 
connotations.” Ibid.,13. The shift towards a demand driven economy and government policies to match is 
traced through the shift to Keynsian economic thought, and the democratic hopes of left-progressives.    
140. Benjamin R. Barber, Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow 
Citizens Whole, Reprint (W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). Barber argues that markets are intimal to adult 
political life, such that we are unable to engage in the long-term thinking required for democratic citizen-
ship. Barber’s book follows in a long line of critiques of how consumption in capitalism might eviscerate 









there is sufficient employment for citizen workers. Producerism is still a visible part of 
American ideology, and perhaps consumption is merely another version of its prolifera-
tion.   
Understanding the transformation that the economy, and world, has and is experi-
encing is a large task, and beyond the scope of this project that seeks to understand this 
transformation through a narrow focus on how it has changed the world of work and la-
bor. However, a review of the portion of the broader literature that discusses this trans-
formation yields findings that cluster around the four main challenges I discuss in this 
chapter. This does not mean that these are the only challenges, or that categorizing them 
in this way is not without limitations, but the frequency with which synonyms and related 
ideas emerged from the literature suggests that these challenges might be central. Fur-
thermore, these are all challenges that are potentially problematic for the co-constitutive 
citizenship I am advancing, so they are particularly useful to explore.   
The challenges facing the superfluous today are different than those who faced 
waged laborers, who secured legal citizenship if not the just economic order they sought, 
and women, who failed in banning alcohol, but gained the political power needed to ad-
vance their claims to just compensation for work in the home. Indeed, there is still a great 
deal of unrecognized or unremunerated work, inside and outside of the home. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 









even the employed face challenges which make their political action difficult, particularly 
if the goal of political action is understood as occurring in an existing public sphere and 
consisting particularly of dialogue. This public sphere vision, as discussed in the last 
chapter, is particularly difficult to enact when its potential citizens. This chapter sketches 
the most central challenges to the advancement of the public sphere citizenship discussed 
in the last chapter: first, the precarity of work, which extends to the real deprivation that 
the unemployed or underemployed experience; second, the extension of paid labor re-
sponsibilities into the home, and corresponding lack of time and resources for creative 
work; third, the challenge of the depoliticization and privatization of work makes the 
connections between work and politics difficult to see.  Finally, and closely related, the 
incompatibility of how we work with rich and supportive family life and the labor of the 
household, an issue that is central for men and women of all classes. Because these chal-
lenges occur in the economic sphere, they are not always recognized by advocates of 
public sphere citizenship, of any variety, particularly because the capacity they erode is 
that of creating a public space, rather than acting within it.  
 
3.2 Challenge One: Precarity and Vulnerability 
 
 Waged work is inconsistent. Patterns of employment are more sporadic than at 
any time post industrial revolution. There is a growing body of research exploring the 
concept of “precarious labor;” that is, the idea that “no one, not even in the traditional 









lifetime,” and therefore experience pressure throughout life to anticipate and adapt.142 We 
might understand this as a turn to “free agency” for all workers, particularly young ones, 
who are taught to see mobility and adaptations as strengths.143 As anyone who has at-
tended any sort of career counseling knows, the average person changes jobs and careers 
seven times in their lifetime. This oft quoted fact is source less, given that the Bureau of 
Labor only tracks job changes, given the difficulty of establishing what constitutes a 
change in “career.”144 A growing divide between “insiders” (those with standard con-
tracts) and “outsiders” (those who provide flexible and contingent labor) is occurring 
throughout the manufacturing sector.145 This is mirrored even in high status professions, 
such as academia, where tenured professors make up less and less of the labor force, re-
placed by contactless adjunct laborers who usually lack stability, benefits and academic 
 
142. Andrew Ross, Nice Work If You Can Get It: Life and Labor in Precarious Times (NYU Press, 
2009), 2. 
143. Daniel H. Pink, Free Agent Nation: How America’s New Independent Workers Are Transforming 
the Way We Live (Hachette Digital, Inc., 2001). 
144. “NLS FAQs,” accessed November 21, 2012, http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch43. Indeed, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics has yet to complete an entire longitudinal survey on this question (and its 
data so far refers to Baby Boomers, and may not apply in the same way to younger populations), but from 
18-44 the average boomer changes jobs 11 times. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Number of Jobs Held, Labor 
Market Activity and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers; Results from Longitudinal 
Survey” (US. Department of Labor, n.d.), http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch43. These data refer to 
American workers, and probably severely undersamples migrant, undocumented and black market workers. 
145. Arne L. Kalleberg, “Flexible Firms and Labor Market Segmentation Effects of Workplace Re-











freedom.146 Workers of many classes are without long-term guarantees of occupational or 
job stability. 
Precarity also refers to the increased mobility of labor, both within nation states 
and worldwide. This is not a new trend, given that labor markets have been driving mi-
gration for hundreds of years, but the increased transnational nature of labor flexibility is 
striking. The centrality of labor market flexibility and migration is such that in geography 
and sociology a “mobilities turn” understands flux and migration as the central dynamic 
in contemporary life and society.147 In a practical sense, the centrality of mobility is re-
flected in the actual numbers of people who move, temporarily or permanently, to meet 
the demands of the global labor market.148 Immigrants in industrialized countries work in 
agriculture, food preparation, office/house cleaning, child care, landscaping and, increas-
ingly, manufacturing sectors, and their vulnerability means that these industries can hold 
costs down by keeping wages and worker protections low. Migration flows often occur in 
“chains,” where family members or people from the same area attract others to move to 
 
146. Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education 
(Princeton University Press, 2004). 
147. John Urry, Mobilities (Polity, 2007). Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (John Wiley & Sons, 
2000). conceives of this as “liquid modernity”, considering the software and internet related flows of in-
formation and identity have made the human condition “fluid”. 
148. A study that combines statistical study of large data-sets with qualitative investigations into the 
life of immigrants and migrant workers in seven global cities, argues that it is migration that allows, and in 
a sense shapes, the international economy.Harald Bauder, Labor Movement:How Migration Regulates La-









the same place or industry, providing a network of support and connection to home.149 
There is also a cascade effect of migration, where middle class or skilled laborers in 
emerging economies, such as India or Brazil, travel to the United States or Europe to 
work, often in domestic settings, but then recruit care for their own families from poorer 
countries.  
Migrants and immigrants, even within nation states, do not line up with the ideal 
of the public sphere citizen because insecurity and movement are in tension with the 
grounded and localized concept of a political space where identity is bracketed. For im-
migrants, identity and belonging (including legal status) may be a high bar to entry into a 
political space, or may indeed be the locus of their political action, as in the years of hard 
work by undocumented workers and their allies in the United States. For precarious 
workers who have legal citizenship, their precarity (and thus proximity to the social safe-
ty net) means that their relationship to local and state government may be fragile or short-
lived. Furthermore, Habermas’ identified that the unique feature of the bourgeois citizen-
ship was that his economic interest led him to the political sphere, but also to look be-
yond it in a practice of publicity. The precarious worker may be led to politics for the 
same reason, but the goal will not be critique of power (which in the bourgeois moment 
enhanced the agency of up and comers), but instead the preservation of the corporations 
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and practices that provide jobs. Indeed, if workers change jobs excessively, they cannot 
even be expected to act out of preference for a particular industry, but instead with a uni-
versalized attachment to measuring politics as a calculus of jobs and economic growth. 
Or, in local politics, with attracting and maintaining industry, even when this industry is 
dirty, morally dubious or even harmful.150  
For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere is built because the economic interest, 
as well as the cultural practices, of a class that is growing powerful demands it, and this 
public sphere is lost because the mass public’s interests are instead served by the re-
placement of critique publicity with public opinion and social science. The situation of 
the precarious worker reflects this, even when we look at wealthy or upper class freelanc-
ers, reflecting the de-professionalism of many classical professions as well as the domi-
nance of the short term contract model of employment. This group, who we might think 
of as entrepreneurs, or the creative class, includes some workers we do not think of as 
precarious, such as those working in the financial sector on Wall Street.151 These workers 
also have little incentive to invest, in a non-monetary sense, in the political system. The 
 
150. States and local regions are locked in fierce competition to lure or retain big companies, although 
there is some signs that they may be resisting this trend. Jennifer L. Gilbert, “Selling the City Without Sell-
ing Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability,” Urban Lawyer 27 
(1995): 427.This competition results from the very real devastation that occurs when a key employer leaves 
or shuts down. See: Timothy J. Minchin, “‘It Knocked This City to Its Knees’: The Closure of Pillowtex 
Mills in Kannapolis, North Carolina and the Decline of the US Textile Industry,” Labor History 50, no. 3 
(2009): 287–311, doi:10.1080/00236560903020906.  









fact that many industries, but particularly the financial services and other stock market 
related sectors, hedge their bets by donating to both major political parties in the United 
States is often analyzed as demonstrating the problems of equating money and speech in 
a democratic system.152 However, we could also understand it to show that the tension 
between the private interests of the individual and the communal good debated in the 
public sphere in the Habermasian idiom have dissolved, such that the interests of the pre-
carious worker (not to mention the businesses they work for or would like to) are equated 
with the general goal of high-employment and expansion of the market. This combines 
with the naturalization of the market, such that politics are seen as an artificial imposition 
on its development, rather than constructing the social and material relations in which the 
market functions. In such a context, the interests of precarious workers are constructed as 
eliminating politics, rather than building a robust political space that supports critical dis-
course.  
 This disconnect is further amplified by the growth of unemployment and related 
jump in people drawing on short and long term social safety nets, such as unemployment 
benefits, aid payments or disability in the Unites States. While unemployment is more 
visible during downturns in the economy, it is a threat even in better economic times and 
 
152. See Thomas Stratmann, “Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Finan-
cial Services Legislation*,” Journal of Law and Economics 45, no. 2 (2002): 345–373. Hint: yes. Proposals 
to counter this are anemic at best: Edward J. Kane, “Changing Incentives Facing Financial-services Regula-









looser labor markets.153 One in six workers in blue colors jobs were laid off in 2010, with 
around 24 qualified applicants for every opening.  Despite some news reports that suggest 
that some of the unemployed were enjoyed the slow pace or time for self-improvement, 
the common experience of unemployment is scarcity and fear.154 
Unemployment is difficult in a material sense, but also a social one. The tight as-
sociation between blue-collar work and a successful mode of masculinity makes this su-
perfluousness psychologically difficult for workers whose loss of work is equated with 
loss of status, identity and standing within the family and community.155  Unemployment 
or bouts of poverty, even for young people, are highly correlated with health problems 
and alcoholism.156 Even more alarmingly, men with job losses have shorter lifespans than 
 
153. A longitudinal study of aging workers found 5.2 bouts of unemployment for the Baby Boomer 
cohort mentioned above, with the rates rising for those with high school education or less. “The NLSY79,” 
accessed November 21, 2012, http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm. 
154. Unemployment and job loss has long been associated with mental health issues and suicide. Peter 
Bryan Warr, Work, Unemployment, and Mental Health (Clarendon Press, 1987). It is furthermore “scar-
ring” in terms of lifelong earnings as well as emotional damage. Wiji Arulampalam, “Is Unemployment 
Really Scarring? Effects of Unemployment Experiences on Wages,” The Economic Journal 111, no. 475 
(2001): 585–606, doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00664. There are advocates for mitigating this mental and mate-
rial damage through programs aimed at those out of work thanks to the recent recession, such as: Lauren D. 
Appelbaum and Editor, Reconnecting to Work: Policies to Mitigate Long-Term Unemployment and Its 
Consequences (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2012). 
155. Luis Jimenez and Valerie Walkerdine, “‘Shameful Work’: A Psychosocial Approach to Father–
son Relations, Young Male Unemployment and Femininity in an Ex-steel Community,” Psychoanalysis, 
Culture & Society 17, no. 3 (July 28, 2011): 278–295, doi:10.1057/pcs.2011.14. 
156. Krysia N. Mossakowski, “Is the Duration of Poverty and Unemployment a Risk Factor for Heavy 










those without.157 As these same statistics do not fully apply to women, there must be 
more at work than the material stresses of losing a job. Either women are more easily 
able to meet their material needs in other ways, or they experience paid employment as 
less essential to their self-image, perhaps because of historical association of waged work 
with masculinity.158 Unspoken assumptions that women who exit the labor market will 
care for their families may also exert extra pressure on men to find work outside the 
home. 
 The causes of this shift are complex, but the central dynamics that relate to the 
dimension of citizenship I’m discussed are the changes in international trade, capital 
markets and migration flows aided by the neo-liberal advances of the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
What is commonly termed “globalization” is, in the world of labor, another term for the 
growing precariousness, labor market segmentation, and migration that accompanies the 
 
157. Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter, “Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using Ad-
ministrative Data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 1265–1306, 
doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1265. 
158. This is true even thought women and the young tend to be more vulnerable to layoffs and cut-
backs. Sher Verick, Who Is Hit Hardest During a Financial Crisis? The Vulnerability of Young Men and 
Women to Unemployment in an Economic Downturn, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Sci-
ence Research Network, August 18, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1455521. Both the higher inci-
dence of primary child care responsibilities and social norms have meant that thus far women struggle less 
with job loss, particularly if they have a partner. Monica L. Forret, Sherry E. Sullivan, and Lisa A. 
Mainiero, “Gender Role Differences in Reactions to Unemployment: Exploring Psychological Mobility and 
Boundaryless Careers,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 31, no. 5 (2010): 647–666, 
doi:10.1002/job.703. For single parents of any gender, unemployment has a much higher correlation with 
depression, suggesting that it is not merely social stigma and the availability of benefits that prevent harm 
from unemployment, but very real deprivation. Marybeth Mattingly, Kristin Smith, and Jessica Bean, “Un-
employment in the Great Recession: Single Parents and Men Hit Hard,” The Carsey Institute at the Schol-









growth of finance markets, widespread privatization, surge of transnational corporations 
and IMF led reforms of global markets.159 It also emerges from dynamics more internal 
to labor markets, such as the protests of the 1970’s against conformity of the lifetime oc-
cupation model and calls for more worker control or democracy. These calls were refor-
mulated in a rather perverse way, creating a more flexible and less hierarchical workplace 
with more potential for career change. Labor is still not as mobile as capital, particularly 
given the speed with which the latter can move between markets as foreign direct invest-
ment, the removal of which was a central cause for the East Asian Financial crises that 
gave the first indication that the globalized world was not without risk. Even physical 
manifestations of capital, such as factories, are more mobile than one might think, leaving 
entire towns vulnerable to the “outsourcing” that is such a strong political talking point. 
In the United States, the particular attachment of retirement healthcare and other benefits 
with full-time work provide particular incentives to use flexible, part-time or temporary 
labor, as do the lack of support for combining family and work life, which mean that 
many men and women seek this work so that they can manage their home responsibilities. 
All of this precarity challenges the creation of public spheres because it reduces 
the likelihood that citizens with have the security and stability from which they can 
emerge to build the public sphere and protect their interests/contest the political. Without 
 
159. Carole Thornley, Steve Jefferys, and B. eatrice Appay, Globalization and Precarious Forms of 










steady employment or roots in a particular community (or even nation-state), precarious 
workers are more likely to be distanced from their legal place of political membership, 
and thus not protected by the legal guarantees of citizenship. For workers who are legal 
citizens, the centrality of paid work means that its precarity, or absence for the unem-
ployed, renders them also highly mobile and unattached. The close association of work 
with merit, reflected most clearly in popular debates around “entitlements,” means that 
the potential contributions of the unemployed or welfare recipient are suspect.  Along 
with the very real stigma attached to temporary work,160 unemployment,161 and wel-
fare,162 come the material deprivations when separated from the labor market, the central 
method for gaining substance in a capitalist world. In a world of precarious labor, the 
democratic work of citizenship suffers.  
 
3.3 The Particular Problem of Precarity for Marginalized Workers  
 
This is even more true for those who are the least stable in precarious labor mar-
kets, as determined not from relative skills or education, but structural power dynamics 
 
160. Anthony S. Boyce et al., “‘Temporary Worker, Permanent Loser?’A Model of the Stigmatization 
of Temporary Workers,” Journal of Management 33, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 5–29, 
doi:10.1177/0149206306296575. 
161. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unem-
ployment, MIT Press Books (The MIT Press, 1989), http://ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/026262074x.html. 









and social relations. This relative power is not merely a matter of adding up one's poten-
tially negative characteristics (woman, foreigner, college graduate, etc.), but rather each 
potential employee experiences his or her own worth as the complex interaction of identi-
ty, history, and location163. For example, African American women were traditionally 
excluded both from jobs other women took up in the early 20th century, such as clerical 
work, and from the factory work that many of their male counterparts took up, and there-
fore were most likely to work in the service industry, particularly as domestic servants, 
laundresses or in factory jobs deemed too dangerous for white women.164 They thus expe-
rienced a situation differing substantially from either that of women or black men, even 
those these sets also saw limited opportunities available to them. By the 1980’s and 
1990’s, factory work was increasingly less secure and less desirable, and at this time also 
employed more and more African American women.165 While the work available for 
women had changed, the association of lower status groups with flexible, expendable and 
dangerous work had not. 
That divisions of labor are not natural and instead rely on non-economic factors is 
especially clear in the case of migrant or imported foreign labor. The most prominent ex-
 
163. As discussed Chapter 1, Section 4, this is the particular type of intersectionality that I am pursu-
ing, with a focus on the importance of work as well as class, race, gender and nationality.  
164. Teresa L. Amott and Julie A. Matthaei, Race, Gender, and Work: A Multi-Cultural Economic 
History of Women in the United States (South End Press, 1996), 168.  
 









amples occur where the culturally, ethnically and often religiously different live, often for 
many years or even generations, in states with various levels of protection. A prominent 
example is the Turkish gast-arbeiters in Germany166 or masses of African construction 
workers in Middle Eastern oils states like Dubai, although most states experience in and 
outflows of migrants that are complex and essential for understanding the relationship 
between work and citizenship. In schemas such as the German and Dubai ones, workers 
have certain limited legal rights, but are expected to repatriate to their own country at 
some point. In Dubai, the migrants, many of whom come from northern Africa, often do 
fit this pattern, especially given the precipitous drop in construction following the global 
contraction of the late 2000s. Frequently, the lens through which these problems are seen 
is one in which cultural integration is deemed unlikely due to perceived vast differences 
between culture, a lens mirroring a general tendency to oppose East and West.167 Howev-
er, the situations in Germany and Dubai, which are mirrored around the globe, point to 
 
166. In Germany, Turkish workers have instead become a permanent part of the population, num-
bering 2.7 million in 2004, with about half of these holding german citizenship. Ali Mehdi, Strategies of 
Identity Formation: Youth of Turkish Descent in Germany (Springer, 2012), 19.  This text explores this 
phenomenon through qualitative interviews with a set of youths born in Germany to Turkish parents, whose 
identity, and rights, are in flux, arguing ultimately that the future of Germany depends on changing rela-
tionships with its resident “Gurks”.  
167. This “clash of civilizations” thesis does not hold up to scrutiny. Brittany Ann Tallman, “The 
Question of Turkish Integration in the Context of German Identity Conceptions” (thesis, Bowling Green 









the complex relationship between status citizenship and actual belonging, which can oc-
cur because of, in spite of or without formal membership. 
3.4 The New Debtor’s Prison and the Economic basis for Citizenship 
 
That citizenship is connected in deep ways to concepts of work and worth is show 
clearly in the rise of commercial and student debt, particularly with the reemergence of 
imprisonment for nonpayment. The United States broke with the tradition of imprisoning 
those who could not pay their debts in the colonial days, although similar practices such 
as indentured servitude, conscription, slavery itself and of course its replacement of 
sharecropping continued. Formal systems of imprisonment for indigence continue to be 
replaced by more diffuse systems of control, such as the use of vagrancy laws or imposi-
tion of court and other fees in cases that do not trigger the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel.168 These cases respectively insured that those without the inability to pay for 
court transcripts, or for appeals that were a matter of right, would not be prevented by 
their poverty from exercising these rights. These cases connect to the broader use of 
equal protection laws to protect the poor, particularly in the world of criminal law, where 
 
168. In “Bearden V. Georgia - 461 U.S. 660 (1983),” Justia US Supreme Court Center, accessed 
April 7, 2013, http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/461/660/. the U.S. Supreme Court took up the 
issue of imprisonment for debt in by considering a case where an individual was sentenced to probation and 
required to pay a large fine in installments. He was unable to fully pay his fine, and thus sent to jail. This 
ruling followed in a line of cases that considered the importance of indigence or wealth in terms of the 
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (Supreme Court 










the provision of counsel in criminal proceedings was guaranteed via the court’s interpre-
tation of the 6th amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright.169 In Bearden, the Supreme Court 
determined that those without the ability to pay court ordered fines, restitutions or court 
costs could not be summarily imprisoned for this unwilling failure. They seemed to em-
ploy  “intermediate scrutiny”; that is, demanding more compelling rationale from the 
state for his exercise of power than that required by rational scrutiny, but without mark-
ing the case as involving either the “fundamental rights” or “suspect classes” that would 
trigger the harsher requirements of strict scrutiny.170 This reading of the case foresaw the 
possibility that poverty might be understood as a suspect class in the United States, trig-
gering the protection of strict scrutiny.  While there is little later case history to support 
this hopeful argument, and a counter-example found in the property tax upholding ruling 
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,171 the importance of thinking 
about the nature of the poor in relation to constitutional protection and debtors prison is 
only becoming more pertinent. 
 
162.“Gideon V. Wainwright - 372 U.S. 335 (1963),” Justia US Supreme Court Center, accessed April 
7, 2013,  
170. F. Lautz, “Equal Protection and Revocation of an Indigent’s Probation for Failure to Meet Mone-
tary Conditions: Bearden V. Georgia,” Wis. L. Rev. (1985): 121. Lautz claims that the court is actually ap-
plying the criteria of strict scrutiny, which demand a compelling government interest to which the law is 
narrowly tailored and employs the least restrictive means in meeting this test. 









Debt and poverty are thus, in the world of constitutional jurisprudence, constitu-
tionally barred from triggering imprisonment on their face. Bearden concerned debts 
owed to the state, which had been historically treated somewhat differently that civil 
debts, the latter of which were disconnected from imprisonment in the early 1820s in 
most states.172 The development of bankruptcy laws, which of course allowed for debtors 
to move past large debts while retaining the basic good needed to live, along with prohi-
bition of imprisonment for civil debt, virtually eliminated the practice. Indeed, there are 
persistent complaints that these policies are too today indulgent to debtors. As any stu-
dent knows, educational debts are immune from bankruptcy, out of a concern that temp-
tation to default on these very expensive loans would be too great173. The assumption is 
that student debt is linked to the very ability to repay it, through the increased earning 
power provided via education, is a broad and often unwarranted assumption174. This per-
haps accounts for the growing focus of the student debt in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, who see the stickiness of student debt as a virtual debtor’s prison. 
 
172. Ann K Wagner, “Conflict over Bearden v Georgia in State Courts: Plea-Bargaining Probation 
Terms and the Specter of Debtors’ Prison, The,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 2010 (2010): 383. 
173. (It is odd that one can bankrupt oneself by pursuing "bad" debt on consumer goods, while the 
"good" debt of student loans must be retained. Perhaps this is what makes it "good". Perhaps, as some have 
suggested, student debt functions to coerce students to enter the labor market, particularly to seek high-
salary employment, rather than pursue less lucrative interests or reject the system altogether.   
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Along with the permanence of student debt, the resurgence of actual imprison-
ment for debts, particularly civil debts, is alarming. Citizens can be imprisoned for failing 
to pay child support, alimony, and fees associated with driving a car.175 While Bearden is 
still good law, it has not been interpreted to require an indigence hearing prior to sentenc-
ing (as the right to counsel does). Instead, individuals are assigned fines without assess-
ment as to their ability to pay, and these fines are often compounded after they are im-
prisoned because they are then charged for their own “room and board” or other assorted 
fees, a situation that also applies to the general population of people released from pris-
on.176 Individuals are also often charged with contempt of court or similar procedural 
charges in relation to unpaid debts, sometimes resulting in multi-year jail sentences.177 
Our prisons are increasingly also debtors’ prisons, if de facto ones 
The Dickensian flavor of debtor’s prison should not distract us from the stark re-
ality that U.S. Citizens face imprisonment, along with the implied threat of starvation and 
 
175. K. L Moss, “Debtors’ Prison,” Michigan Bar Journal (2010), 
http://spb.mplp.org:8080/download/attachments/5013511/spb_aclu_article_7-10.pdf. 
176. Tina Rosenberg, “Out of Prison, Into a Vicious Circle of Debt,” Opinionator NY Times, accessed 
November 27, 2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/out-of-prison-into-a-vicious-circle-
of-debt/. And, as the New York Bar Association’s 2006 report shows, it is likely that around 80% of those 
accused of a felony in the United States are indigent, with two fifths unemployed or working only part time 
prior to arrest., and their ability to pay for their own incarceration in the months after exiting prison is less 
than their ability to provide their own counsel. 
177. Richard E James, “Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the 









homelessness, if they cannot support themselves via the labor market.178 This does not 
mean that there is an easy solution; one of the reasons why these judgments have prolif-
erated is that many of these cases relate to child support, and the state has an understand-
able interest in enforcing the requirements that biological parents provide for their chil-
dren.179 However, the high penalties and increased incarceration have not resulted in in-
creased payment of these fines or back-owed child support, and are unlikely to serve as a 
workable solution for poor children. Indeed, most of these types of fines remain uncol-
lected, despite the threat of imprisonment.180 Even worse, the profits of these conflicts 
tend to go to commercial probation management companies. As the New York Times de-
tails, private companies are hired by the state and to collect debts, particularly in the cas-
es of misdemeanor fines which do not trigger the requirement for counsel.181 Not only is 
the precarious worker at risk of imprisonment, but also this imprisonment itself helps 
build up a prison-industrial complex that provides cheap labor for manufactures and regu-
larly turns profits for prison management companies.  
 
178. As the Washington Post reports, debtors’ prison is a reality in about a third of states (Silver-
Greenburg 2011). Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Debtor Arrests Criticized,” Wall Street Journal, November 
22, 2011, sec. Law, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577052373900992432.html?mod=wsj_share_t
weet. 
179. Kirsten Levingston and Vicki Turetsky, “Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt as a 
Barrier to Reentry,” Clearinghouse Review Journal of Poverty Law and Policy (n.d.): July August 2007. 
180. Ibid. 
181. Ethan Bronner, “Probation Fees Multiply as Companies Profit,” The New York Times, July 2, 









3.5 The Precariat needs Institutions that can transform the Conditions of Labor  
  
Precarious labor is a problem for public sphere theorists because it produces con-
ditions inimical to communal political action, and enforces the narrative that the goal of 
politics is to remove itself from the natural sphere of the market so that it can act unhin-
dered; some theorists, however, see precarity and flux as a strength to be drawn on, rather 
than lamented. Clashes between the “creative class” hypotheses and claims about the 
“precariat” class animate social theory about workers in the new economy.182 The former 
suggests that knowledge workers and cultural producers, including those who produce via 
social networks or other Web 2.0 platforms, are evidence of the democratization of work 
and the possibility of governance from the ground up. The latter worry that the unstable 
conditions under which most people work, creative class or not, along with the eroding 
walls between work and leisure, are an increase in oppressive working conditions mistak-
en for liberation.183 The similarities between their situations were exposed most clearly as 
the financial crisis of 2008 deepened, so that the creative class (whose precarity was un-
derstood as a type of entrepreneurship or portfolio building) was exposed as supremely 
 
182. Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt, “In the Social Factory? Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cul-
tural Work,” Theory, Culture & Society 25, no. 7–8 (December 1, 2008): 1–30, 
doi:10.1177/0263276408097794. 
183. Andrew Ross, “The New Geography of Work Power to the Precarious?,” Theory, Culture & Soci-
ety 25, no. 7–8 (December 1, 2008): 31–49, doi:10.1177/0263276408097795. This pieces argues that the 
seeming gulf between what is typically understood as precarious labor- part-time, service industry, transient 
or piece-work- and the creative class world is actually very narrow indeed, and that all workers are in a 









vulnerable to unemployment184. While the mobile and flexible ideal of the young, crea-
tive consultant is aspirational for many, the accompanying insecurity and dislocation may 
not be. 
Some thinkers even discuss the “precariat” as the heir to the proletariat and as a 
potential revolutionary subject.185 Probably the most visible proponents of the creative 
and emancipatory power of workers today are Antonio Hardt and Michael Negri, who 
draw on a Marxist heritage to advance their theory of the “multitude.”186 The “multitude” 
indicates that the revolutionary subject which confronts an international world order 
headed by the United States and other western powers is not united by class interests, as 
in the case of the proletariat, nor identity politics but rather remains relentlessly plural. 
The multitude is produced by, and productive of, networks of communication which both 
allow for the spread of capitalism and its alternatives through shared projects rooted in 
love. The multitude is contrasted with the concept of “people”, which is the formal and 
 
184. Indeed, it may be that the traditional role of the artist, with its romantic attachments of freedom of 
movement, independence and garrett living, forms an ideological basis for the extension of contract-based 
and benefit-free work throughout the economy. Ibid.  
185. The stirring of the precariat is associated with the anti-globalization protests in the wake of the 
1990’s growth of neoliberal policies via the IMF, trade agreements like NAFTA and the expansion of the 
European Union into monetary and fiscal policy. Guy Standing, The Precariat (Bloomsbury Publishing 
PLC, 2011), http://www.bloomsburyacademic.com/view/The-Precariat/book-ba-9781849664554.xml. 
186. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth, 1st ed. (Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009) which follows on the heels of their popular Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Har-
vard University Press, 2001) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire, Reprint (Penguin Books, 2005). While Empire and Multitude are attempts to diagnose the 
problems of contemporary global postimperialism, Commonwealth proposes a emancipatory subject in the 









entrenched unit of popular sovereignty into which Empire seeks to transform the produc-
tive and free-floating multitude.187  
 What is problematic about their thinking is not that their political analysis is sus-
pect as some have claimed, or that their theories are overly abstract, or overly optimistic, 
as others have. It is rather their adoption of the assumption, transformed, that the laboring 
classes will of their own accord develop class-consciousness and that when they do so, a 
public space will be waiting in which they can act. Despite their argument that the net-
worked nature of the multitude provides new avenues for the expansion of solidarity 
movements, the argument essentially revolves around this occurring organically, and de-
spite the networked nature of the powerful as well as the proletariat. What Multitude 
needs is an accompanying set of strategies and policies that would empower the groups 
the authors rightfully see as central for global political change, along with an account of 
the mechanism by which they can form a politics out of this solidarity.  
 
187. Thus: “New figures of struggle and new subjectivities are produced in the conjecture of events, in 
the universal nomadism […] They are not posed merely against the imperial system—they are not simply 
negative forces. They also express, nourish, and develop positively their own constituent projects. […] This 
constituent aspect of the movement of the multitude, in its myriad faces, is really the positive terrain of the 
historical construction of Empire, […] an antagonistic and creative positivity. The deterritorializing power 
of the multitude is the productive force that sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and 
makes necessary its destruction.” Multitude, 60. Lest it seem, as critics claimed, that the multitude were 
merely the flip-side of empire, expressed in the so-called anti-globalization movement but incapable of 
truly creative projects, Hardt and Negri developed the idea further in Commonwealth, although the book 
does less than it purports to in differentiating itself from Multitude. Drawing on historical concepts of the 
commons and linking them to the creative capacities of networked workers, who are described as the “gra-
vediggers” Marx tells us to look for, Hardt and Negri explore the possible basis in language and culture for 










  Precarity is experienced through insecurity, unemployment, migration and dislo-
cation, resulting primarily in the destabilization of both the ends and means that produce 
vibrant public spheres. Workers are at risk of poverty and imprisonment, even if em-
ployed, and rewarded on the basis of their exploitability, rather than work. This narrows 
the field of their political interests such that hedging against this precarity is the central 
focus, which does not produce the necessary tension with the political space required for 
a critical publicity to function. Nor does this flux automatically or easily create the sort of 
networks or associations that promote solidarity and action. Without looking at work, po-
litical theorists miss this challenge to their ideas about deliberative public sphere citizens.   
 
3.6 Challenge Two: The other side of Precarity is Ubiquitous labor 
 
 We also need to recognize how work is both scarce, in the form of precarity, and 
overabundant, in the form of overwork and ubiquity. This is not a paradox; economic 
pressures lead to compressions at the demand side of the labor market, while also produc-
ing a climate in which workers have fewer options and this less power within the work-
place.188 In times of higher unemployment, workers are more likely to respond to pres-
 
188. Employers cooperate with workers, address their concerns, and/or give them a voice only when 
the cost of not doing so to company profits, flexibility and publications- is greater than that of cooperation.”  
Kate Bronfenbrenner, “What Do Workers Want: Reflections on the Implications of the Freeman and Rog-
ers Study,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 3 (2001 2000): 385. This is 










sure to work longer hours and take their work home with them. The second central chal-
lenge to workers, and to arguments that the “precariat” will rise up independently, come 
from the erosion of time and energy humans devote to other pursuits. This applies both to 
we spend our days and lives, including the degree to which education or socialization is 
focused on wage labor. Aside from working more hours in general, a trend that holds true 
for those with a salary and those who are paid by the hour or piece, demands from the 
workplace during non-work hours or the imperative to develop oneself into a better 
worker grow. Self-surveillance or treatment of one’s self as one’s resume embodies the 
need to conform to physical and mental qualities of a good worker, reinforcing norms 
hostile to variations in performance of gender, racial or sexual roles. It also applies to the 
functions of society as a whole, given the erosion of long-term ritualistic holidays that 
interrupted and regulated agricultural production under feudalism, which provided sup-
port for the poor as well as communal reflection. Time is experienced instead as uniform 
and linear, centered on the repetitive workday rather than the ebb and flow of ritualistic 
and spiritual time. Finally, some of the traditional spaces of resistance to work as necessi-
ty, such as art and education, are even more oriented towards producing saleable products, 
be they art or workers. 
 Human beings work for wages for more of their lives than in any point in history. 
This may sound only trivially true, given that the dominance of the labor market over 
other ways of providing sustenance is relatively new. It is indeed possible that the work 









will suggest below that there were important contrasts in the system of work that provid-
ed space for other parts of life. Of course, who works, in what situation and for how 
much is a highly complex equation that varies by country, socioeconomic status and gen-
der. However, it is not only in the famously overworked United States that hours spent 
working are rising; even in France, home of the 35 hour workweek and a maternalist pol-
icy that rewards women who do not work, the percentage of citizens who are seeking 
paid employment is on the rise, as is part-time work.189   
Indeed, the workers seek more hours in response to labor practices that reward 
companies for hiring part-time works as well as overworking full-time ones. Part-time 
workers, who are much cheaper per hour for employers in the United States, can be used 
to carefully regulate the company’s labor costs. In busier times, workers will be allotted 
more hours, while otherwise kept to a minimum, in a new twist on inventory on demand. 
The tendency of women and students to see themselves as voluntary part-time workers 
helps mitigate the potential backlash for this practice.190 However, as is evident in the 
Wal-Mart protests developing around required work during holidays such as Thanksgiv-
 
189. “France: Less Work, More Time Off,” CBS News, accessed November 22, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3475_162-704571.html. 
190. Bruce J. Eberhardt and Steven B. Moser, “The Nature And Consequences Of Part-Time Work: A 










ing, and the hiring of many part-time workers who seek full-time employment, this ten-
dency is not perfect.191 Indeed, increasing part-time work is no solution.  
Similarly, a tight labor market encourages unwanted and unpaid overtime as 
workers attempt to retain their jobs. This applies both to salaried and hourly workers, the 
former of whom are often responding to professional norms that associate long hours 
with success.192 Working 12-hour days or more is normal on Wall Street, and these prac-
tices are common among doctors and other professionals as well193 In professions that 
pay by the hour or have lower overall salaries, overtime is even more problematic.194 It is 
more and more common for a technically 40 hour work week to stretch far beyond that; 
while each individual can be seen as “choosing” to stay late or take a second job, the 
 
191. One argument is that these workers should be understood as “the working unemployed” given the 
frequency with which the instability in their work leads to taking on multiple jobs, some in the informal 
labor market, Stuart Henry, “The Working Unemployed: Perspectives on the Informal Economy and Un-
employment1,” The Sociological Review 30, no. 3 (1982): 460–477, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
954X.1982.tb00663.x. Alternately, we could identify a “dualism” that divides workers and promotes over-
work. Chris Tilly, “Dualism in Part-Time Employment,” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and 
Society 31, no. 2 (1992): 330–347,  
192. In the United Kingdom 20-30% of workers worked unpaid overtime in 2010 “Trades Union Con-
gress - 900,000 Workers Across the South East Are Working Unpaid Overtime,” accessed November 22, 
2012, http://www.tuc.org.uk/workplace/tuc-19216-f0.cfm. This lead unions to call for a “Work your Proper 
Hours Day” for all workers. In the United States, data is lacking, but major corporations such as Google, 
Oracle and Bank of America have faced lawsuits alleging mandatory unpaid overtime, which are up 32% in 
2011 Paul Davidson, “More American Workers Sue Employers for Overtime Pay,” USATODAY.COM, 
accessed November 22, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/money/jobcenter/workplace/story/2012-04-
15/workers-sue-unpaid-overtime/54301774/1. 
193. Ho, Liquidated, 17.  
194. About 21% of full time workers worked mandatory (unpaid) overtime prior to the recession. 









ubiquity of the practice combined with the very real health effects bely that this choice is 
that free. 
One of the other key elements of this erosion of “leisure,” the now elusive free 
time that was seen as on the rise in the 1960’s and 1970’s, is the extension of workplace 
surveillance and pressures from external sources to internal pressures on the self. Tech-
nology, most notably in the form of email and cell phones, allows for this easy bleeding 
of work time into leisure time, although it is not purely a function of advanced ability for 
work concerns to permeate home time.195 Employees in less email-centric jobs are also 
subject to pressure to make themselves more available for work. As mentioned above, the 
rise of part-time service sector work coincides with a rise in expectations that part-time 
workers will be available when required.196 Workers are also, by dint of pressure to retain 
and advance, expected to spend their time in self-improvement ventures that increase 
their attractiveness as employees.197 Work and life becomes integrated so that even ac-
tivities like learning new recipes or attending exercise classes, or getting divorced or into 
debt, become part of one’s own marketability. 
 
195. Technologies allow for the constant access of work from home, but that this access leads to con-
flict most often for employees who heavily identify with their jobs and thus make themselves more availa-
ble. Wendy R. Boswell and Julie B. Olson-Buchanan, “The Use of Communication Technologies After 
Hours: The Role of Work Attitudes and Work-life Conflict,” Journal of Management 33, no. 4 (2007): 
592–610, doi:10.1177/0149206307302552. 
196. Union workers are subject to these expectations as well as assumptions that they will not vary 
their schedule in response to unpredictable family crises. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate. 
197. “You’re like an advert for yourself,” such that a CV becomes embodied in the physical and men-









Indeed, this integration is so common that we might wonder whether post-
industrial work is the new leisure, and that the blending of work and non-work time 
shows that work has become the source of fulfillment and identity that leisure once 
was.198 While we should be wary of valorizing a mostly mythical world of leisure time, 
before neo-liberalism, the high amount of stress that workers experience, in combination 
with the very real tensions and even neglect of children and families due to work, sug-
gests that this wholehearted identification with the workplace is not without major 
costs.199 However, it is clear that the workplace is now the central locus for both social 
belonging and personal meaning, such that individuals identify with their work in a way 
once reserved for professionals. Or, they fail to identify with it, and thus identify as fail-
ures.   
Work also takes up more of our time because the year as a whole is organized 
around a normalized schedule with few breaks for common holidays or rituals. This is 
explored in political theory in terms of the shifts in how time itself might be experi-
enced.200 It is certainly empirically true that, while we think of feudal times as full of 
 
198. Suzan Lewis, “The Integration of Paid Work and the Rest of Life. Is Post‐industrial Work the 
New Leisure?,” Leisure Studies 22, no. 4 (2003): 343–345,  
199. For an argument that Tayloristic principles of scientific management have been effectively dis-
seminated to leisure time, which is no longer functionally separate form work time, see Ed Andrew, Clos-
ing the Iron Cage: The Scientific Management of Work and Leisure (Black Rose Books, 1999). 
200. Charles Taylor, in his massive exploration of secularism, sees our experience as time as essential-












hardship, they were also punctuated by holidays and festivals throughout the year, which 
provided rest and community strengthening ties. As these traditions were replaced, the 
connections between rich and poor eroded.201 Of course, the holidays that do exist for 
most workers (although of course not all) were hard-won in the early 20th century, as un-
ions and other labor activists pushed against truly all-consuming workweeks and hours.202   
In a similar vein, just as time becomes homogenized in relation to the workday, so 
to do the orientation of activities and institutions, most prominently education, towards 
the workplace. The purpose of public education has, in part, always been connected to 
socializing individuals so that could be good consumers, workers and citizens. Even the 
more stratified education systems, either historically or in non-American contexts, serve 
the function of preparing students for the roles they will play as adults, however modified 
by historical configurations of class or local conditions. The debate about the future of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
and local happenings. He calls these “higher times” and claims that holidays can be “warps” which connect 
moments to each other, while normal time is experienced as expendable and commodified. Charles Taylor, 
A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 
201. Professor James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale 
University Press, 1987). 
202. Perhaps holidays still provide much needed “slow time,” particularly for women who may often 
engage in both paid and unpaid labor. Rosemary Deem, “No Time for a Rest? An Exploration of Women’s 










the liberal arts education is not a simple not concluded one.203 Yet, liberal arts education 
at its core resists market imperatives and creates humans with who are culturally literate 
and the ability to critically engage the systems around them. This ideal has never been 
available to even a fraction of the population in the United States or other wealthy coun-
tries, so some of the hand wringing is no doubt nostalgia in an unrealistic way. But, in 
another sense, the fight over the future of education is a fight over the role that work will 
play in the lives of future generations, and what sort of skills and sensibilities they will 
develop as part of their education.  
 
3.7 Challenge Three: Depoliticization of the Economic Life    
 
The ubiquity of work is particularly difficult to manage because working condi-
tions and work itself are depoliticized so as to seem natural; to make a politics of work, 
work itself needs to be seen as a subject for political activism. This is not the same thing 
as making employment figures part of the political discourse, but asking why work is ar-
ranged in the way that it is, and under what conditions could we work differently. The 
term “depoliticization “has its theoretical origins in the work of Carl Schmitt, who accus-
 
203. For an overview, see Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New 
Economy: Markets, State, and Higher Education (JHU Press, 2004). She argues that higher education has 
been converted to a market driven system of “academic capitalism” where universities shift to seeing stu-
dents as customers and seek to maximize profit. Even beyond the university, welfare systems aim to pro-
duce good workers, particularly workers willing to take on unpaid labor in addition to a waged job. Nona 
Yetta Glazer, Women’s Paid and Unpaid Labor: The Work Transfer in Health Care and Retailing (Temple 









es liberalism of adopting this process as a way of neutralizing conflict.204 Thus if the 
market, and by extension the labor market and workplace, is itself perceived as respond-
ing to natural economic laws, the conditions of the workplace are themselves natural. 
Given that work is connected intimately to some of the more depoliticized elements of 
society- private life, the family and technology- this is no wonder. 
The lack of interest in work by political science and theory echoes its’ general de-
politicalization. This trend is not new.205 Indeed, as union based politics, not to mention 
socialist alternatives, are on the wane in the United States and in the world, the vehicles 
for studying the power dynamics, socialization effects and organization of work in a po-
litical science are fewer and fewer. Perhaps this depoliticalization is linked to the capital-
ist form of waged work, but also the historical heritage of the work ethic.206 If work is 
ubiquitous and somewhat inevitable, than it may seem that making it a subject of norma-
 
204. “[D}esignating the adversary as political and oneself as nonpolitical (i.e., scientific, just, objec-
tive, neutral, etc) is in actuality a typical and unusually intensive way of pursuing politics.” Carl Schmitt, 
The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab, Expanded (University Of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 21  
205. C. Wright Mills, White Collar:The American Middle Classes: The American Middle Classes (Ox-
ford University Press, 2002) This famous exploration of “the American middle classes” predicts a great 
many of the above trends in the early 60’s, and he begins his study by noting that the frequent intra-
comparison of different sorts of work rarely rise to questioning “the world of work as presently organized.” 
3.   










tive political theory is pointless. The exceptions to this rule, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, have broadly been calls for more democratic organization of the workplace.207 
However, the call for genuinely democratic workplaces has been met by internal 
reorganization that does not substantively shift power to employees, although it occurs 
under the name of empowerment. Employee empowerment is a central tenet of manage-
ment literature from the 1990’s, replacing the earlier calls for post-Fordism and flexibil-
ity.208 In a representative quote, empowerment was supposed to “unleash the synergistic, 
creative energy of everyone in the workplace.”209 In other words, calls for democratic 
empowerment in the workplace have been perverted into profit-gaining ventures that seek 
to shift responsibility to employees in hope they produce surplus surplus value. These 
sorts of processes have been implemented in all kinds of workplaces, including assembly 
lines through the much-vaunted Total Quality Management system, all the way up 
through mid-level management. There are not, however, corresponding shifts in the own-
ership structures of most businesses, nor in the decision-making hierarchy. 
 
207. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy; Pateman, Participatory Democracy  
208. B. Harley, “The Myth of Empowerment: Work Organisation, Hierarchy and Employee Autonomy 
in Contemporary Australian Workplaces,” Work, Employment & Society 13, no. 1 (1999): 41–66. This type 
of thinking either involves a commonsense involvement of employees in the decisions that affect them, or 
the grander shift to a conceptualisation of “leadership” by employees that replaces the paternalistic rela-
tionship, and is embodied in practices like autonomous team based work groups. 











Workplace democracy has been folded into the depoliticized workplace and its 
mini- realization in the form of “empowerment” has dovetailed with increased self- and 
co-surveillance at work, rather than the desired democracy. Instead of meaningful control 
of their working conditions, employees increasingly function under the simulacrum of 
control that expresses itself in a need to monitor oneself and others for performance goals. 
The hierarchical nature of corporations themselves, and their relationship to the market 
via shareholder responsibility is unchanged, as are the wage and power differentials be-
tween workers. Surely an authentically worker-controlled entity would alter these struc-
tures significantly. Even the famed Mondragón worker’s cooperative in the Basque re-
gion of Spain functions has been accused of behaving very similarly to non-cooperative 
firms in the area, and that workers in fact are less likely to push for their rights to demo-
cratically control the entity, in part because the myth of horizontal control diffuses poten-
tial conflict, further depoliticizing work.210 
While Michel Foucault’s claims about disciplinary power form the backdrop for 
much analysis of workplace control, postulating an overall shift in the organization of 
surveillance and visibility is not required to make the point that employee empowerment 
is often a smokescreen for increased pressure and control.211 We might understand this as 
 
210. Sharryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragón: Cooperatives, Politics, and Working-class Life in a 
Basque Town (SUNY Press, 1996). 
211. This is beautifully illustrated in the 2005 film Brazil directed by Terry Gilliam, where the anti-












the privatization of stress, such that each individual worker is expected to take responsi-
bility for the corporation as a whole.212 This way of training or treating employees is not 
limited to white collar employment; from McDonald’s to the factory floor, a focus on 
empowerment and identifying with one’s work is common. Just as the ubiquity of work 
makes work more common outside the workplace, so too does the cooption of workplace 
democracy make work itself more pressured and all-consuming. 
 
3.8 Challenge Four: Work in the world relies on Reproductive Labor in the Home  
 
If the work of citizenship is made difficult to undertake given the three challenges 
above, it is made nearly impossible by the incapability of waged work with the work and 
labor in the home that supports families and politics.  This is especially problematic be-
cause shifts to dual earner families put immense pressures on workers, particularly in re-
lation to traditional gender roles. This shift is far more central to experiences of work/life 
conflict than the extension of working hours, as families struggle to cope with household 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
and to a complete lack of information about his duties. Instead, the head of his department tromps through 
echoing corridors, as employees mob him for signatures. This is employee empowerment taken to an ex-
treme, but just as in lesser examples, results in turning pressures inward and making the employee the focus 
of any mistakes. 









care work, including childcare responsibilities.213 When “work/life balance” is discussed, 
the image evoked is of an upper-class professional woman who is deciding whether to 
take time off from work to raise her children. Debate about this choice has focused and 
derailed feminism since the gains in women’s employment in the 1970’s and 1980’s, fo-
cusing on “choice” and arguing about the relative value of these choices. The struggles of 
professionals are no doubt less than sympathetic for the majority of Americans, who may 
not connect their own experiences of tensions between work and family with the stylized 
drama over the mommy track. Nonetheless, the way that work is organized today is in-
compatible with the care work required in the home. This is true for professional jobs 
where long-hours, perhaps measured in terms of what is billable, combine with competi-
tion for promotion and assumptions that women with families will be less dedicated pro-
duce conflict. This is, of course, part of the explanation for the remaining glass ceiling 
effect, given the continued higher levels of childcare and housework undertaken by 
women. 
However, other types of work are also incompatible with family responsibilities, 
and this incompatibility may be particularly difficult on non-gender role conforming in-
dividuals, like men, who seek to navigate this tension. Working class men, who may be 
part of masculinized workplaces where care responsibilities are interpreted as deviant, 
 
213. Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, “Overworked Individuals or Overworked Families? Ex-











struggle to manage work and family.214 This is not an argument that work needs to bend 
to match up with the natural form of the nuclear family; no doubt, many of these tensions 
emerge also from gendered assumptions about who raises children and who provides ma-
terially for individuals. But given that neither side of this equation matches up with the 
ideal, it is time for both families and workplaces to change. 
Indeed, one way to understand shifts in the workplace is through an exploration of 
the role that gender still plays in work. In particular, labor is also frequently described as 
“feminized.” This both means that women, worldwide, have surpassed men quantitatively 
in the workplace, and that qualitatively the work that people are likely to engage in is that 
traditionally associated with femininity. Many, perhaps even most, people work in jobs 
where they persuade, sell, serve, enable, respond, care for, raise or even cook or clean for 
others. These are, obviously, the traditional roles of women. The service economy is the 
most obvious aspect of this shift, but so is the rise of an economy more and more driven 
by socially reproductive labor, that is labor that communicates and nurtures our shared 
culture and bodies.  Women are traditionally the producers of culture in this sense, even 
if what they traditionally pass on is patriarchal. To feminize labor is therefore to make it 
 
214. Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter (Harvard 










reproductive, but also to render it weak and vulnerable to the excesses of capital, which is 
masculinized as the manipulator and consumer of culture and raw labor. 
Indeed, women themselves are very attractive workers for the new economy. One 
would think that their greater share of childcare and housework would make them unat-
tractive, and indeed this is typically blamed for the remaining “glass ceiling” effect. 
Many people are burdened with the pressures of care and housework, including powerful 
women who may face heightened pressure to perform as well as those in more typical 
jobs.215 However, their commitments to unpaid labor outside the workplace mean that 
women are more likely to accept part-time work, which is typically lower paying and 
without benefits. They may also be willing to take on piecework in the home, or intermit-
tent work that is understood as an extension of their chores.216 Women are useful to em-
ployers precisely because of the conflict that may have with family life. 
The anxiety produced by the desirability of feminized labor in the new, networked 
economy (even as this employment is increasingly contingent) is displayed in the cultural 
churn around the “mancession” and general hand wringing about crisis in masculinity.. 
 
215. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation: New Edition, 2nd ed. (Basic 
Books, 1993); Ruth Simpson, “Have Times Changed? Career Barriers and the Token Woman Manager,” 
British Journal of Management 8 (June 1, 1997): 121–130, doi:10.1111/1467-8551.8.s1.10. 
216. For example: Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, Third World Women 
and the Politics of Feminism (Indiana University Press, 1991). This text explores how the construction of a 
variety of jobs as “women’s work”- whether they are lace making in India or assembly of chips in Silicon 
Valley- relies on assumptions about the close connection between women and motherhood to obtain flexi-









The tight connection between whiteness, masculinity, work ethic and citizenship is chal-
lenged by a global labor market that seeks out women and minorities, and values emo-
tional labor. Many news stories trumpeted the “mancession,” claiming that the recent job 
losses hurt men much more than women, and others claimed that hiring was also dispro-
portionately helping women. Although it is true that job losses in male dominated indus-
tries like mining and manufacturing meant more job losses for men, the recovery has 
benefited men more than women.217 Still, middle-aged and working class men, once the 
most likely to be employed in stable and long term jobs, are less likely to be employed in 
general, and in such jobs in particular. This makes them prime allies. 
 
3.9 Reflections on the Central Challenges of Contemporary Work  
 
That these issues are problematic in terms of equality and justice is no surprise, 
but this interaction with democratic theory suggests that the organization of work is a 
central democratic problem. Rather than the independent, vocal, speaker who moves 
from a secure private space into a public one of contestation and inequality, we have de-
pendent, mobile, precarious workers whose education is aimed at meeting labor force 
demands, even as paid work clashes with gendered care responsibilities in the home. And, 
 
217. “Two Years of Economic Recovery: Women Lose Jobs, Men Find Them,” Pew Social & Demo-











given the centrality of work, we have little explanation of how the public is built and sus-
tained, or by whom. The promise of a mini-public within the workplace has turned to the 
control of workers, and the movement of women to the workplace has only increased the 
pressures on families. Work is the central problem for a full theory of democratic citizen-
ship today. 
The good citizen has a good job which adds to society through productive in-
creases in GDP, and yet these jobs are not limited by status citizenship via outsourcing 
while growth in America centers on, on one end, service and care industry jobs like 
healthcare, personal services and entertainment, and on the other, self-consciously non-
national and entrepreneurial knowledge workers epitomized by the technology sector. 
The unemployed, while not technically barred from citizenship (and indeed blessed with 
the leisure time to participate), lack the informal standing of a wage and corresponding 
place in the political order, while those with work are likely to be distanced from the po-
litical space because of the very work they do (if it is abject) or divorced from national 
and local politics because of the global orientation of their work. It should be no surprise 
to anyone that technological elites are willing to renounce their citizenships or seek out 
complex tax havens to avoid capital gains taxes. Indeed, we have come to a point where, 
in Aristotle’s terms, most of us are living as non-citizens, or “natural slaves” while a se-
lect view live not as citizens but as nomadic elites, with few commitments to particular 









The unemployed, are likely to experience their own alienation from the political 
space, aided in part by the demonization of public assistance in the political world. Illus-
trations of this are not hard to find in the wake of massive unemployment in 2009 and 
2010. While much of the reporting has focused on the psychological traumas of unem-
ployment, often in relation to de masculinization experienced by male ex-breadwinners, 
this psychological distress points to the paramount importance of employment for Ameri-
can citizens. It also suggests that the model of citizenship prominent in the west is built 
squarely on masculine conceptions of work and respect. The trick is to cultivate meaning-
ful work and accompanying respect (self and otherwise), without demeaning work that is 
not masculine, and while building the social solidarity that makes political action possible 
and desirable. This can only happen by rejecting the current way that we work, particular-
ly in its commitment to an inaccurate model of a head of household worker with few out-
side responsibilities.  
The difficulty of meeting these four challenges to the livelihood and democratic 
possibilities of workers is readily apparently. In specific, work trains people who do not 
fit the dominant mode of democratic theory, particularly because they spend their time in 
the privatized space of the workplace, learning to form themselves flexibility to market 
imperatives rather than developing norms of universal public reason. They also lack the 
supportive network or public space in which to act politically, given the spread of depo-
liticized work throughout life and even time as experienced by workers. Finally, they 









ity, requiring constant self-surveillance. In the last chapter, I will suggest reforms that 
will better support democratic citizenship and more stable work; however, it is also nec-
essary to rethink democratic theory. To do this, we should follow the examples of actual 
citizens who sought to moderate or overcome the challenges of the political space they 
lived in, by drawing on the importance of their previously unrecognized work for citizen-












CHAPTER FOUR: CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP: SHAYS’ REBELLION, THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE PROGRESSIVES’ PROMOTION OF 
GOOD CITIZENSHIP  
 
4.1 Introducing the Historical Dimensions of the Problem  
 
 If we want to overcome the challenges to public sphere citizenship discussed in 
the last chapter, it will help to illustrate how work/labor hierarchies relates to political 
citizenship in an historical sense. This illustration will both provide an example of a 
group of citizens who sought to build public spheres around the concepts of need, rather 
than individualistic independence. Given their spectacular and violent failure, in the form 
of Shay’s Rebellion, it will also offer a warning that changing the relationship between 
hierarchies of work and citizenship is a hard task. Their failure, however, was made good 
over one hundred years later in the work of Progressive theorists who struggle to extend 
concepts of citizenship to include those who labored, even as this extension produced 
new complexities and altered the original Aristotelian concept of citizenship markedly. 
We can see this shift also in the struggle of the role of the government in the courts, 
which provides fodder for a theory of democratic work.   
The citizenship regime under the Articles of Confederation displays the clash be-
tween doctrines of democratic citizenship and experiences of the soldiers and workers 
whose class did not qualify them for the franchise. They contested this exclusion not on 









rights of assembly and constitutional competency. Of course, women and slaves, not to 
mention those below the waged laborers, free blacks and foreigners, were also without a 
voice in the new republic, but it was those on the margins of acceptance who put forth an 
alternative conception of good citizenship and a just economic order, as well as a public 
sphere in which to speak. While their claims returned in later arguments by populist 
farmers, remaining a subterranean stream in American political thought, to a great extent 
this alternative was quashed in the progressive response to urbanization and industrializa-
tion, where concerns about the “mass” citizen and worker fed impulses to regulate family 
life through by rewarding masculinity in the form of ordered wage labor. 
 
4.2 Citizenship in Liberal and Republican theory  
 
The origins of normative conceptions of citizenship in the United States emerge 
from the colonial experience of crafting a new political order, drawing on the heritage of 
European social and political thought to address the unique challenges that faced the ex-
colonists, such as slavery, relatively low levels of education and literacy, and debt. As 
many have traced, the two strongest theoretical bases for good citizenship evolved from 
the liberal individualist tradition218 and the civic republican.219 An ever-shifting combina-
 
218. Tracing the history of liberalism in itself and in America is a dissertation in itself. However, Louis 
Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, 1955 is the classic text, although his claim’s that there have never 
been true alternatives have been widely debate; see David F. Ericson and Louisa Bertch Green, The Liberal 












tion of these two approaches to citizenship prevailed, with the liberal social contract serv-
ing as a model for basic membership and rights, and the civic republican for exemplary 
citizenship that ought to be admired. There are serious differences between these ap-
proaches, particularly in contemporary adherents. However, both approaches valorized 
the individual property owner, even sometimes allowing for members of otherwise sus-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Brent Gilchrist, Cultus Americanus: Varieties of the Liberal Tradition in American Political Culture, 1600-
1865 (Lexington Books, 2007) and of course, Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citi-
zenship in U.S. History (Yale University Press, 1997). For the roots of liberalism in political theory, see 
Crawford Brough Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1964) for the association of the roots of liberalism and acquisitiveness.  The core 
concepts of the somewhat varied approaches that fall under the heading of liberalism include “an image of 
human beings as essentially equal, rights-bearing, interest oriented individuals who are entitled to have 
these rights defended, especially against governmental intrusion” James P. Young, “Reconsidering Ameri-
can Liberalism” in Andreas Hess, American Social and Political Thought: A Reader (NYU Press, 2002) 
65. Civic Republicanism is associated with historical traditions in Europe as well as arguments about 
the founding traditions in the United States, often centered around the Cambridge School and the works 
such as Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 1. “The” Renaissance (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 2, The Age of Reformation 
(Cambridge University Press, 1978) and Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli 
and Republicanism (Cambridge University Press, 1993). In these accounts, civic republicanism is an histor-
ical alternative to liberalism where the activities and virtues of citizenship are foregrounded, as is the im-
portance of constitutional government. For application to the American context, see John G.A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975); Ber-
nard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Harvard University Press, 1967; Gordon 
S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution: How a Revolution Transformed a Monarchical So-
ciety into a Democratic One Unlike Any That Had Ever Existed, (1992); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic 1776-1787, (1969).  Thomas L. Pangle critiques these thinkers for overemphasizing 
aspects of positive freedom in their explorations of civic republicanism in The Spirit of Modern Republi-
canism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (University of Chicago 
Press, 1990). Contemporary civic republican Philip Pettit responds to this critique by arguing for the con-
cept of freedom as non-domination, which is preferable to concepts of freedom as non-interference because 
“you can be dominated by someone, in the case of the lucky or cunning slave, without actually suffering 
interference at their hands and you can be interfered with by some agency, as in the case of subjection to a 
suitable form of law and government, without being dominated by anyone” (Philip Pettit, Republicanism!: 
A Theory of Freedom and Government: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press, 









pect groups to gain membership because of their status as men of property and leisure. To 
be a good liberal citizen is to quietly tend one’s enlightened self-interest and private good, 
while avoiding harming others in the polity. This citizen ideal is associated with the inde-
pendence of traditional masculinity, and activities such as military service in contrast 
with the dependence of women and children.220 Civic Republican citizenship certainly 
requires a much thicker engagement with the “public good,” and a concern that political 
life be as important as private life. However, the good Civic Republican citizen, if civic 
minded and perhaps less individualistic than the liberal citizen, is also defined by inde-
pendence and masculinity.221 These two classical approaches to citizenship heavily influ-
enced the elite debates at the time of the founding, and independence was frequently as-
sociated with landowners who were not dependent on daily labor to maintain their own 
lives.222  
 
220. Perhaps understood as an underlying “sexual contract” which links the liberal social contract 
model to the story of “how a specifically modern form of patriarchy is established” (Carole Pateman, The 
Sexual Contract, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 1988), 1. Or, perhaps through policies which reward 
the greater obligations of men, such as military service, preserve this tension even when women are formal-
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        Yet independent landowner was not the actual position of most citizens under the 
Articles of Confederation, and the question of what sort of work should count for good 
citizenship was an open one, particularly in relation to money and debt. The pressure 
from poorer citizens in the Northern States, particularly those with high debt loads, ex-
poses the close relationship between political citizenship rights and economic or social 
ones. One of their strongest demands was the end of debtor's prison, which they argued 
was an unjust application of state power for what was essentially a private, community 
matter. The development of the debt economy is intimately tied to the creation of state 
power, which shifts localized regimes of credit to debt regimes backed by force.223 Debt-
or's prison, and associated practices where entire homes or, perhaps apocryphally, an old 
woman's bed, were forcibly removed from those who owed either taxes or debts to other 
citizens, were a normal occurrence in 18th century United States. However, the citizens 
and soldiers who had supported the Revolution did not accept this practice, or the growth 
of state taxes in general, as appropriate for the free and self-governed people, whose ex-
ercise of their political rights, as well as access to economic opportunity, required that 
their basic needs were met. Each person, (able-bodied white male), needed the security 
and resources from which to secure his broader place in society. 
 









4.3 Federal Citizenship under The Articles of Confederation was linked to Mobility 
 
The Constitution of 1787, or at least its interpretation in the Federalist Papers, fa-
vored a hybrid of civil republican and liberal visions of American citizenship, but the Ar-
ticles of Confederation that they replaced were open to a wider variety of citizen practices. 
Typically, the Articles of Confederation are faulted failing to solve coordination and free 
rider problems, particularly those raised by common defense or trade; however, they also 
allowed for non-elites to act politically in a way rejected by the 1787 Constitution, per-
haps providing another impetus for their adoption.  This event and surrounding political 
debate, and the Anti-Federalist Papers themselves, offer a clear vision of citizenship 
housed not only in the Civic Republican tradition of active participation, but moving be-
yond it into a populist advocacy of democratic collective rights, both to the material sup-
ports required for political participation and direct constitutional competency in the form 
of nullification and recall. Yet the type of government and society reflected in and pro-
moted by the Articles, even as reflected in the famous Shays’ Rebellion, was not de-
stroyed by the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, but rather remained a subterranean force. 
While the Treaty of Paris officially ended the war on September 3rd, 1783, the co-
lonials had been operating under the Articles of Confederation since 1777, and they were 
officially ratified in 1781. There are few descriptions of citizenship in the Articles, as the 









what self-contradictory. We find the familiar guarantee "to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States" granted to all state members. 224 This article barred 
slaves by definition, but also listed "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice" as 
lacking protection.225 These privileges and immunities are given some definition as the 
Articles go on to guarantee freedom of motion between the states, and forbade trade poli-
cies, such as duties or taxes, that are only applied to non-state residents.226 To be a citizen 
under the articles was to be mobile.  
These basic scaffolding was less about citizenship in a normative or rights-based 
sense, and more about the political economy established by this understanding of citizen-
ship. The Articles were protected, or attempted to protect, an open market for labor as 
much as capital, at least inasmuch as every member of the United States must respond to 
the same rules in whatever jurisdiction they found themselves, and this extended to non-
commerce related laws, and to extradition of those charged with "treason, felony, or other 
high misdemeanor in any State."227 While this last provision is of course part of attempts 
to create a united criminal justice system, it also supports greater mobility of labor be-
cause it reassured employers that mobile citizens will still be subject to rule of law.  
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An Articles citizen is thus a mobile one, who can move between states with little 
trouble, and perhaps also to bring goods from state to state. This seems inconsequential in 
our current understanding of states as nearly borderless entities, but at the time is a bold 
transformation of relations between the states. It is at the level of state citizenship that 
citizen’s political rights are secured, as the Articles are silent otherwise on the place of 
the individual. Even the requirements for delegate selection are left up to the states, 
which of course have one vote each. The primary focus of political belonging is in fact 
the states. Yet, there is a hint of national citizenship here, as the guarantee of portable 
privileges and immunities suggests. 
However, the Article citizen is not merely a commercial one, moving between 
states in the service of commerce. He or she is also a potential judge, which is more cen-
tral to a broader conception of citizen competence than the otherwise broader protections 
for citizens in the 1787 Constitution. Because of the remaining borders between states 
mean conflict, a complex system for the settling of controversies between different states 
is adopted.228 If the two states in conflict cannot mutually agree to appoint a court, then 
congress shall name "three persons out of each of the United States" and then proceed to 
whittle this list, partially by lot, until a commission of judges is seated. Each Commis-
sioner must swear "'well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according 
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to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection or hope of reward.”229 The commer-
cial citizen is thus always also a potential judge of the highest controversies, a sort of pro-
to-supreme court that is utterly of the people. The importance of this is not merely the 
type of skills it assumes and cultivates, but the very central place that such adjudication 
of conflict has in social contract theory, and the reasoning behind the new government230. 
And in the Articles of Confederation, all citizens may be called on for this duty. 
Of course, this judgment applied only to states, not to individuals, which severely 
limits it as national form of citizenship. It is interesting, however, that the facility of 
judgment was thus nationalized, while punishment of citizens was held at a state level. 
This is a different system altogether than the dual citizenship that ends up evolving under 
the constitution. This dual citizenship is one where all restriction and punishment is a 
state or local affair, while the ability to move freely, to work or trade and to serve as ad-




230. Indeed, one way to read Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan is not as a proto-fascist glorification of 
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the power of shared definitions and common names. The problem in the state of nature is this lack of clarity 
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4.4 Why political economy was a key locus of struggles for Political Membership 
 
There are three main areas in which the Articles were found wanting, and which 
provided justification for the move to the more powerful government that eventually 
emerged. First, struggles over currency, debt, and the lingering costs of the revolutionary 
war. Second, concerns about the decision making process itself, as inefficient and per-
haps even tyrannous. Finally, the specter of war, and the need for a clearer voice in for-
eign affairs prompted this conflict. Embedded in each of these was a concern about the 
type of citizen allowed for and promoted by the articles, a citizen who was both a worker 
and (potentially) direct participant in public and constitutional affairs. 
 A populist vision of citizenship housed in a free people, not limited to the landed 
gentry, and attracted many actual citizens, including Daniel Shays. Shays’ Rebellion is 
the most well known confrontation between state government and citizens before the 
adoption of the Constitution, but hardly the only. It does bring to the forefront the com-
plex stew of competing interests and concepts of nationhood present in the newly minted 
states. Indeed, its very designation as a "rebellion" reflects the interpretation of the elites 
of Massachusetts, who saw in the mass action "a contempt for all constitutional govern-
ment" and indeed raised $20,000 to quell the disturbance.231 Elites of several states sup-
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ported Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts by push for the use of federal military, such 
as it was, to end the conflict and protect the large store of weapons and ammunition 
stored at Springfield. They were also eager to use the incident as motivation to scrap the 
Articles of Confederation. A side-effect or, in a more insidious reading, a goal of the up-
date was to rein in the model of co-constitutive workers’ citizenship embodied in the con-
flict, which was not seen by most participants as a "rebellion," but rather as a patriotic act 
of creative citizenship and defense of a political economy that rejected the growing pow-
er of finance capital.  
While Shay's Rebellion often refers to a specific clash, occurring at Worcester, 
Massachusetts in September of 1787, the discontent and activism that built this move-
ment began much earlier. The Massachusetts Constitution, which included many a pro-
tection not included in the Articles of Confederation and a relatively expansive view of 
citizen rights, limited suffrage to: “Every male person being twenty-one years of age, and 
resident in any particular town in this commonwealth, for the space of one year next pre-
ceding, having a freehold estate within the same town, of the annual income of three 
pounds, or any estate of the value of sixty pounds, shall have a right to vote in the choice 
of a representative or representatives for the said town."232 For the election of state offic-
ers, the requirement was an estate worth 60 pounds. These requirements left a great many 
small farmers who had previously been able to vote and hold office, at least in local elec-
 









tions, disenfranchised. This shift was a shock for many smaller farmers or workers, espe-
cially for those who had served in the Revolutionary army and understood themselves as 
a part of the new polity.  
It was not merely the changing voting requirements that politicized these (mostly) 
men; arguments about debt, currency and inequality were central to the post-
revolutionary experience, both at the individual and state level. We are familiar with the 
elite version of these arguments in the form of the fights over the national bank. For non-
statesmen, these arguments went beyond the academic, although they also contained a 
political theory. No doubt the depression of 1785 was an important backdrop to this ac-
tion, but dissent is not fully explained as an economic protest prompted by narrow self-
interest. Not only were some participants well off, but their demands were not merely for 
debtors’ relief, but also for the institution of a system that would insure more balance be-
tween debtors and creditors, and recognize the key nature of work, especially paid work, 
for American political life. Indeed, their claims would be echoed by the protests of the 
Progressive Populist Party after the civil war, and formed part of the justification for the 
New Deal. 
The backdrop for the currency crisis was of course the Revolutionary War, which 
had accrued a great deal of debt abroad, which must be paid in gold. The Articles provid-









mechanisms created a classic collective action problem.233 States who did not pay their 
share were not punished, and states that did ended up paying more than originally intend-
ed. But each state had high debts of its own, and so the taxation rates were quite high, 
averaging about $200 per head of household, and $50 per each person, including chil-
dren.234 This was more money than most farmers, even successful ones, earned in an en-
tire year, and the average salary for workers hovered around $25 per annum.235 Prior to 
the Revolutionary War, trade with the West Indies, particularly the products from the 
fishing and whaling industries of New England, had been robust, but these industries 
would take some twenty years to recover from the loss of ships and skills that occurred 
during the war.236 The textile and other industrial production that New England would 
become famous for had not yet fully developed, and the agrarian production of the south, 
while more profitable, relied on the unremunerated labor of slaves rather than free labor-
ers, and this led to a different set of tensions and political rebellions. 
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        Not only were there approximately 90,000 ex-soldiers who were adjusting to life 
after serving in the continental army, or various militias, but also many of these were 
owed back pay from the new government.237 Per the Articles of Confederation, each state 
was encouraged to keep an active and armed militia238. Furthermore, the recompense for 
debts owed was a suit in the courts, yet (per the Articles of Confederation) no suits could 
be brought by states or individuals against the federal governments. However, suits could 
(and were frequently) brought against debtors, and the spike in these court cases mirrored 
the high rates of debt and default all around.239 While lawyers may have profited off these 
exchanges, collecting from all sides, the net effect on most citizens was property seizure 
and in many cases, debtor's prison. The inability of people to pay debts was compounded 
by a lack of standard currency that was accepted; while debts and taxes needed to be paid 
in hard currency backed be species like gold or silver, this was in short supply. Instead, 
most people and workers had the paper currency that had been issued by most states and 
the National government during and after the war, which was not always accepted. It was 
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common for farmers to trade in goods, rather than currency, but goods-in-kind were not 
accepted as taxes. 
Floating currency, not backed by gold or other metal, was a source of great suspi-
cion, particularly because of the frequency that political changes rendered it useless. Af-
ter the Stamp Act and during the widening breach with Great Britain, Massachusetts and 
the other colonies lacked a source of hard currency, and so issued bills of credit backed 
with the questionable promise of redemption either by an as yet unimagined new gov-
ernmental form, or by the British Government once a new system of representation was 
established.240 In an interesting twist, the "tobacco standard" was essentially in effect in 
some parts of Virginia, as stores of tobacco in warehouses insured that (privately) printed 
notes were redeemable.241 While paper currency could easily depreciate, it was in circula-
tion along with numerous foreign coins backed by gold, which tended to gain in value. It 
is no wonder that the former was plentiful and the later scarce. 
The scarcity was far more problematic for everyday people than for government, 
as the latter's debts could be discharged with the notes but at least the taxation portion of 
the former's could not. The state governments could manufacture value in the form of 
printed currency and, despite the very real cycles of inflation and deflation that followed, 
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essentially solve their fiscal problems by fiat. There were limited political checks on this 
practice, and it destabilized the nascent compact. It also meant a political economy that 
favored large-scale debtors and currency trader, who benefited from inflation and the 
premium on hard currency, and disfavored those whose primary debts needed to be paid 
in this hard currency while they only held notes, such as ex-soldiers, laborers paid in 
notes and small to medium sized farmers and businesspeople.242 Those who protested the 
use of paper money, who sought to base currency in labor value, rather than exchange. 
Indeed, certain types of debtors were in favor of paper money; those with large holdings 
who could discharge their debts more easily in inflationary times.243 Those who protested 
the situation were not, as some have claimed, merely angry about general inequality and 
private debt, but the building of a monetary system that rewarded capital above labor.
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4.5 Understanding Shays in Context 
 
 Shays’ Rebellion, despite its place in every high school civics book, has generated 
relatively little scholarly output. One notable exception is a collection printed as a bicen-
tennial tribute of sorts.244 As these writers discuss, Shays’ Rebellion has been recuperated 
in the years since it occurred, so that some on both the right and left claim it as part of 
their origin story. However, the actual claims of the participants are not so easily assimi-
lated to contemporary ideology, and they support a vision of democratic life in America 
that is neither a minimalist state nor a strong central government. Even contemporaries of 
the event were not sure what to make of it. Far from actual events, they wondered at the 
causes for this disruption and were apt to blame a lack of political virtue and cohesive-
ness in citizens, rather than the government. 
Holding a civic republican view of citizenship, even when accompanied by skep-
ticism of power, elites in the cities do not consider whether rural activists might have a 
legitimate claim of their own to make, suggesting that “the mob is headed by some des-
perate fellows, without property or principle.” 245 They also tended to exaggerate the 
 
244. Robert A. Gross, In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion (University of 
Virginia Press, 1993). 
245. In a “Letter from John Marshall to James Wilkinson,” 1787, Marshall reports receiving “con-
flicting accounts of the motives and views of the insurgents. Marshall considered the possibility that the 












criminal histories of Shays and his cohort, in particular suggesting that they failed in the 
manly tasks of soldiering.246 This was untrue, given that no less illustrious figure than 
Lafayette had presented to Shays a sword recognizing his bravery.247 Observers of the 
conflict assumed the outside forces or criminal minds were at work. 
However, some journalists at the time did suggest that Shays was more than a 
criminal or pawn.248 They even identify the origins of Daniel Shays’ activities in a con-
vention of delegates convened to consider the problem of Massachusetts’ debt and the 
role of local courts in the debts of individuals.249 The actions of Shays and company were 
directed at courthouses and legal establishments, rather than the legislature or other 
branches. It was with the courts that the townspeople took issue, seeing them as usurping 
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the democratic role of the populace. Harper’s reports the Shays’ central talking point was 
the “undemocratic” status of judges.250 He also adapted the “nullification” theory of 
State’s rights to suit citizens claiming, “they had the right to dispense with all laws that 
were obnoxious to them.”251  In other words, citizens themselves had duty to examine and 
judge the laws of the land, and the judiciary branch was an impediment to this judgment. 
The reversibility of law on the basis of the decisions of the people was a core democratic 
principle. Given that many of these protestors had lost their ability to directly elect their 
representatives because of property holding requirements (and the shrinkage of fortunes 
experienced in the debt crisis), their claims reflect a demand that their voice be heard, at 
least in the form of nullification of the rulings of judges in matters of debt. 
 The words of Shays himself were not widely reported at the time, perhaps because 
they did not match up with the portrayal of him as an unkempt anarchist, committed to 
individualistic rejection of the rule of law. Until the famous attempt to take the armory of 
Springfield, which might have prevented the local militia from detaining the Regulators, 
Shays focused his campaign on the courts, and at each confrontation his groups petitioned 
for a stable currency and that their demands be published in Boston and beyond.252 Along 
with a healthy respect for the power of publicity, this suggests that Shays wanted a shift 
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in the entire regimes’ relationship to debt, not merely forgiveness for his own, and under-
stood the connection between dissent and public forums. The calls for nullification pro-
moted by Shays were not, as portrayed by elites, claims about the individual’s right to 
reject laws, but rather the collective right to do so. As soldiers and workers, these protest-
ers had supported and paid for the political institutions that were now, in their view, held 
by oligarchic interests who profited through high finance, while debt-ridden rural coun-
ties suffered. One of the few quotes remaining from Shays is from his defense of early 
actions against courts in Western Massachusetts, which followed months of attempts to 
advance grievances legally through the Committees of Correspondence that had formed 
the organizational backbone of the revolution only a decade earlier. Shays defends his 
Regulators against the charge of anarchy, noting that “we sincerely deprecate the conse-
quences of anarchy,” but must secure temporary support for suffering fellow citizens “in-
duced by the ties of friendship and trust, and by, as we trust, the stronger laws which reli-
gion indicates, of doing as we would be done by.”253 While this religious natural law ap-
peal may be less attractive to contemporary secular ears, it does indicate that the Regula-
tors had thought about what they were doing and why, and approached the courts as an 
appropriate target, while also seeking to popularize their understanding of what was owed 
to average citizens. 
 









The majority of primary source documents that remain are records of the battles 
themselves, rather than the speeches or deliberations of the participants in the battle. It 
would be nice if there were more records of the aspirations, motivations and arguments of 
the participants, but little of this information was preserved. In part this may be because 
historians and generations of civics students have assumed that the Regulators were pri-
marily poor farmers and debtors, and therefore both acting purely out of economic self-
interest and illiterate. However, this does not correlate to the actual demographic infor-
mation about the rebels, which showed that not only debtors or farmers who participated, 
but entire rural communities in Worchester, Berkshire and Hampshire counties.254 Most 
strikingly, there was no clear correlation between debt and rebellion.255 While debt issues 
may have influenced the political climate and Daniel Shays himself, a widespread feeling 
that the Massachusetts government was beholden to Boston corporate interests was also 
important. 
In petitions and speeches, Regulators affirmed the right to assemble and to give 
opinions on public measures, and a decidedly negative appraisal of the political economy 
of the day, including the cost of state government (which itself was a passed-on federal 
expense), and the currency problems discussed above, including the sorts of punishments 
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offered to debtors.256 Local assemblies often predated these petitions where townspeople 
met to discuss their shared frustrations. One common complaint was that government is 
attentive to the needs of townspeople in places like Boston and New York, rather than the 
average people in the hinterland.257 This trope will be repeated throughout the history of 
American political life, whether in the form of populist uprisings or the urban/rural ten-
sions exposed during national election cycles.  The political climate was such that linking 
"two-penny shopkeepers, usurers, speculators, or any other class of men, that delight to 
fatten on the distresses of mankind” to the problems of the system was common.258 Yet 
the insulting tone that many popular newspapers took towards the well off, particularly 
the classes who were experimenting with finance capitalism, was more than just a cri-
tique of personal greed. Rather, the system itself was seen as responding to and codifying 
opportunities for greed, and thus increasing inequality and distress; one wrote that citi-
zens "who disdained to stoop to foreign tyrants, now bow their necks to internal des-
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pots.”259 In other words, the perception was that via the expansion of debt, an oligarchy 
was developing in the name of aristocratic governance of the learned few. 
 
4.6 Regulators as Popular Constitutionalists 
 
        The adoption of the odd name Regulators reflects that the protesters saw them-
selves as merely tinkering with the institutional design and balance of their society, rather 
than undermining it. While their opponents, including the authors of the Federalist Papers, 
most notably Alexander Hamilton, asserted that state power and republican citizenship 
were not incompatible, the Regulators asserted the direct competency of the people in the 
interpretation of the rights of assembly granted in the Massachusetts constitution. 
We might see this sort of competency claim as a type of popular constitutionalism, 
which is an approach in legal theory that applies populist democratic values to constitu-
tional theorizing, often as part of a critique of judicial review or supremacy. For Popular 
Constitutionalists, (despite a great deal of debate over the scope and justification for pop-
ular review of constitutional law or interpretation) there is no justification for the distance 
between average people and the constitution.260 Indeed, a central line of exploration of 
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popular constitutionalism suggest that the people, often as part of political contestation, 
engage in acts of constitutional interpretation from time to time. In this case, they inter-
pret judicial authority as overstepping the bounds of popular sovereignty inasmuch as it 
allows the unjust expropriation of citizen goods in relation to corrupt debt practices. 
        The Regulators, perhaps empowered by the space left open by the Articles of 
Confederation citizenship, claimed this sort of competency. They did not, however, base 
it in their formal status citizenship or even (solely) their military service. Rather, they 
rooted their claims in the work they did, as farmers and laborers, and the common set of 
needs that all humans have.  This basis is shown in their assertion of their rights as inde-
pendent and productive workers, who “earned” their homes and goods. Of course, this 
independence housed in free labor was opposed to the situation of slaves and women, 
both groups who were understood to be dependent and without the competency to serve 
as republican citizens. However, the Regulators and their ilk, despite drawing on racial 
and gendered understandings of the world which contributed to the limiting (and indeed 
in some places the revocation) of the franchise for women and even free blacks, had a 
broader understanding of productive citizenship that that of the classical republican no-
bleman. The new American citizen was not one of leisure, but rather one who worked for 
a living and because of this work deserved a voice. The citizen also deserved economic 
protection as well as political representation, and the controversy over debt and currency 
reflects this tension, which we might understand as “jockeying for power among the vari-









and merchants.”261 The former insight was eventually made part of the American creed, 
while the latter has merely flared up from time to time. 
These elements of the Regulator approach are shown not only in how their ap-
proached their activism, via the courts and seeking to make their demands public, but also 
in their statements of political ideals. We might understand this as a claim that “the 
American Revolution had legitimized a certain kind of legal activity- namely, extralegal 
action. To them, extralegal action was, and always was, legal.”262 They even were under-
stood at the time to be more than disgruntled farmers, but of offering coherent opposition. 
In one of the actions that quelled the rebellion, the action took place inside a church, 
where the arresting officer took the time to argue, point-by-point, against the previous 
speech against the government.263 This would not seem necessary if the protesters were 
merely hooligans opposed to order. John Adams uses his satirical alter ego, Humphrey 
PloughJogger, to express this counter-understanding of the events.264 While Ploughjogger 
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is illiterate and certainly meant to poke fun at country farmers as well as the Bostonian 
elite, like most satire this writing contains shards of sharp truth. He says: “I have been 
greatly abused, have been obliged to do more than my part in the war, been loaded with 
class rates, town rates, province rates, Continental rates and all rates ... been pulled and 
hauled by sheriffs, constables and collectors, and had my cattle sold for less than they 
were worth ... The great men are going to get all we have and I think it is time for us to 
rise and put a stop to it, and have no more courts, nor sheriffs, nor collectors nor law-
yers.”265  
Unlike Ethan Allen in Vermont, who rejected a partnership with Daniel Shays, 
Shays did not explain his ideas in writing or public speeches. In a meeting with General 
Putnam, sent to Governor Bowdoin in a letter, Shays was reported to have said, in re-
sponse to a suggestion that he would either take over the government or die trying, “My 
God, I’ll never run my country!” and then to assert that his leadership was prompted by a 
desire to avoid bloodshed and not to gain political power for himself.”266 Indeed, the ma-
jority of the conversation seems to be about the issue of “court stopping,” which seems to 
me a desire to enforce popular constitutionalism. Others have read Shays as the assertion 
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of a physiocratic way of level- housed in private property- rather than a leveler position 
as understood by the gentry.267  
Shays’ was more than a rebellion driven by private interest and abdication of per-
sonal responsibility to pay one’s debts, although this understanding helped those who 
wanted a new Constitution to make their case.268 It was a challenge to the very presump-
tion that debt and personal responsibility could be so linked, particularly when those who 
“owed” had to play by different rules than those who did not. Indeed, the very fact that 
“[t]he immediate result of Shays’ Rebellion was consolidation of repressive violence—
like that later sanctioned by President Washington to crush the Pennsylvania Whiskey 
Rebellion in 1794—in the hands of both state and federal government” is a striking re-
minder of the power of the alternative view.269 
And it was a much broader populist movement than its encapsulation as a rebel-
lion or troupe of rebels led by Shays would suggest.270 The hodgepodge of floating and 
backed currencies, only some of which were accepted as payment for taxes and fines, as 
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well as the turn away from localized barter systems, put great pressure on small farmers 
and workers. These same men were stripped of political rights to vote, and interpreted 
these trends, quite reasonably, as the instantiation of oligarchical principles centered on 
urban elites. To protest, they began by using the established forms of the committees of 
correspondence, and when this failed they attempted direct action through the courts, the 
most visible arm of state power and the enforced of debtors prison and other penalties. In 
this they asked consistently that their claims be heard by the politically powerful, and on-
ly when this failed to occur did they take up arms. In doing so, they understood them-
selves not as anarchist rebels, but as patriotic “regulators” of the same ideals than sparked 
the revolution. They asked for a fuller, and fairer, share of citizenship for manual laborers 
and the (moderately) poor, understood as a collective exercise of political power for 
shared projects. 
This might make some readers nervous, given that supporting producerist claims 
to government support over those who are seen as unproductive, such as the unemployed 
or welfare recipient, has led to vicious social conflict and stymied development of eco-
nomic and social rights in the United States. One important difference between the Regu-
lators and those who disdain the 47% is that the Regulators did not reject the unemployed 
or destitute, but rather argued that the system (particularly the currency system) produced 
poverty. There were indeed indigent and homeless among their ranks, as well as wealthi-
er folk who supported the principles of the Regulators. However, the central claim was 









dependence. Even the injured veteran or wage laborer, each of whom had less seeming 
control over his destiny, deserved a role in politics and society, as well as economic secu-
rity.  
Even urban elites struggled to determine the shape that good citizenship, particu-
larly in relation to the economy and consumption, would take. The non-importation of 
British goods that had been a fashionable way for upper class women to protest in New 
England prior to the Revolutionary war carried over into anti-luxury campaigns and 
commitments to wear simple, American clothes during the same time as Shays’.271 While 
the position of elites has been foregrounded here, this position still in uneasy formation. 
While it is easy now to see the Regulators in stark contrast with the “Friends of Govern-
ment,” no doubt both sides were struggling to spell out what sort of political sensibilities 
would be appropriate for a new country. 
 
4.7 Echoes of the Anti- Federalist Papers’ Democratic Theory of Citizenship  
 
 This same alternative conception of citizenship and collective responsibility for 
political institutions of average people is reflected in the Anti-Federalist Papers. The An-
ti-Federalists were a relatively diverse bunch, particularly given that the papers often as-
sembled under that name are presumed to be from at least 20 individual authors. While 
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their individual arguments against the proposed constitution, and the process through 
which it was created, varied, they did fear the over “federalization” or consolidation of 
power to a central government.272 Given their preferences for localism, it is no wonder 
that the Anti-Federalists saw themselves as continuing the conceptual and theoretical leg-
acy began in the Revolution, which rejected distant government in favor of local admin-
istration and a loose compact between sovereign states. 
Their second central interest was in preserving the participation and access of or-
dinary people to the government.273 In particular, the jury, the militia and the assembly, at 
the local and state level, were portrayed as schools of democracy. Interestingly, this con-
cern for the participation of everyday citizens extended to concerns about specialization 
and professionalization, especially of the military and political professions. While the 
Anti-Federalists understood that direct democracy was unlikely, they wanted representa-
tive bodies that mirrored the general populace, especially the middle class, as fully as 
possible.274 As the “Federal Farmer” writes in his 9th letter, larger electoral districts are 
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likely to increase the prominence of wealthy politicians, because the everyday good qual-
ities of citizens will not garner recognition at large. Instead of centralizing government, 
particularly away from the rural districts where the Regulators emerged from, the new 
state should shore up local politics and promote the ability of average citizens to contrib-
ute.  
Furthermore, the Anti-Federalist papers were directly concerned with economic 
inequality and political economy that promoted finance.275 In some of their writings, the 
association of Republican government with equality is strong, countering arguments that 
competing private goods (or factions) will lead to a public good. Centinel, for example, 
writes: “A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people 
are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided.”276 Well-read in republican 
theory such as that of Montesquieu, the Anti-Federalists did worry that the virtue of the 
people would not be sufficient, on its own, to prevent despotism, but argued that their 
competence would be increased by participation.277 This interest in the relationship be-
tween economic and social equality with political stability and freedom holds in the work 
of various nom de plumes. Still they were themselves property owners concerned about 
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the protection of property, and their arguments are not as far from those of the Federalists 
as Shays is from both. 
 
4.8 Using Simone Weil to explain the Regulators invocation of Needs over Rights 
In the American context, the assertion of fundamental needs as untouchable by 
public and private authority has most often taken the form of a claim to a "right". While 
rights language had a certain resonance with Shays’ followers, they reasoned more broad-
ly and directly from the needs of individuals and families to exist, and remain housed, 
clothed, fed and healthy. For example, one of the first protests was arranged around a 
harvest day, and a communal feast occurred as part of the political action.278 This senti-
ment was echoed in the writing of Daniel Grey, who explained their motivations as cri-
tiques of the practice of debtor’s prison, which “thereby a reputable body of people ren-
dered incapable of being serviceable either to themselves or the community.”279 Debtor’s 
Prisons were problematic because they hurt the community, not just the individual, sup-
ported also by his criticism of the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus, which for 
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Gray meant that there was no one “to assert and maintain the rights of the people.”280 
These rights should be understood as collective rights to a productive and healthy com-
munity, not independent rights as in our contemporary idiom. The idea that Shays,’ and 
indeed much early rebellious or militia action, was about collective rights is newly im-
portant given the importance of originalism in arguments about the Second Amendment, 
which itself reflects the linkage of militias and community rights.281    
While the Regulators did, as mentioned above, make use of a natural law basis for 
rights and justice, they interpreted this natural law to grant neither negative nor positive 
rights, at least as famously formulated by Isaiah Berlin. Indeed, by "right" they did not 
mean something asserted against a government, or a sphere of protection in which gov-
ernment cannot interfere, but rather the power of communities and individuals to preserve 
and extend themselves. This is not quite a positive right, either, because the militia, which 
stands in for the local community, is the bearer of the right, not individuals. This commu-
nity is not fully communitarian, in that it is both rooted in place and created, like any so-
cial movement. 
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Simone Weil’s ideas about needs help move us beyond this distinction, as she 
writes in of the primacy of needs, spiritual and physical, over rights.282 Indeed, Weil's 
concept of "rootedness" goes a long way in helping us see the types of radical claims 
Shays advanced.283 Uprootedness is linked to Arendt’ category of superfluous life 
through the shared experiences of refugees and the unemployed; the later situation Weil 
calls “uprootedness raised to the second power.”284 To be uprooted, for Weil, is to lack a 
community in which one can participate meaningful, to which one has duties, but also 
means a lack of work that one can love. Weil is thinking about the working class in 
France, whose experiences of industrialization and war form the basis for her arguments 
that work must be imaginative and focused on the needs of the worker, rather than driven 
by technological progress or the decrees of the uprooted urban classes.285 However, the 
same dynamics of increased pressure on workers to join the formal labor force, and de-
creased control over their own workday, existed in the long drive to industrialization in 
the United States. Just as the World War, declines in farming and changes in production 
produced rootlessness for the working class in France in the 1930s, the Revolutionary 
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War, the decline of farming, and urban expansion of manufacturing and trading produced 
the citizenry who made up the Regulators. 
Weil’s solutions are not fully developed in The Need for Roots, but they center on 
the development of meaningful work and the need for collective political action to create 
the institutions that can sustain a rooted life, while providing the space individuals need 
to act politically. This resonates with the project of Shays’ Regulators, who sought to 
clear a space for their own political action through direct protest and contestation of the 
power of the courts. While they failed, their vision remains a viable current in our shared 
historical experience of citizenship and politics. Their version of self-government was 
one in which no only distant kings were not allowed to determine how local resources 
were spent, but even state capitals, and their representatives, the Courts, were rejected as 
democratic authorities. Instead, communities should themselves be able to determine 
what counted as currency, and also what levels of taxation were permissible. Certainly, 
this is not a vision amenable to building a nation-state, but it is a vision that sees the abil-
ity of individuals to participate directly as key to democratic citizenship. 
 
4.9 Ghosts of Shays in the Progressive Expansion of Good Citizenship  
 
 The claims of Shays and his contemporaries are a model for political membership 
claims in the work that actual citizens do, and connecting these claims both to constitu-
tional competency and needs, each understood in relation to a networked community ra-









continues to resonate throughout United States history, even as slavery and westward ex-
pansion take center stage. This tension bubbles to the service in times such as the Populist 
Farmers’ movement in the 1860s,286 and through the struggles of Reconstruction era 
blacks to establish themselves as fully respected citizens.287  It would take until the 
1900’s for men like Shays to gain full membership in the political space, and then under 
the aegis of progressive reform, which worried that such citizens were unfit. The exclu-
sion of workers from status citizenship would not last, although their enfranchisement 
would create new paradoxes of political membership, discussed in the next chapter. 
However, the normative ideal of citizenship remained tied to an independent, masculine 
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subject with as little debt and dependency as possible. These classical accounts of citizen-
ship, even as reformulated by the social contract theorists to apply to those who labored, 
at least if they held property, were finally stretched to their limit by the rapidly industrial-
izing world around the turn of the 20th century, and needed reform. Progressive activists 
and theorists attempted to embrace dependence by asserting the commonality of the “po-
litical body” and meet need by developing social programs, but they unthinkingly re-
tained and even built on the ideal of masculine independence to contain and manage fam-
ily and social life, which was perceived as under threat of massive dissolution. 
The pairing of the Shays and Progressive adaptation of mass citizenship is im-
portant because it reminds us that in attempting to correct an exclusion, in this case the 
average people from political power, states and reforms often rely on other problematic 
schisms, in this case gender. A similar story could probably be told about the relationship 
of race to understandings of worth, dessert and welfare in the United States. For an early 
20th century Daniel Shays to become a full member of society, he needed to be regulated 
by the pressure to maintain a steady job to support his family and himself in the city, 
where the great trio of urbanization, immigration and industrialization altered existing 
social bonds. Although the worker citizen, even if poor, was welcomed into the political 
space through the mechanism of party machines, he was also subject to reform projects in 
his neighborhood and workplace. As Taylorism and urban planning, not mention social 
work, developed, elites worked out their concerns about mass culture and mass democra-









a democratic nation. Perhaps most problematically, they linked the new working citizen 
with a highly gendered division of labor, tying intimately together the workingman with 
citizenship, efficiency, speed, stoicism and effort. With production ever more separated 
from the home, women and children were more dependent on their husbands and fathers, 
thus producing the single breadwinner family that is still thought of as natural. Citizens 
had to be independent, and this independence was linked to other masculine virtues at the 
expense of women, who suffered materially and spiritually from this distinction, particu-
larly when they or their partners did not fit these gender norms. This shift, which heark-
ened back to the yeoman model through the suggestion that each working man could 
eventually become a homeowner, and thus propertied, put immense pressure both white 
working men and those who did not fit neatly into this normative ideal, such as women, 
non-whites, ex-slaves and foreigners. There were of course progressives who resisted im-
pulses to social control and give more useful material for bolstering democratic citizen-
ship today. 
The legal limits of status citizenship changed along with the labor market in the 
late 19th and early 20th century. In the United States, nearly universal white male suf-
frage, via the elimination of property requirements, occurred between 1820 and 1850.288 
The “split labor market” generated by the continued existence of slavery meant that even 
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white laborers could be defined in opposition to an inferior group, conceived as unworthy 
of the social and political standing granted to even poor white potential-wage earners. 
This relationship continued after slavery ended, preventing political coalitions among the 
worse off and alienating the poor whites of the south such that they become their own 
minority group with an insular culture and strained relationship with the ruling classes.289 
Still, by the turn of the century, all of these groups were technically enfranchised and, 
indeed, the reconstruction era participation of black male citizens was of course quite 
high. Even women, the subject of the next chapter, neared the vote. The franchise, and 
thus also the political public sphere, was now much closer to its claim to equal access, if 
still hemmed in by custom, cost of access, sexism and racism. 
 It is this political landscape, coupled with a United States growing more urban, 
industrialized, mobile and wage-based by the year, that must be traversed by progressive 
political reformers in the 1920’s and early democratic theorists alike. They are in a sense 
coming back up against the original problem posed by Aristotle; how can citizenship and 
labor be reconciled, if at all? They faced this question with a commitment to broad partic-
ipation in both democracy and the labor market.  It is no wonder that the central task of 
progressivism took up was making the masses fit for democracy, through both educative 
and coercive means. In this context, it is no wonder that “the old ideal of a commercial 
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republic united by a common class of self-employed households...slowly lost ground to 
the new vision of an industrial order united through the kinship of social self-hood.”290 In 
other words, the new economy has created a new citizen, or rather reformulated what sort 
of work most were doing, and so citizenship norms had to adapt. From the earlier concep-
tion, the theorists retained the privileged status of the good citizen, and the requirement 
that he be educated and invested in the political order. This was a difficult, given the very 
real low literacy rates among American citizens, and thus required that progressive theo-
rist buttress their arguments with calls for massive education and public welfare projects. 
 The people which Progressive activists and thinkers hoped to help, or institute, 
this overlapping vision of work and citizenship were indeed working in a different way 
from their ancestors, in the United States or Europe. The 19th century is characterized by 
decreases in farm population, industrial development of railroads and cities, and the 
growth of mechanized production.291 By the 20th century, farm labor occupied less than 
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half of the labor force, the vast majority of who were non-black, adult men.292  Workers 
were also characterized by a racial dichotomy. On one hand, the nativism that character-
ized this time period was in full effect, while on the other the cheap labor of marginalized 
groups such as Italian, Irish and German immigrants was required to fuel the growing 
industries of food processing, steel, and manufacturing. However, these groups claimed 
the right to higher wages and levels of inclusion on the basis of their skin colors, actively 
repressing African American workers and arraying the white working class in opposition 
to black labor.293 These racial tensions among the working class are a key element to un-
derstanding citizenship struggles in this time period.  
Work in the period of rapid industrialization was characterized by increased mo-
bility, a trait not necessarily prized by citizenship theorists who sought close-knit com-
munities of neighbors.294 Mobility reflects the desires of employers to maximize efficien-
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cy and find skilled workers, yet we might also see these qualities as privileging a certain 
type of worker and citizen.  
Along with a willingness to move for work, the worker, more and more, was ex-
pected to be flexible and malleable.295 Unorganized and unskilled workers bore much of 
the weight of the advance of scientific management in the factory.296 The new system 
demanded that workers produced at higher speeds and with increased subordination to 
management. Cheap, easily trained and replaceable workers who came predominantly 
from immigrant groups replaced skilled labor.297 “Scientific management” gave the ap-
propriate cover to marginalize skilled, and potentially powerful, workers and instead em-
ploy more vulnerable operatives, who were unskilled, and often women or immigrants.298 
All of these developments made developing citizen workers very difficult, as working 
conditions deemphasize the very political capacities needed to act publicly.  
The worker, while still likely to be white or moving that direction through the 
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Assimilation process was more diverse than the classical model, which put certain strains 
on progressive attempts to adopt a citizenship developed on the civic republican model of 
independent homeowner. The worker no longer was likely to have the leisure and educa-
tion, not to mention private family space, from which to develop political activity. Instead, 
the worker needed the intervention of elites in the form of social workers and activist, as 
well as the developing welfare state, to insure that he or she was a healthy member of the 
social body. This in part explains the struggle of Progressive activists to ameliorate social 
conditions for the poor.  
 
4.10 The Taylorization of Progressive Citizenship  
 
Many progressive theorists saw industrialization as hailing a new age of social 
solidarity, not to mention nationalism. The argument was that: “we pass over form un-
conscious social cooperation to conscious social cooperation.299 This conscious social 
cooperation extended to the economic where, “civilized people have changed their ways 
of doing their work.”300 Society thus has a duty to recreate its economic systems so that a 
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wider range of individuals can be free and fit for citizenship. Thus, the elimination of 
poverty must occur for progress to follow, because there are no differences between the 
disadvantaged and the rest of the people “which cannot be rapidly obliterated” by the new 
effort which he called “social work.”301 All of the theorists saw work, and citizenship, as 
coming under rational and scientific principles. 
Indeed, there much in the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor and other reformers 
of workday processing that sounds eerily similar to the calls of Progressive thinkers to 
order and elevate the slums.302 Of course, Taylor himself saw the individual factory 
worker as too stupid to understand the broader implications of his task, whereas the rhet-
oric of many progressives, and activities of some like Jane Addams and John Dewey, saw 
the potential for citizenship and freedom for all (or most...) people. Taylorism refers to 
the general trend of “scientific management” in the industrial and office workplace, ex-
tended also into how the tasks of housewives were changed by new technology. Tay-
lorism also featured prominent “time-study” type assessment where each task was meas-
ured and standardized, so that the most efficient ordering of steps could be adopted. The-
se ideas were also applied to the spaces of the home provides a fascinating case study for 
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subtle ways in which social change occurs; her own presentation of her task starts from “ ́ 
the personal attitude of the woman toward her work.303 Rationality, market share, order 
and efficiency were all hallmarks of the worker inside and outside of the home. Further-
more, the goal of scientific management was to fit the worker to the larger organization, 
be that the home or factory. 
Progressives sought to do more than produce effective housewives and workers, 
but they promoted the same values in their writings on education, social change and set-
tlement work, particularly the idea that the individual must be made to fit the collective. 
For many, “the object of education is to fit children into the life of the community.”304 
John Dewey defends the absolute sovereignty of the individual citizen against elitist con-
cerns that the mass subject is incapable of self-rule with the claim that “the individual is 
society concentrated.”305 This is because “the good consists of friendship, family and po-
litical relations, economic utilization of mechanical resources, science, art, in all their 
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304. Mary Parker Follet, “Training Democratic Citizens” in Eisenach, The Social And Political 
Thought of American Progressivism, 106. Her goal was to develop community centers focused on the mod-
el of Hull House in each neighborhood, so that adults and children could learn democratic values of inter-
dependence and duty to the collective through shared experiences and self government of the club itself. 
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complex and variegated forms and elements.”306 The good citizen, for Dewey, is like the 
good citizen for earlier theorists, but with the addition of the value of efficiency and sci-
entific rationality.   Jane Addams went perhaps furthest in attempting to broaden citizen-
ship without forcing citizens into wage slavery, or household drudgery, but instead fo-
cused on their full range of needs. Addams’ social theory comes out of her experience 
founding and living at Hull House, a social settlement in the immigrant heavy world of 
Chicago’s Back-of-the-Yards neighborhood. Her theory is perhaps most immune to the 
Taylorization of citizenship in that she adamantly demands that immigrant’s literary and 
cultural needs are just as important as their material ones, and furthermore that workers 
need more skills than those required by their jobs.307  For Addams, the task of democratic 
renewal is inherently extended to all citizens as part of the social organism, and her ulti-
mate, rather utopian, goal seems to be the extension of a classical ideal of education and 
citizenship to all. This vision was broadly adopted by the American education system.308  
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be made universal if they are to be permanent” Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Jane Addams Reader (Basic 
Books, 2001), 80. 
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The tension between citizenship was reformulated as a task that could be solved 
through education, which would produce good citizens, who would“ devote themselves 
to the duties of good citizenship and to the arousing of the social energies which too 
largely lie dormant in every neighborhood given over to industrialism.”309 Good citizen-
ship could no longer be associated with nobility, or even property ownership in the clas-
sic sense, but instead with the order of the factory and the relative independence of a fam-
ily wage. Indeed, the tension between what a citizen ought to be and the actual inhabit-
ants of American cities no doubt led in part to the rise of elite theories of democratic rep-
resentation, where the role of the citizen was reduced to occasional preference indicator. 
That progressive theorists wanted to hold on to the notions that citizens are the heart of 
democratic legitimacy, supported by social and educational programs, was both admira-
ble and lamentable, given the way it legitimated a program of social control. Still, think-
ers like Addams provide glimpses of how classical citizenship could be adapted for an 
industrializing nation, through the rejection of distinctions between manual and intellec-
tual labor, and demands that human needs for culture, education and literature exist sim-
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ultaneously, rather than after one’s basic life is supported. She rejects the demand that 
workers be left out of the political community because they lack the language or other 
skills, while also refusing to succumb to temptations to engineer the lives of the working 
class. Instead, she develops and indeed lives a practice of rooted community, where the 
indigenous needs and interests of the community are foregrounded. 
 
4.11 Rereading Lochner and The Right to Work as Collective and Constitutive   
 
 The tensions in American citizenship theory and practice over the nature of work, 
and whether it qualifies or disqualifies one for democratic decision-making, are also on 
display in the Supreme Court’s struggles to limit government’s use of the commerce 
clause to interfere with the economy. Lochner v. New York (1905), is nearly as reviled as 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) or Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), at least in the legal academy. 
Lochner, a bakery owner, ran afoul of a New York law which prohibited bakery employ-
ees for working over 60 hours a week or 10 per day, and fined proprietors who allowed 
them to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned lower courts’ decisions to overturn 
this fine, ruling that the 14th amendment protected a substantive “right to contract” which 
was not outweighed by the stated purpose of the law, which was the health of bakers. The 
case gave its name to an “era” which only came to a close with the deference to the legis-
lative branch signaled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), and the infamous 









Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the legislative branch to more heavily regulate the strug-
gling economy. 
Lochner is a problem for liberal legal scholars, because it avows that the 14th 
amendment guarantees are more than procedural, in this case extending to the right to 
work. This concept has recently gained prominence as a way of applying protection to 
fundamental rights or protecting minorities, a seeming paradox for opponents of Lochner, 
who might also have political commitments to the New Deal.310 Lochner, however, can 
and has been seen in a different light, if we let go of an attachment to the Warren Court or 
the New Deal as the only possible bulwarks of a just democratic order. 
Lochner is central to constitutional scholars’ understanding of the New Deal, and 
the Warren Court use of the commerce clause in Civil Rights cases, and thus considera-
tions of its role tend to focus on the limits of federal power. Because Lochner type re-
strictions on the ability of government to regulate the economy are in contrast to New 
Deal economic policies as well as much government action that follows, it has been des-
ignated part of the “anti-canon” of cases legal scholars love to hate.311 However, con-
 
310. It has been suggested that the great struggle of contemporary liberals is to develop a theory of ju-
risprudence that produces Brown v Board of Education (1954) and not Lochner. Professor Laura Kalman, 
The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, 1St Edition (Yale University Press, 1996). We might add to this 
formulation the need to also protect the New Deal.  
311.  Jack Balkin explores the meta history of Lochner as it has been perceived by legal academics, 
through the concept of a legal “canon” he and Levinso) observe, which also implies the existence of an 
“anti-canon” of disgraced cases. Richard Primus, “Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent,” Duke Law 












servative (generally libertarian) and liberal scholars have begun to question the status of 
Lochner, the former in defense of its doctrine of rights to contract312 and the latter 
through historicist constitutionalism.313 Lochner is of such scholarly interest because it 
brings both normative arguments about the relationship of economic and political forces 
and debates within constitutional theory about the proper role of judges, as well as over-
arching arguments about how constitutional adjudication should or does occur.314  
The paradox of a Supreme Court ruling that might be (seen through an historicist 
lens) correct in its own time, but incorrect in our present time (and therefore overturna-
ble) requires an accompanying theory of liberal constitutionalism that sees “the duty of 
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all actors, including judges, to change their interpretations of the Constitution to reflect 
these changing circumstances.”315 Living Constitutionalism is thus intimately connected 
to theories of constitutional change that are not reliant on Article V amendments, whether 
they occur through populist movements combined with transformative leadership, or par-
tisan entrenchment formed through intrabranch dynamics.316 All of these theories stress 
the complex interdependence of legal norms, social movements and partisan politics. 
They also signal that, despite the seemingly more important “rights revolution” of post-
Brown courts, the symbolic power of the New Deal or social welfare state more broadly 
is not exhausted. Indeed, it is only the libertarian Bernstein who is willing to argue that 
Lochner’s substantive due process protection of a “right to contract” as understood in the 
case is sensible, even if post-Carolene products applications of substantive due process 
are more common. 
A rejection of Lochner seems on its face to be an embrace of New Deal era in-
volvement in the economy, but it is also a claim about the relationship between labor and 
capital. Labor markets operate on principles that do not match up with the assumptions of 
classical economics, whether for reasons of asymmetrical information, the downward 
wage pressure of high unemployment, the inseparability of labor power from one’s body, 
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or the lack of tenable options for alternate sources of subsistence, whether this lack of 
option is due to a thin or non-existent welfare state or lack of resources or skill needed to 
maintain oneself ‘off the grid.’ One of the closest analogues to a Lochner style “right to 
contract” today is the “right to work” legislation that is active in over 20 states, and one 
of the most powerful limitations on union power in the United States. Indeed, the Taft-
Hartley act of 1947 that permitted states to effectively ban the closed shop workplace has 
been the target of a wide range of activists, including catholic workers and Occupy Wall 
Street.317 While liberals acknowledged (and, if they are left enough) may deplore the 
move by Samuel Gompers and other union leaders to develop a space within the capitalist 
order, rather than contest it in search of a more socialist political space, they nonetheless 
are generally unwilling to let go of the historic and powerful association between unions 
and progressives.318 This is a mistake, but not because workers in all sectors are not cen-
tral to democratic renewal. Indeed, I am arguing that this is precisely what they are. 
However, the set of conceptual (and activist) tools developed around union organizing in 
the early 20th century, and the 19th century social thought on which much liberal theoriz-
ing still dwells, is overly bound to a static and unrealistic picture of unions, and of work. 
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In particular, factory and the male breadwinner loom too large in the shared imagination. 
Most workers in the global north, and even a great deal of workers who live in the global 
south, are not factory workers, and those who are in manufacturing tend to work in jobs 
which defy easy categorization as skilled or unskilled, given the likelihood that they will 
work with complex machinery and robotic equipment. Progressives need to create new 
sorts of unions that work for people in the home, unemployed or freelancing319, if they 
want to advance the citizenship claims of workers. 
Lochner is a case about labor and its relationship to rights, the central way that re-
lationships between the governed and government are understood in the U.S. context. Do 
workers have the “right” to work as many hours as they want? Asked in this way, it is 
difficult to see how the Justices could say no, and contemporary examples of “right to 
work” legislation have all but destroyed unions today. But, what if the question of Loch-
ner is reformulated to be about need - what do individuals need, not just to stay alive, but 
also to fully take their place as governing members of the American political body? What 
if the “right to work” was not understood as a negative right to make contracts, but rather 
a substantive and communal right that accrues to the needs of the community? The as-
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sumption is that the alternative to an unregulated labor market is social dependency or 
class warfare. But if there are other alternatives, we can advance them if we consider the 
“right to work” as a right to broad ranging social and political membership.  
The constitutional vision of Lochner as decided is of a nation of free individuals, 
trading their labor on the open market, as much of it as they please for the price that suits 
both parties, who through this market transaction preserve the independence and dignity 
necessary to perform also as citizens. Work, for Lochner and for some of the progressives, 
qualifies one for citizenship. But this work must be free- that is, part of a labor contract 
imagined as purified from the influence of ascriptive characteristics- and it must corre-
spond to the Taylorist sense of order and rationality. To actually support a notion of a 
free choice to work, much more is involved that the bare assertion of such a right. Indeed, 
what is needed are supportive networks and constitutional maintenance of people and in-
stitutions. If New Deal Liberals accepted substantive due process and the right to privacy, 
but understood these rights positively or in the group way I’ve proposed, rather than as 
mere permissions as the Lochner court does, the debate over substantive due process 
could be resolved. Furthermore, the right to privacy arguments in the line of cases follow-
ing Casey could be linked to the Equal Protection argument advanced in Lawrence v. 
Texas (2003), to provide not only support for gay marriage and federal funding of abor-
tion, but of constitutional support for social policy attempting to support workers. 
 For New Deal liberals, who support precedents that allowed regulation of the 









Court uses of substantive due process, the case is a problem. However, it is also a prob-
lem for opponents of these legal trends, or opponents of Unions, because the substantive 
due process rights extended in Lochner can and have been extended to surprising places, 
such as contraceptive use and interracial marriage; it is a leading contender for justifica-
tion for same-sex marriage. However, there does not necessarily have to be an impasse 
between supporting substantive due process in terms of civil rights and the economic lib-
erty found in the original case, which is now only protected on a rational-review basis, in 
light of a much expanded commerce clause power. 
Lochner may not have been as far off base, or as incompatible with later uses of 
substantive due process as is commonly thought. If the above impediments to the free-
dom of contract were removed, particularly with the substitution of robust alternatives for 
moving towards one’s life goals and sustaining one’s physical needs, than the right to 
contact might have more of a place next to rights of association and travel, which Judith 
Shklar perceptively links to the right to work.320 What the right to good work entails 
should not be the right to commodity one’s labor, but rather the right to participate in col-
lective constitutive projects that have meaning, and to have the freedom to do so without 
regard to one’s waged labor. This would require wide-scale reform, perhaps even larger 
structural shifts, and would challenge how both markets and politics works in the United 
States, but could start from the development of positive economic rights through both the 
 









democratic branches and the Judiciary. In this light, Lochner might not be such bad law 
after all. 
This reading helps us avoid Lochner style citizenship as it was understood at the 
time, think with assumptions about the interrelation of paid work, dignity and citizenship 
that automatically exclude the large portions of the population who gain their sustenance 
not through the labor market, but through the mediation of the family. Women and chil-
dren both, while increasingly working in the formal labor market, perform labor in the 
household that indirectly receives remuneration through the family earnings of a husband 
or father. At the time of Lochner, this issue of women’s work and its remuneration, both 
in terms of cash and political voice and access, came to the fore in Muller v. Oregon, and 
also through women’s activism via the temperance movement and prohibition. To under-
stand this tension, a useful case study is the way that women, whose work was not seen 
as providing the skills needed for citizenship, contested the concept of the good citizen as 









CHAPTER FIVE: READING TEMPERANCE, PROHIBITION AND REPEAL AS 
DEMANDS BY WOMEN FOR RENUMERATED HOUSEHOLD LABOR AND A 
PUBLIC SPHERE OF THEIR OWN 
 
5.1 What we learn from Temperance and Anti-Temperance Women  
The experiences of women involved in the American Temperance movement 
provide an interesting case study that shows the tensions in a concept of citizenship 
stretched to include the common person through the rhetoric of the social body, while 
holding on to the model of a fully independent masculine citizen worker. Even as the 
claims of Shays and waged labor were integrated into the social space, other divisions 
were deepened. Still, women from a variety of class positions once again asserted 
themselves politically on account of their reproductive labor, asking not for direct wag-
es but for shifts in laws that would reward women in the home, even if most paid em-
ployment was closed to them. They also contested the private nature of masculinized 
public spheres for workers and upper class professionals, creating their own alterna-
tives and using the power of the state to destroy them. These actions also provide a 
model for co-constitutive citizenship for our own time. 
 Temperance and Prohibition are central events in the gendered history of the 
United States that are only recently receiving the attention they deserve. In American 
Political Development literature, prohibition and the 18th amendment that limited the 
sale and manufacture of alcohol on a national level tend to be portrayed as an experi-
ment that failed. Popular sources similarly see Prohibition as a strange aberration in the 









built around difference, particularly race, class and gender difference, and ignited by 
attempts to form workers, citizens and families in response to industrialization.321 Simi-
larly, the role of women in temperance and Prohibition, while often featured, is de-
scribed through the narrative of the development of interest group politics, although 
this model only fits a certain subset of women. Indeed, women stood and agitated on all 
sides of this issue, and their approach to politics was rooted not only in assumptions 
about women’s moral superiority, but also in their work inside and outside of the home.   
Early social movements prompted and then were aided by the enlargement of 
the franchise, although their importance is often overshadowed by these broad and 
formal changes in political structure. In particular, the role of those who are not full 
participants in formal politics is key, whether the exclusion at issue is de jure or de fac-
to  (the former applying to women, and some immigrants, the latter to these as well as 
many African Americans).  While the canonical story of the social movements after the 
Civil War and before the New Deal is one of abeyance and aberration, with slow and 
begrudging attempts to push state and federal government to exercise broader powers 
to support political minorities, the political story is one of heady expansion of these 
powers, particularly in service of previously disempowered groups. Furthermore, the 
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claims these citizens made to political space are not made (purely) on the grounds of 
abstract humanity or even the rights of American citizens, but rather are rooted in the 
everyday work they performed. 
 
5.2 Roots of Temperance as a Social Movement  
To the degree that any historical story can be told simply, the story of Prohibi-
tion is the one of a critical mass of temperance minded social activists, building on 
concerns about immigration and industrialization, who extended state laws prohibiting 
the sale and manufacture of alcoholic beverages to constitutionalize a federal ban on 
the sale and manufacture of alcohol. As this 18th amendment was eventually repealed, 
unlike other pieces of the progressive platform, prohibition is incorrectly understood as 
a failed experiment.322 It makes more sense to see the period between the Civil War and 
the Great Depression, which is the high point of temperance activity, as an integral part 
of feminist history, social movements, and growth of the power of the federal govern-
ment. The forerunners of federal prohibition were early associations, most notably the 
Washington Temperance Societies of the 1840’s, which included groups for women 
and the elite sponsored “Committee of Fifty” which convened to study “the liquor 
problem”, and the Anti-Saloon League, founded in 1893. The Women’s Christian 
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Temperance Union (WCTU), headed by Frances Willard, was the largest and most 
prominent of women’s groups with a central tenet of temperance, although we will see 
that their overall platform was much more complex. 
In the first wave of temperance advocacy during the 1860’s, activists attempted 
to shift social mores through direct action and moral suasion, particularly by praying at 
the doors of saloons or seeking entry. The latter strategy tended to drive away business, 
as the women activists would pray or drink water in the middle of the bar. One of the 
most famous of these activists was Carrie Nation, one of many “saloon smashers” who 
took the fight against alcohol quite literally. Depictions of Nation and her hatchet were 
a mainstay of pro- and anti- temperance rhetoric at this time.323 Nation’s advocacy was 
a complex mix of mysticism and motherhood, as she saw her calling as a religious de-
fender of the conjugal family. Specifically, she joined the image of the mother as moral 
guardian with public aggression and even violence, a mix of adhering to and transgress-
ing gendered expectations.324 The image of an older woman wielding a grim face and a 
hatchet was often rendered comically, but her advocacy is an early indication that the 
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relationship between women and politics was changing, as were the tools and spaces 
seen as appropriate for this action. 
 
5.3 Prohibition matters for the American Political Development 
While the early advocacy of these groups centered around moral suasion and 
pledges to “stay on the wagon,” by the turn of the 20th century reformers had generally 
committed to using the power of the state to reinforce moral power.325 These groups, as 
well as religious organizations led by pastor Billy Sunday, portrayed Prohibition as a 
cure for the social ills that appeared to threaten American life, such as the dissolution of 
the family and urban poverty. These concerns were tinged by nativism, racism and 
gendered anxieties about masculinity as women moved into formerly masculine spaces, 
all of which were stirred up in the rapidly changing social conditions. The dry activists 
requested pledges from elected officials, and advocated one issue voting in favor of dry 
candidates, whatever their party affiliation. This led to a great deal of success at the 
state level, as dry states, towns and counties foreshadowed federal prohibition.326 
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Nonetheless, the passage of the 18th amendment, and its eventual repeal, are 
unique moments in American history. The Anti-Saloon league drafted the actual text of 
the 18th amendment in one of the first examples of interest group production of legisla-
tion, which banned “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors,” rather 
than the consumption thereof, and the details were worked out through the Volstead 
Act of the following year.327 While most states had similar laws in place, the patchwork 
of liquor laws, which often differed from municipality to municipality via “local option” 
laws, was a regulatory mess. Still, consumption of alcoholic beverages fell markedly 
and 170,000 saloons were soon closed.328 Furthermore, admissions to hospitals for al-
cohol related diseases, such as cirrhosis, and alcoholic psychosis decreased. The 
wealthy or connected could squirrel away alcohol for home use, while the working 
classes had less access as prices increased due to scarcity, and “intoxicants priced 
themselves out of the market."329 Class partitioned even alcohol availability. Yet, pro-
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hibition was far more successful that we give it credit for; America’s drinking levels 
would not return to pre-prohibition levels until the mid 1970s.330 
Prohibition is most famous not for this relatively successful change in the drink-
ing habits of working class urban dwellers, a central goal of progressive citizenship, but 
rather for providing the opportunity for the expansion of the criminal underworld repre-
sented by such figures as Al Capone. Along with alcohol imported from Canada and 
other countries where its production was legal, smugglers accessed supplies of alcohol 
used for industrial purposes or prescribed as medicine.  This often required complex 
treatments to remove the methanol with which much industrial alcohol was mixed, fur-
ther driving up the cost of booze. While prohibition would eventually provide part of 
the rationale for the creation of a national law enforcement body in the form of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, its initial enforcement was the purview of the treasury 
unit of the Internal Revenue Service. Rumors of the corruptibility of agents and local 
government officials were widespread, and supported by low enforcement rates. Of 
course, given the consumption was not illegal, even “untouchable” agents had difficul-
ty obtaining convictions.331  
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During prohibition, alcohol was still consumed, particularly in the home and 
through the growth of “speakeasies,” which were underground bars, often operating out 
of private houses and basements. Home brewers and winemakers could still make and 
consume these beverages, although stills were generally classified as productive and 
subject to destruction. Although alcohol consumption had fallen, the prevalence of 
smuggling and a general belief that prohibition was unenforceable gained traction in 
the late 1920s. As we will see, an unlikely coalition (which features women prominent-
ly) advocated to end of prohibition. 
Nonetheless, the 18th amendment was still popular as late as 1928, as citizens 
overwhelmingly choose representatives who supported the Volstead Act.332 However, 
the backdrop of the growing economic depression gave new urgency to claims that le-
galizing alcohol would move illegal profits of bootlegging back into the light of day- 
and back into the realm of taxability. The 21st amendment, which overruled the 18th 
and mandated state control of liquor laws, was passed in 1933. Fascinatingly, despite 
its unique status as a repeal of another amendment, the constitutional history of the 21st 
amendment is lacking. This is despite the fact that it remains the only amendment to be 
ratified through the use of state conventions, rather than via state legislatures like the 
others, and despite its subsequent clashes with the dormant commerce clause due to its 
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second section’s granting of alcohol control powers to the states. If it is possible that 
prohibition was not as much of a failure as generally understood, and if it has deep 
symbolic and material importance for the citizenship of women, particularly citizenship 
in relation to class as well as gender, then this omission should be rectified. 
Prohibition is also often left out of the standard narrative of the growth of feder-
al centralization, which is instead centered (particularly in the history of Constitutional 
Law) on development during the New Deal. Along with moral restrictions on consump-
tion, or rather to enforce them, Prohibition became also a centralizing and federalizing 
project, one that may have been just as important as the New Deal for the solidification 
of federal power.333 Whether Prohibition is seen as part of a pre WW1 growth of the 
federal government depends on how government size is understood; in terms of GDP, it 
was still quite small, but in terms of regulation, large.334 We could trace the growth of 
the federal prison system in relation to prohibition, as crimes associated with black 
market alcohol sales rose rather than fell.335 The increased regulation and crime 
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prompted the creation of the FBI in 1908.336 Prohibition at the federal level also occurs 
amid prominent public fights over income taxes and other national projects, as the ram-
ifications of the Civil War for federalism emerge. It was only in 1895 that the Supreme 
Court rejected the federal tax as unconstitutional, and the 16th amendment was not rati-
fied until 1913337. Prohibition was part of this trend towards centralization, not an aber-
ration. 
As a matter of constitutional history, the rise and fall of the 18th amendment is 
unique. The enormity of a social movement first passing and then another highly relat-
ed social movement repealing an amendment to the constitution, despite famously dif-
ficult ratification processes, is easily lost on contemporary observers. At the time of its 
proposal, the 18th amendment was part of a shift that began decisively in the Recon-
structive practices of the Civil War, wherein the sovereign States of America were re-
placed by the sovereign People.338 We might understand this shift as a fundamental 
 
336. H. A Overstreet and Bonaro W Overstreet, The FBI in Our Open Society (New York: Norton, 
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337. The 17th amendment, which was ratified in 1913 as well, provided for the direct election of sena-
tors. This, just as the 16th had and 18th would, shifted power from local and state centers towards the fed-
eral government. Even though senators would be elected at the state level, they would no longer be hand 
chosen by the state legislators, effectively ended any direct control of state government on national repre-
sentation.  
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change in the understanding of sovereignty in the United States, transferring to 
“amending agents” and the federal government the reserved sovereignty of the people; 
his view is that the lack of conventions and rejection of referendums indicates the un-
democratic nature of these amendments, as well as the destruction of the limited gov-
ernment expressed by written constitutional limits.339  
The Repeal of the 18th amendment and Volstead Act in the form of the 21st 
amendment is no less striking.  Proponents of Prohibition, in this case the Anti-Saloon 
league, confidently laid out the political math required for repeal and declared it with-
out “the slightest hope.”340 Convincing 2/3rd of Congress and 3/4s of the state legisla-
tures or assemblies was and is a difficult task. Yet there were successful, in no small 
part because prohibition had not succeeded in solving the problems of family life, pov-
erty and unpaid labor in the home that motivated its adoption. A continued interest in 
these goals prompted repeal just as it had prohibition. The political elites who advocat-
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ed for its demise had as their goal not only the potential liquor taxes associated with the 
industry, but were explicitly concerned about the growth of federal government en-
croachment into the behavior of individuals.341 Repeal meant a rejection not only of the 
moralizing limit of personal consumption, but an attempt to resist the centralizing state. 
Prohibition shows, in fact, how powerful the linking of morality and fear can be 
to changing government forms. James Morone analyzes it in terms of yet another 
“moral panic” prompted by immigration and otherness, showing how prohibition was 
not an accident, but an outgrowth of the utopian thinking that characterizes American 
religious history and, furthermore, points to the attempt to avoid solving the hard prob-
lems, such as lynching in the south, with a simple legal moral rule.342 There are clear 
analogies in our current wars on drugs and obesity, which may attempt to solve prob-
lems of poverty and inequality obliquely. Samuel Gompers (and Frances Willard, actu-
ally), as well as Eugene Debs and Jane Addams, argued for the primacy of poverty and 
estrangement as social problems rather than “demon rum,” but the public accepted the 
war on alcohol and the demonized the individual alcohol drinker rather than a war on 
poverty that identified harsh working conditions and massive inequality as problems. 
Prohibition was not only a moralistic and individualistic drive to punish and 













ther away, but also a response to and challenge of the emergent commodity and labor 
market economy. As with many rapidly industrializing industries, alcohol producers 
turned to mass production of alcoholic beverages in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ry.343 This did not mean that Americans did not drink in the years leading up to prohibi-
tion, but rather that home production of both distilled and brewed alcoholic products 
was standard. The industrialization of beer production and commodification of beer 
consumption went hand in hand with the broader move towards industrialization and 
urbanization, especially as immigration from beer drinking nations, such as Germany 
and Ireland, swelled to meet labor market demands. Prohibition cannot be disconnected 
from immigration, or from industrialization, and the temperance movement should be 
interpreted in relation to these broader changes in American economic and social life. 
Similarly, the social movements literature tends to overlook the importance of 
the political activity that occurs before 1913. This may reflect the view that “[n]ew So-
cial movements are a product of the shift to a postindustrial economy...unique and, as 
such, different from the social movements of the industrial age.”344 It may be a mistake 
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to see the time in between major landmarks (such as the first and second waves) as 
dead periods, but these are instead times of “abeyance” that may be integral for the 
growth and health of social movements.345 The progressive social movement, which 
comes into its full powers while prohibition is in effect and on which the New Deal re-
forms of the Roosevelt administration are based, is built on the networks and experi-
ence of temperance activists, and even those who advocate for repeal. 
 
5.4 Contextualizing Prohibition in the Changing Family  
Prohibition and temperance also occur in a time when men and women, some-
times with the aid of law, substantially renegotiate the terms of marriage and family life. 
Sometimes this renegotiation is portrayed as the coercive effect of industrialization on 
gender relationships, but this approach misses the degree to which men and women 
were also agents in these shifts. While they are often portrayed as adversaries in both 
popular entertainment and political propaganda (especially temperance propaganda), 
men and women from a variety of class, gender and racial positions seek to renegotiate 
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institutions like marriage and courtship, in part through resistance to is commodifica-
tion.346 Certainly, the power of industry, including those industries tied to alcohol is 
important, but does not negate the ability of individuals to counter or modify those in-
terests. 
The specter of divorce and family disintegration is in fact central to progressive 
ideology and activism.347 The time period in question forms the context for a transition 
“from institution to companionship” for marriage, although we might wonder whether 
companionate marriage is also an institution.348 A companionate marriage was to be the 
central experience in the lives of individuals, and its maintenance and concern rank 
above those of society or other associations.349 Despite some variance between states, 
the prevalence of “fault” divorces (i.e. when one party had to prove infidelity, disserta-
tion, madness or the like) prior to the late 19th century was likely the main cause for 
 
346. For a small, but interesting example, there was an attempt by the jewelry industry to introduce 
“male engagement rings” in the 1920’s with reference to tradition; the failure (and contrasting success of 
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low divorces.350 It was at least interpreted as such by the Department of Labor who 
commissioned a study in 1880 to try and understand American divorce rates, which 
were indeed the highest in the world.351 These laws changed as marriage changed; it 
became an individual choice, centered ideally on affection or love, and divorce laws 
followed suit. 
The context for temperance and prohibition was changing society where work, 
family and how government related to citizens were renegotiated, and the way activists 
acted reflects this complexity and the importance of temperance and prohibition in the 
attaching citizenship to work. Attempts to modify classical citizenship to fit the social 
scape of the late 19th century were running up against the fact that a great deal of pre-
sumptive citizens were, along with their other unattractive qualities, drinkers. Temper-
ance and prohibition were not a failed experiment or an historical aberration, but rather 
a core experience in the construction of gendered citizenship tied to the public sphere 
of waged labor, but also providing an alternative history of claiming wages for repro-
ductive labor. 
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5.5 Feminist Readings of Prohibition as Maternalist 
 
The story of suffrage and women’s social movements usually includes, but rare-
ly foregrounds, prohibition and temperance. Part of this may be due to a tendency in 
feminist thought to structure history around a “waves” concept, wherein neither prohi-
bition nor the continued efforts of activists during the 1940’s and 1950’s fit neatly into 
the dominant narrative, wherein liberal first-wave feminists gain the vote, and then fade 
into the background until the second-wave emerges in the 1960’s.352  The period before 
1903,when the suffragist movement established itself institutionally through the Na-
tional Woman’s Party but after the 1848 Seneca Falls convention, and related activity 
by Susan B. Anthony and Lucy Stone, is relatively blank.353 Or, if not blank, it is filled 
with intimations that the activity of women between Seneca Falls and the gaining of the 
(national) vote in the United States in 1913 were not political but rather “maternalist” 
 
352. For a critique of the “waves” narrative as tending to negate the accomplishments of earlier gen-
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acts seeking “social purity”354 or mere temporary transfers of home life into the city 
square355 and in general as a turn to the social and private, away from the political. 
This sort of view only counts as political (and, by implication, emancipatory), 
activities that are now considered clearly part of politics, such as interest group for-
mation and voting. In the early 20th century, these activities are clearly public and 
clearly political. Yet the temperance movement does not occur against a backdrop 
where interest group mobilization or mass electoral politics were established, but rather 
in a space with a much smaller national government and more locally aligned political 
practices. To contemporary eyes, women picketing inside or outside of a saloon look 
like a pack of busybodies asserting themselves in the business of others.356 In contrast, 
the women marking for voting rights are coded as political figures, even as their de-
mands for voting rights are centered in the same maternalist “home protection” ideolo-
gy.  The temperance legacy has also been sullied by the eventual descent of the WCTU 
into racism, Social Darwinism and Eugenics. Within the history of the women’s 
movement, and feminist theory, prohibition is seen as important but highly constrained 
by dominant ideology that linked women to the private domestic sphere of the home. It 
is seen as “another way that women fused domesticity and politics,” especially given 
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the prominence of the WCTU and its “home protection rhetoric” which housed its ad-
vocacy in the duty of women to care for the home and family.357 Certainly, there were 
tradeoffs contained in the home protection route, but they were not made unknowingly 
and not the only types of advocacy. 
        Despite the close relationship that prohibition and temperance have with a 
growth in their political power, women’s rights advocates seem somewhat embarrassed 
by the episode. The mainstream feminist tradition in America strongly identifies with 
liberal rights-based approaches to equality, and as such is typically skeptical of legal 
restrictions on what are seen to be moral (or even public health) issues, seeing them as 
barely veiled attacks on the choice and privacy of individuals, especially women. Given 
the core place that reproductive rights, including abortion, have held in the political ac-
tion of women’s movements for the past 50 years, it is difficult for feminists to applaud 
a movement that demonized seemingly private choices about the body. Furthermore, 
the premise of Mothers against Drunk Driving (M.A.A.D) in the 1980s and beyond was 
often associated with conservative feminism, sometimes left out of the story of the de-
velopment of the women’s movement.358 While the temperance movement, and its 
leaders, are often acknowledged as part of the early movement of women into public 
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and political life, it is not as celebrated as the abolitionist movement, which fits in bet-
ter with the emancipatory narrative of suffrage. 
Histories of women’s movements in the United States do not utterly leave out 
temperance, but the complex actions and positions of different groups of women is of-
ten covered over, perhaps in part because the connection between temperance and pro-
gress for women, or what we might call women’s rights, is not well understood. Fur-
thermore, the WCTU tends to become the focus of feminist studies of the period, 
prompting ongoing debates about its feminist content (or lack thereof).359 They ask 
whether temperance was good for women, or for feminism, rather than asking what sort 
of gendered relationships of citizenship and belonging were highlighted, developed and 
altered through the temperance movement. However, there are a few historians who 
have worked on the temperance movement, taking gender and power as part of shifting 
and constructed patterns, rather than static.360  
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While it is surely true that there are significant drawbacks to the approach and ideology 
of temperance activists and their opponents, they were not a monolithic group, and 
their concerns were part of the broader tensions around citizenship raised by industrial-
ization and immigration, as well as the generally pre-industrial models of citizenship 
available to progressive era thinkers. 
 
5.6 Temperance was part of larger strategy of Stanton and Willard  
 
 Indeed, most temperance advocates were not as single-issue minded as might be 
assumed, and their focus on temperance reflected, rather than detracted from, their 
commitment to social justice. For example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frances 
Willard were both deeply personally committed to temperance, but within the broader 
context of their political theory, temperance was about more than moral prohibition. 
Each of these women did, perhaps sometimes unthinkingly, reflect the gendered divi-
sion of labor and assumptions about the proper separation of the sexes, including the 
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prominence this gave women in matters of morality and family. However, they also 
questioned these divisions, and their questioning often centered on the status or place of 
women as workers. 
The strategic use of temperance, and the cultural norm of the moral superiority 
of women, was a central tactic for Stanton, although she argued that “women’s eco-
nomic dependence on men, which was reinforced by their lack of legal or political 
rights” was a bigger problem than alcohol.361 Stanton connected the alcoholism of men 
and the related abuses to the general economic plight of women. The issue of temper-
ance was more acceptable than that of suffrage, and meeting space or other resources 
could be more easily obtained by groups of women promoting temperance than those 
seeking the vote.362 In particular, Stanton and her allies used religious networks and 
allies to promote temperance, ultimately asking that pastors speak from the pulpit on 
suffrage as they had against alcohol, the “white slave trade” and other prominent social 
issues. Through concerns about economic dependency, she drew attention to the prob-
lematic division of labor in the household, which she saw as exposed publicly by the 
rise of alcoholism and what seemed to be incumbent poverty. Like many thinkers of 
her time, she both questioned and relied on the “cult of domesticity” and separate 
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spheres ideology, and her liberal feminism was shot through with more radical allianc-
es with free love, labor and reproductive rights movements.363 While she focused her 
energies on gaining access to formal rights, most particularly the vote, property, and 
access to employment, she also spoke frequently about the problematic relationship of 
work within the family to work within the formal labor sphere, given the necessary de-
pendence those who did the former had on those who did the later. 
The WCTU, and its most recognizable leader, Frances Willard, drew close con-
nections between gender and temperance. It was, however, not her only focus, and her 
advocacy for education, birth control, community health centers, public kindergarten, 
sex education and similar ideas are easily overlooked. Willard popularized the theory 
of “home protection” in her speeches and writings, and this argument formed a basis 
for calls for women’s suffrage, and indeed is echoed in variants of care feminism. The 
idea that women had a special duty and ability to protect the home, and to do so would 
require them occasionally to leave it, is a much more radical notion than might be ap-
preciated from this remove. As Willard explains it, the root of home protection is in the 
instinct of “self-preservation,” which she closely aligns with “mother love,” but also 
with the non-essentialized role of the wife as a particular position in the family.364 She 
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strategically uses the role of women as defenders of the home space, a position fully 
aligned with the “Angel in the Home” ideology common in the upper classes. 
Willard’s own work at times guilty of this same hyperfocus. Written to explain 
the tactics and platform of the WCTU, her text Women and Temperance is an odd mix 
of portraits of individual temperance activists and a presentation of central accom-
plishments of the WCTU, organized under such headings as “WCTU in the House, So-
ciety and Government”. Throughout the text, the trope of “pictures of women at work” 
is deployed to describe not only political and social work aimed at temperance or the 
other goals of the organization, but also housework, educative work, volunteering and, 
occasionally, wage earning in labor market. Work, along with the ethical position af-
fording to women, carried great weight in Willard’s arguments for the centrality of 
temperance for supporting the lives of women and children. After the consistent display 
of women’s work as part of an appeal, Willard describes set of tactics for instituting the 
social change sought; some, like proselytizing among the Germans, prisoners and those 
in the slums substantiate the claim that the WCTU and similar organizations functioned 
through a racist and classist logic.365 Others are calls for the use of federal, state and 
local powers to prohibit the use of alcohol, or the formation of temperance clubs to 
provide alternative amusements for men and women.366 In between, Willard advocates 
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the development of independence for young women through the development of skills 
such as gardening, customer service and accounting.367 Willard’s “Home Protection” 
theme makes use of but also subverts the separate sphere ideology common at the 
time.368 The problems of women’s work and the solution of temperance- as well as so-
cial transformation-were linked in Willard’s imagination. 
 
5.7 Labor in Temperance Texts 
There are also rich resources for understanding the relationship of temperance, 
work and gender in primacy documents from temperance societies themselves, such as 
published collections of useful materials for would-be temperance activists.369 The 
lengthy book is a mix of prose, poetry and illustration, and includes an example of most 
of the common deployments of masculinity, femininity and their relationship to work 
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and family. First, there is the ever-present specter of the absent or abusive father, 
whose drinking harms “little ones like me,” in the form of the innocent child that is re-
tained from Victorian imagery.370 There is also the deployment of alcohol as enemy to 
the rising association of masculinity with self-mastery and individualism; drinking 
turns men into “victims” who are “enslaved”371 by “sorcery”372 of “basilisk spells.”373 
In particular, drinking men are described as lazy and unwilling to work: “mopes and 
encumbrances to society.”374  This is odd given that the temperance movement, while 
spearheaded by upper-class whites, was aimed squarely at the working classes, particu-
larly immigrants and blacks, who were much more likely to trade their labor for wages. 
Indeed, a counter-argument of the time, which even Frances Willard expressed sympa-
thy for, blamed urban working conditions for the rise of alcoholism.  
This contradiction seems to resolve in a dual strategy; that of moral suasion 
housed in a model of masculinity for the upper classes and legal enforcement of this 
masculine ideal for everyone else. Thus Horace Mann’s contribution contrast a compe-
tent, handsome and upright man with a craven, deformed drunkard, while a poem sug-
gests, in a sentence alarmingly close to the opening sequence of a 2000s sitcom: “the 
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world wants men, men, manly men.”375 Masculinity, particularly working class mascu-
linity, was a central obsession of the temperance activists.376 However, the connection 
between masculinity and temperance is clearly a contested one at the level of popular 
culture, rather than as a media disseminated image, with both sides attempting to con-
nect manliness to either consumption or forbearance. Thus the early forerunner of the 
“self made man” teetered between drinking and not drinking, depending on who de-
ployed the image.377 The temperance fight was over whether Horatio Alger would end 
up with a glass in his hand or not.  
Women were not immune from images of social control. The female drunkard 
is not absent from this text, represented especially as a wayward, working class mother 
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who, “drunk in the street,” shames her waiting family.378 In “Little Bessie,” a mother is 
talked into temperance by an interlocutor who draws on the mother’s protective duties 
to her children, suggesting that alcohol is just as dangerous as a weapon in the home.379 
Not only are anxieties about who is raising children and how they are raised prevalent, 
but also so is absolute maternal responsibility for the welfare of children, a trait that is 
often naturalized but was less prevalent in societies with higher mortality rates in 
childhood. Indeed, we might see the tendency in early 20th century psychology to cen-
ter adult disorders in failures in mothering as an outgrowth of this development.380 
Temperance ideology draws on this trend.  
Ideological images of women also abound in this volume, supporting to a great 
extent the influential “cult of true womanhood” thesis of, wherein women aspire to “pi-
ety, purity, submission and domesticity.”381 In particular the text calls for the women 
“of polite society,” a thinly veiled class signal, to use moral suasion and their role as 
educator of the young (and holding a monopoly of the legitimate supply of sexual rela-
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tions) to promote temperance.382 This task is explicitly constructed as “women’s work,” 
just as the broader temperance effort is constantly referenced as labor, effort, making or 
just work. Alongside the oft-noted martial and religious symbolic language, metaphors 
related to work, or images of communal projects such as pyramids and towers are prev-
alent. 
5.8 Labor and Temperance in Popular Culture 
 
 The drive for prohibition (and part of the drive against it) was on the part of 
women intimately connected to demands for social respect and economic compensation 
for their labor. This request is rarely made explicit, but is clear in both the campaigns 
themselves and the close connection of work and alcohol in popular culture. Many 
vaudeville plays dramatized the connection between alcohol, reproductive labor (par-
ticularly the work of raising children) and gender relations, usually setting the drama 
within a marriage. A typical play begins with a conflict over household labor; in this 
case, a fight about why the wife, Emily, has not prepared dinner for her husband, Harry, 
who leaves to give her time to make him dinner.383 Then a comedic adventure with 
baking occurs, wherein it becomes clear that Emily is an inexperienced cook, until Har-
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ry returns “with a beautiful jag.”384  They fight, and while the initial conflict is over the 
cooking, the argument immediately shifts to money, and a debate over whose property 
the house and its contents properly are. In the play, a mother in law ex machina solves 
the fight over shared possessions, but the tension over the connection between property, 
work and marriage is evident, and common in theater of the time. 
 In other play, an angry wife links her labor and her citizenship directly, com-
menting “You want us [women] to pay taxes, mend socks, mind babies, cook wash and 
iron and still we must keep our mouths shut.”385 This play, “Don’t Wake the Baby,” has 
fun with the fact that both milk and alcohol comes in bottles; he is left in charge of the 
baby while the wife attends a political meeting, during which he places the baby’s dia-
per on his little head and spikes the bottle of milk with whiskey. The subtext is that 
men are not fit for reproductive labor, and that when women attempt to upset the gen-
dered division of labor by entering the public space; men bring disorder and drunken-
ness into the private sphere. Yet, the claims of the wife that connect her tax paying to 
her mending and both of these to the requirements of a public voice go unanswered, 
leaving the ultimate narrative of the play coinciding nicely with the manufacture of the 
lazy, incompetent husband as scapegoat. Marriage was about money as much as it was 
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love, and alcohol was an economic issue because of its ability to destroy the ability of 
its abuser to provide for his family. 
The economic underpinnings of marriage are questioned from the point of view 
of the husband, as in prominent vaudevillian’s deeply satirical monologue.386  In this 
play, the speaker says that women’s entry into marriage is akin to becoming a capitalist, 
investing in the “machine” of a husband, and that this arrangement is unacceptable 
when women “don’t want to do their own housework.”387 The changing nature of mar-
riage as an economic bargain is then linked to temperance (and women’s political sta-
tus) through the medium of the free saloon lunch, which is portrayed as necessary giv-
en the unwillingness of women to provide food for their men.388 Tension over house-
hold labor is not new, nor is the turn to creative solutions, like the free saloon lunch, to 
circumvent the tensions. 
The deep connection between children and property is also a common reference 
in popular entertainment and the political advocacy of progressive theorists. Many 
plays show a couple staying together for the sake of a child, who is often symbolically 
linked to their shared property, as in play where the dueling couple’s clothing are pack-
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ing into suitcases, and then mixed in the middle of the stage with the child on top.389 A 
trope so common as to become dull in these early vaudevillian plays is a disagreement 
over who owns the furniture, with the husband claiming that he has purchased it while 
the wife claims that it is her dowry money that makes up his cash reserves; note that 
this tension is happening at the same time that an activist push for reform of common 
property laws is in effect.390 The relationship between women’s work, property and 
marriage was an open topic of comedy and discussion, not a secret to be uncovered.  
 
5.9 Connecting Temperance to the concept of Reproductive Labor 
 
     To fill in theoretically how prohibition was about labor, not merely morality, 
looking at the 1970s exploration of housework by Italian feminists involved in the 
Marxist Autonomist movement is useful. They protested existing social arrangements 
because of the hidden and unremunerated nature of work in the home, which for them 
included sexual as well as manual labor. They claimed that capitalism is built on the 
assumption of invisible or free labor in the home, which they titled “reproductive labor,” 
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developed from on the Marxist idea that market relations provide bare subsistence lev-
els to the worker, while exploiting the excess, unpaid surplus labor. This wage relation 
is how capital works, as what each individual has to sell is his or her labor itself, which 
becomes a commodity, a labor commodity, in the free market. Reproductive labor is 
what creates the labor power in the first place.391 Thus, one of the ways that capital 
grows profits is by the free exploitation of the ideology of the home and women’s work 
that does not need to be directly accounted for on a balance sheet or unemployment 
figures, particularly as “family-wage” jobs become less common. Struggles over wel-
fare, medical care, housing, and education can all be seen as evidence of this pressure 
point. Indeed, we can see that women, especially women of color and immigrant wom-
en, have long been at the forefront of activism relating to these ideas. The Italian solu-
tion was to demand wages for household labor, a move echoed by Selma James in the 
United States. 
  However, another way to approach the same problem would be to use legal re-
strictions on social practices that abuse or undervalue reproductive labor. While the 
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family and patriarchy certainly existed before capitalism, the particular form that the 
family was taking at the turn of the century was fundamentally capitalist.392 Positing 
the complete movement of men and women into utterly separate spheres is too simplis-
tic, but shared labor of those in the home together, such as on farms, was replaced by 
work, often by multiple family members, outside the home. In any case, the reproduc-
tive work of childbearing and rearing still fell on the mother, although many wealthy 
women were able to continue to shift these responsibilities on the lower classes through 
the hiring of domestic labor, often very cheaply. While women did not yet outright 
challenge this arrangement, the bargain only worked when the reproductive labor of 
women was rewarded with a stable household- and this was undermined by the condi-
tions under which more and more urban populations labored. Similarly, more wealthy 
families were experiencing their own tensions around the relationships between men 
and women, particularly around the exclusivity of the public space of social interaction. 
This would also change during prohibition, although not necessarily in the way that 
Drys had thought. 
 Instead, Prohibition is a time where women’s work changes substantially. While 
prohibition was nationally instituted in 1920, and lasted until the 21st amendment in 
 
392. “In time, the pre-capitalist household with its unity of production, reproduction and consumption 
collapsed, leaving a void.” Stuart C. Aitken, The Awkward Spaces of Fathering (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 










1933, a large majority of states and countries went dry in the twenty years before that, 
with Maine starting the party, or rather ending it, in 1851. This was also a time when 
women moved markedly into the paid labor force.393 The literature on women’s work 
in this time generally agrees that, despite the initial view of “two separate spheres,” 
women’s work was often intimately integrated into home life, and indeed the choices 
women made about employment should be understood in the context of their greater 
households and family units.394 Frequently, women’s labor was often hidden (at least 
from the census), particular if they were self-employed or involved in a male led type 
of self-employment. Women often frequently kept chickens, grew vegetables, took on 
boarders, or even ran small restaurants out of their homes. Yet this sort of cottage in-
dustry was under pressure from the rising availability of slightly higher paying factory 
jobs, some of which duplicated services previously offered at home. Of course, partici-
pation in the labor market was markedly different for women of color.395 Note that 
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much of this work contradicts the idea that a strict separation of spheres occurred in 
terms of the workplace and politics- although one exception is in the availability of 
public amusement and society.    
 Women at the turn of the century are severed from production, or entering the 
workforce at lower wages than men, while still responsible for domestic work, and thus 
at a disadvantage. This combines with rampant problems with domestic violence; 
abandonment and lack of access to wages men receive. Laws that might come later, 
like protections against abuse in the home, child support, or more protective divorce 
laws, were politically impossible. Yet, temperance women took aim at these problems 
through advancing the goals of temperance, which were understood as advancing 
women’s special moral role as keeper of the home, rather than unsettling gender rela-
tions. Yet, this political movement cannot be contained in the ideology of women in the 
home, as it required that women act publicly and form their own public spheres for po-
litical and social advancement. It also made the issue of economic relations between 
family members a political one; companionate marriage should not be seen as a trade of 
affection for labor, but rather required that each partner both labor and love, and this 
bargain could be backed by law.   












Read as a demand for wages, respect, and for a public space outside of the 
home, perhaps even coeducational working and learning environments, prohibition is 
more complex, and the easy declaration of its failure is a mistake. How we currently 
understand prohibition tells us much about our relationship not only to gender, con-
servative social movements and political morality, but also constitutional change. As 
mentioned above, prohibition is often deployed in arguments about limited government, 
with proponents of such varied policies as the decriminalization of cannabis and rejec-
tion of anti-obesity measures such as required calorie counts or bans on trans-fats using 
it as a rhetorical flourish. Certainly, proponents of temperance and prohibition advocat-
ed the use of government power as well as moral suasion to combat the ills of alcohol-
ism. In particular, through exploring the role of the government in “home protection” a 
trope that Frances Willard adapted from a speech on tariffs.396 Home protection was a 
powerful metaphor for proponents of temperance, particularly those in the WCTU, and 
in particular allowed Willard to link moral issues with demands for suffrage, the latter 
of which were initially met with suspension even by WCTU members. Home protec-
tion was the rhetorical invocation of separate spheres ideology, with the twist that, giv-
en the apparent inability of men to exercise political power to protect the home, despite 
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its role as “haven in a heartless world,” 397 it became necessary for women to leave the 
home in order to protect it. Indeed, it was sometimes suggested that women be given 
the vote only in relation to moral matters; “it was not enough that women should be 
home-makers, but they must make the world itself a larger home.”398 The entire world 
was annexed as a subject of women’s work.  
The need to remake the world into a “home” also aligned with developing so-
cial gospel movement espoused by theologians like Walter Rauschenbusch; he and re-
lated thinkers saw in Christianity a duty to remake the world in the image of the king-
dom of heaven, and argued that the second coming of Christ could only occur after the 
hard work of Christians purified the sinful world.399 Social gospel theology was key to 
the home protectionist strategy that Willard embraced, because it mirrored the argu-
ments about the moral duty of women to leave the private sphere to protect it, in that it 
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demanded that the private duties of religion translate to public deeds and advocacy.400 
It also was important because it drew on the longstanding association of protestant the-
ology and good deeds to foreground women’s work.401 Temperance was part of a 
broader conversation about the role of women in religious work. 
 
5.10 Fighting Temperance also protected Women’s Work 
 
It is a mistake to see women as unilateral fans of prohibition and temperance. 
While members of the temperance movement itself were primarily middle and upper 
class white women, urban and rural, who saw themselves as saving the husbands of 
wives from the lower classes from the scourge of alcoholism. Nonetheless, a great 
many women from a variety of socioeconomic statuses drank before and during prohi-
bition, and indeed this drinking become more public during prohibition.402 Anti-
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temperance women also used home protectionist logic as a basis for their drive to re-
peal. Non-elite women were also divided on the issue of temperance; it is overly sim-
plistic to identify the lower classes with consumption and the middle and upper with 
forbearance. This does not eliminate the very real tensions around immigration and ur-
banization which allowed prohibition to gain traction, particularly with the same de-
mographics who would make up the progressive movement that also aimed at improv-
ing the lives of the working poor. The auxiliary arm of the 1840’s Washingtonian 
Temperance club, the Martha Washington Society, was made up of primarily working 
class and often rural members, who combined advocacy with direct support of families 
through shared housework, donated food and unemployment support for men.403 While 
they generally avoided direct political action, they connected the seemingly personal 
vices of alcoholism, which male Washingtonians pledged to abstain from, with a 
broader responsibility of society to insure that working families had the resources nec-
essary to avoid temptation. They also rejected common practices of removing and 
shaming female inebriates and approached alcohol not as a weakness of the lower clas-
ses, but instead a problem intimately tied up with poverty, lack of social mobility and 
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the first round of industrialization.404 Women of the working classes were also oppo-
nents of prohibition, as well as moderate drinkers. 
Women’s opposition to temperance, and their reasons for drinking in public, al-
so show a bid for fuller inclusion and suggest that the saloon was not merely a place of 
vice, but a masculine political sphere that was destroyed to make room for public spac-
es no longer segregated by gender. Temperance, while certainly not as supported by 
women as its opponents made it seem, was about challenging the male monopoly on 
public space which was itself built on the claims of occupation and labor. Popular cul-
ture understood that working men deserved a drink at the end of the day because they 
worked so terribly hard, and they deserved a space to develop bonds, political and oth-
erwise, with other men. Women responded not only with temperance, but also with the 
construction of their own public spheres, particularly in the form of clubs, settlement 
houses and even drinking circles.405 And, interestingly, these counterpublics were not 
only able to circulate their own texts, but to develop a critique of the dominant public 
sphere and thus support massive social change. Rejecting the masculine spaces of the 
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saloon, these groups of women nonetheless took up the mantle of publicity and demo-
cratic citizenship housed in shared conversation, even as they debate Prohibition.  
 
5.11 Saloons as Masculine Publics  
 
Anti-Saloon action was also a way to attack, particularly in immigrant commu-
nities, what has been called the “theaters of excessive machismo.”406 The masculine 
world of the Spaghetti Western was not far off, although oddly saloons were more open 
to women in the west than in the urbanizing northern cities. The saloon was so central 
to the social and political life of men that, as temperance movements gained steam, the 
need was seen to provide substitute institutions and spaces.407 These arguments sought 
“Substitutes for the Saloon”, the discussion of which provides at least a partial socio-
logical understanding of the place of the bar in the lives of American urban men.408  
The stance of its authors is clear, given the addition of an introduction that proclaims 
saloons “an unmitigated social evil” despite the report’s claims that they provide the 
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central social insinuation for millions of Americans.409  Indeed, one of the anxieties that 
the report repeatedly reflects is the worry that saloons are serving to pull men (assum-
edly not the upper class writers of the reports) outside of the wholesome sphere of the 
home into the public space. The ideal of the conjugal family was not only applied to so 
called angels in the home, but also by elites towards the growing urban population of 
wage laborers. Indeed, the entire report is suffused with an elitist and technocratic tone, 
assuming that the lower classes cannot help themselves from drinking without the 
forceful intervention of the state, and aided by the growing world of philanthropic 
agencies led by individuals similar to the report writers. 
Through this ideological fog, the report does help explain why the saloon was a 
central aspect of American political and social life in the 19th and early 20th century. 
The first, and perhaps most surprising claim, that the report makes is that saloons pro-
vide a gender segregated space that each individual requires given that “at times, he 
prefers the society of men to women.”410 Along with the specific benefits of a purely 
masculine space, saloons were consistently tied to the growth of the standard work-
week and the Taylorization of factory life. They are also described as sources of infor-
mation, particularly the results of electoral and sporting competitions.411 Next, saloons 
offered bathrooms and “the only place a glass of water could be asked for and received 
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without fear of intrusion.”412 These physical needs (to which could be added the fre-
quent provision of cheap or free lunch for drinking customers) were not publicly pro-
vided for at this time. The use of alcohol as a sedative against the stresses of urban life 
is also discussed; this is one reason that the committee is concerned about the social 
ramifications of prohibition. They reason that if workingmen and women are not ex-
hausting themselves through physical exertion, they may become unruly. Instead, they 
will need alternative spaces where they can relax. The proposed the development of 
“community centers, club societies, moving pictures, improved dwelling conditions” as 
a way to curb drinking but provide for its social function.413  
However, the report primarily assumes that the functions of the public space of 
the saloon will be easily privatized, and do not need to be consciously replaced with 
any new public space. In this view, men turn to the home, “the natural social center,” 
and to work when the saloon is not available.414 In other words, this report claims that 
the saloons are central sources of information, identity formation, economic transitions 
and political awakening do not actually need substitution, and that each worker can 
channel his or her needs to individual or familial pursuits, with the help of philanthrop-
ic charities and well-meaning technocrats. This is a very similar description to that of 
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Habermas’ Public Sphere.415 Furthermore, the home is described as a natural space, 
rather than a construct attached to changing norms of family life that accompany (and 
abet) capitalist growth.  
        Saloons were also explicitly political- indeed it was often where you voted, and 
where the Chicago Machine emerged, as well as its relationship to the mob. However, 
saloons do not fit the full-idealized Habermasian public sphere model as class, political 
ideology or party, and even sometimes profession- not to mention of course gender seg-
regated them. They were also spaces where you had to- however, cheaply- buy your 
way in. They were of course mainly racially and ethnically segregated, and often 
served as living rooms for the local tenements. But these saloons are still examples of 
multiple “counterpublics” with their own rules of discourse and sets of texts. If we ac-
cept the idea that publics in a pluralist world will be plural, perhaps this model is not so 
different from our own situation.  These salons provided their own set of challenges to 
the type of politics that grew out of their discussions and politicization.  
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If bars and saloon culture served to cement a masculine sphere unavailable to 
women, and indeed the club did in a gendered segregated fashion so as well for wealthy 
men and women, who also drank, then deconstructing this paradigm was imperative for 
the social and political equality of women. Indeed, one of the lost legacies of prohibi-
tion has been women’s public spaces, and the drinking that happened there. When early 
temperance activists entered the saloon, at first to study it, they were greeted with 
shouts of “Whore!” and other disparagements, even prior to their protests. It was not 
merely that they wished to pray in the saloon, or to take a hatchet to it, but that they 
dared to trespass into a space reserved for working males. 
Much iconography of temperance and advocating temperance could be mistak-
en at first glance for women seeking to enter the saloon and have a seat. In a metaphor-
ical sense, this is accurate, even if the bar is a synecdoche for other forums of political 
privilege.  The lack of women in these spaces was proclaimed a dearth of morality, but 
it also was a lack of representation in a crucial social space, that soon became political. 
As women could not gain entrance to these spaces, even when physically allowed, they 
set up pickets outside or, as in the case of Carrie Nation, destroyed the limited space of 
the saloon. In doing so, they created a vacuum that has only been partially filled.  
And, before and during prohibition, women did drink and did place themselves 
into the space of the bar or into spaces for their own consumption of alcohol and poli-









with drinks drew many factory workers of all genders in.416 In other words, working 
women saw alcohol as a part of the reward for working hard, and also appreciated the 
incumbent benefits that well-apportioned public spheres could offer. In taking their 
place in the saloon as well as the workplace, they claimed the prerogatives usually re-
served for men.  
Women also developed their own exclusive drinking practices. “Working-class 
women did indeed drink publicly, not only in bars but in other locations open to public 
view such as tenement roof tops, stoops, and courtyards as well as city parks, alleyways, 
and waterfront wharves.”417 In particular, families in tenement housing often drank to-
gether at night, or in groups of women gathered around a shared alcoholic beverage 
while children played nearby- this was known colloquially as a “can racket.”418 The 
very idea of a “growler”- a beer jug taken to go- was also associated with women at 
home, doing household chores, and getting together. Often this drinking occurred while 
 
416. A description of such an event in from a factory worker: “The following day, Richardson, 
Mooney, and four others ‘filed in the ladies’  entrance’ of Devlin’s, seated themselves in the backroom, 
and ordered ‘Six   beers with the trimmings!’ Greatly enjoying the hearty meal, Richardson declared, ‘I 
instantly determined never again to blame a working man or woman for dining in a saloon in preference 
to the more godly and respectable dairy-lunch room.’ Further, she confessed that ‘I, who never before 
could endure the sight or smell of beer, found myself draining my ‘schooner’ as eagerly as Mrs Mooney 
herself. Soon, she and her female co-workers were making daily excursions to Devlin’s where, Richard-
son observed, ‘I had become a regular patron.’” Dorothy Richardson, The Long Day: The Story of a New 
York Working Girl, as Told by Herself (Century Company, 1905), 259.  
417. Madelon Powers, “Women and Public Drinking, 1890-1920,” History Today 45 (1995): 46 
418. Jacob August Riis and Luc Sante, How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of 









childcare or other household labor was shared, in a reflection of the linkage of work 
and dessert, refracted through the home. While these spaces were not overtly political, 
nor were they private, and they afforded women the ability to expose themselves as 
public beings whose lives mattered. For women who did not work, inside or outside of 
the home, drinking also became more common and public. While the saloon had been 
in general off limits to women, the speakeasy was coed.  
 
5.12 Women gained economic power by exploiting Prohibition   
 
Women also changed their relationship to work and political standing through 
economic endeavors related to prohibition.419 The association of women with home 
production made bootlegging an acceptable, if illegal, occupation for women.420 While 
employment of all sorts was becoming more common for women, particularly in cities, 
it was hardly a normal part of most women’s lives. However, common practices of 
earning money by taking on boarders, laundering clothes and watching children contin-
ued through this time period, augmented by alcohol related schemes. One reason that 
 
419. Many women ran taverns. Peter Thompson, Rum Punch & Revolution (University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1999), 44.  
420. Mary Murphy, “Bootlegging Mothers and Drinking Daughters: Gender and Prohibition in Butte, 









the speakeasies were co-ed may be that women often ran them.421 There is also some 
evidence that female bootleggers were less likely to be charged or incarcerated than 
their male counterparts.422 For black women engaged in bootlegging and other clandes-
tine activities, known as “mojo women,” underground economies were sometimes 
much more welcoming than the formal labor market.423 Most women involved in boot-
legging or running illegal bars were from what we might now call minority groups, in-
cluding immigrants from Italy, Germany, Ireland and Poland.424 Bootlegging provided 
a unique route to economic independence. 
There are many ways to analyze the openness of illegal alcohol related activity 
to women; my suggestion is that the openness of alternative labor and entrepreneurial 
markets to women, and especially to black women whose experience was uniquely 
configured racial and gender categories, suggests that the category of “women’s work” 
 
421. Sandra Schackel, Western Women’s Lives. She argues that women who ran and attended speak-
easies were conscious of the transgressive nature of this activity, and this inspired women’s clubs to hold 
annual events at bars or accompanied by alcohol. 342-343. 
422. Louisiana Historical Association, Louisiana History (Louisiana Historical Association, 2000). It 
is possible that women were benefiting from assumptions about their “natural” relationships to household 
production, or some sort of chivalry. (Or, perhaps they were sneaky bootleggers.) 
423. These women “openly challenged gender race, and sexuality in their work and leisure lives” (53); 
for example, “Queen” Odessa Marie Madre developed an empire of “jook joints” in Washington D.C., us-
ing her wealth to gain access to privileged social and political spheres. Black Women and Work Collective, 
Sister Circle: Black Women and Work (Rutgers University Press, 2002), 53.  
424. Tanya Marie Sanchez, “The Feminine Side of Bootlegging,” Louisiana History: The Journal of 










is more flexible than might be imagined. While the association of women with the body, 
households, reproduction and care is usually seen as a hindrance, keeping women in a 
private space, it also means that work related to private spaces (as alcohol was during 
prohibition) is open to women. Furthermore, the slipperiness of the distinction between 
public and private is evident here, both because the women could use their private and 
even secret businesses to gain public standing and because consumption is part of a 
public economy or social practices of togetherness. Finally, the movement of women 
into the formal economy, as in the working women’s stories above, granted them ac-
cess to the formerly segregated space of the saloon itself, as well as to the newly devel-
oped working women’s drinking groups. 
 The ability of women to change their social, political and economic situations 
through their work was reflected also in the trope (and actual experience) of the “flap-
per.” While the bobbed hair that women adopted is often seen as a fad, it was in part 
made necessary by women’s work in factories, where loose hair was a danger. The fig-
ure of the flapper, with its incumbent controversy over notions of femininity, was an 
international phenomenon.425 In the United States, the flapper was a symbol of the new 
 
425. At least in the French case, the preoccupation with women’s hair reflected fears about changing 
gender roles and “a crisis of domesticity” created by the movement of women into the workforce during the 
war. Mary Louise Roberts, “Samson and Delilah Revisited: The Politics of Women’s Fashion in 1920s 
France,” The American Historical Review 98, no. 3 (June 1, 1993): 657–684, doi:10.2307/2167545., 661). 
This same trend is visable in Weimar Germany, and traces the efforts of the government to curb the work-












status of women, and often associated with upper class indolence. However, the flapper 
was not merely a symbol of changing sexual mores, but a reflection of the centrality of 
work to women’s struggle for political recognition. 
Indeed, one of the reasons that the prohibitions and temperance activists strug-
gled to hold on to their monumental accomplishment of the 18th amendment was their 
growing reputation as sterile, shrill and sexless. That their central message of home 
protection was not about moral purity, but about providing materially for women was 
ignored. Just as they ignored how the very women they sought to help were themselves 
using the situation of prohibition to protect themselves. At the same time, the flapper 
image quickly lost its association with factory work and become linked with Coco 
Chanel and the garconne, effectively limits its political relevance. Both the temperance 
women and the workingwomen who bootlegged or cut their hair were staking a claim 
to the importance of their work and legitimacy of their role in political and economic 
institutions. But the false choice presented by prohibition, as framed by national de-
bates and newspaper coverage, was between a sexless, older moralist and a young, dy-
namic (and useless) flapper. The home protectionist and the working girl were nowhere 
to be seen.  The flapper (although also challenging mores, particularly sexual ones) was 
hemmed in by her devotion to male sexuality, and therefore re-inscribed into the pri-
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vate sphere of the bedroom. In other words, the concerns of women were seen as pre-
political, and their movement in the public space pollutes both it and them- and leads to 
bad policy. Read as a demand for respect for wages, and for a public space outside of 
the home, perhaps even coeducational working and learning environments, then the end 
of Prohibition is more complex, and the easy declaration of its failure is a mistake. 
 The repeal of Prohibition occurred in part because the bid to recoup reproduc-
tive labor in the form of passed on wages from head of household men did not function; 
that is to say, the legal prohibition of drink did not destroy the slums or poverty. Even 
if enforcement had been draconian and drinking levels for all classes fallen to nothing, 
this is likely because the gendered struggle over labor and wages was not a struggle 
that could be ameliorated by shifts in personal behavior of husbands or wives. While 
drinking levels were reduced, and women gained new public voice after the 19th 
amendment and growing workforce participation, even in the interwar period, domestic 
violence, poverty, ill health and lack of education persisted. Indeed, we might thank 
Prohibition for striking a blow against the concept that the poor were poor because of 
the moral choices, such as drink, that they made. Instead both gendered inequality with-
in families and broader inequality between classes grew even as working class men had 
less access to drink and women more to the political sphere. 
Thus men and women worked together to repeal the 18th amendment, just as 
they had to pass it, and still in the interest of protecting (or regulating) poor families 









tomatically produce in citizens the changes they wish to see; lifelong temperance activ-
ists like John Rockefeller Jr. publicly argued for repeal out of a concern that “respect 
for all law has been greatly lessened.”426 The Women’s Organization for National Pro-
hibition Reform (WONPR), which formed in the 1920’s advanced concern about the 
solidity of law as well as reiterating concerns about children and families. Pauline Sab-
ine, head of WONPR and a former temperance activist, was particularly vocal about 
the problem of essentialism in temperance circles, taking umbrage at the way that 
Temperance advocates claimed to speak for all women. Sabine spoke about the grow-
ing tendency of teens and children to obtain drinks in illegal speakeasies, noting that 
saloons had at least been regulated to prevent the drinking of minors.427 Indeed, it was 
the support of women like Sabine, who now had the power to vote, which helped place 
repeal in the democratic platform of 1933, and helped insure that states repealed their 
local prohibition laws in the years to come. They would also continue to push to protect 
and remunerate women, ultimately turning feminist movements away from the moral 
high ground to claiming the right to work outside the home, which of course produced 
its own contradictions for family life that we still struggle with today.   
 
426 David E. Kyvig and Honorée Fanonne Jeffers, Repealing National Prohibition (Kent State Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 165.  
427. Grace Root, Women and Repeal: The Story of the Women’s Organization for National Prohibition 









The inability of Prohibition to solve the problems of household labor perhaps 
also reflects the fact that, for certain groups of women, it had long been expected that 
they would labor in and outside of the home. The legacy of slavery, first reflected in 
anti-vagrancy laws applied to black women and not white ones in the South, lingered in 
the form of assumptions about who was expected to work outside the home.428 For the-
se families, the drive for prohibition as a way to reward labor in the home did not re-
flect the reality of their situation, particularly given the high levels of unemployment 
for African American men who were often partnered with African American women. 
Addressing household labor would need to be a much more direct process that attempt-
ing to reward women through their husbands, a tactic that shored up the existing power 
hierarchies and reinforced the clearly false notion that women did not work.  
5.13 Liberal Citizenship Reformulated by the work of women 
 
       The case of prohibition helps illuminate the complexities of the relationships be-
tween different publics as they are experienced on the ground. It also helps illuminate a 
central difficulty in the public sphere literature. On one hand, the idea of a public 
sphere helps us map the potential distance between the state, the market economy and 
something we might call independent civil society. On the other, the concept of a pub-
lic sphere and its model of a certain type of rational discourse is a way of establishing 
 
428. Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizen-










status and distinction, even as it denies this on its face. In bracketing social status, as 
well as affect, religion, subject position and locality, whole swaths of the population are 
inadmissible by skill if not already by status.  
         In the prohibition and temperance case, women (and men) sought social change 
not (only) through rational discourse. They also intentionally deployed religious and 
emotional arguments to support their case. This was evidence in the first round of oc-
cupations of saloons, where women wept, prayed and begged. While this was certainly 
an attempt to us moral suasion, it was also an affront to the type of masculine public 
sphere contained within the saloon, where such moralizing was inadmissible. Even in 
the violent attacks of Carrie Nation and her hammer, the rejection of the rules of the 
masculine public sphere is clear. They also sought to create themselves the sort of 
spaces they wanted to live in, a strategy also taken up by Occupy Wall Street types. Lit-
tle huts were taken from space to space, and temperance leagues and unions developed 
from these huts into` longstanding organizations. The WCTU, the most famous of all, 
actually did a great deal of work unrelated to temperance, pushing for girls’ education 
and raising the age of sexual consent from 10-16. These spaces made have been built 
around one issue, laced with moral issues and very class stratified, but they became 
more than that. 
     And, it was a space where women claimed the validity of the work they did 
in terms of admissibility to the public sphere. Of course, this was advocacy of one class 









were the symbols of the movement, and whose pictures were frequently displayed, 
wanted. Domestic violence, poverty, hunger, insecurity- all were tied to alcohol. Indeed, 
it was as if the would-be social reformers fantasized that it was a mere lack of self-
control that kept the poor immigrants drunk. The roots of the progressive movement, 
and perhaps its biggest failings, lie in the desire to improve the lot of the lower classes, 
without necessarily questioning the structures that produced class. So, as one critic of 
temperance put it, why do we assume that drunkenness leads to poverty, and not the 
other way around? Certainly, tensions caused by rapid urbanization and industrializa-
tion- tensions that prompted changes in gender mores as well are made visible in this 
argument. And yet, under it all, is the idea that women who work, both physically and 
as care workers for the family, as those who are responsible for the home, deserve to be 
rewarded, both economically and socially.    
 
 Lack of the right type of work renders people superfluous to the political and 
social order, even if they are legally give the option of participating. The wrong type of 
work in this situation was women’s work in the home, which was so devalued that it 
received little or no recompense, except in the form of companionate marriages. When 
partners in these marriages failed to support the work of wives materially or spiritually, 
women responded by seeking to command this support using the power of the state. To 
do so, they relied on problematic but powerful tropes about domestic life and home 
protection, which belied underlying radical claims that amounted to wages for house-









ularly if they were some of the many women who broadened their economic or social 
worlds during or after prohibition. 
 
 5.14 Complicating Intersectional Analysis while considering Women’s Work  
  As discussed in the introduction, Intersectionality has been the central 
contribution of the third wave of feminism activism and theory, seeking to understand 
how various oppressions or subject positions interrelate. My consideration of women dur-
ing temperance affirms the intersectional commitment to “historical specificity in our 
analyses warns of a social science ‘theory of everything…’ and is  “already a method of 
social justice.”429 In particularly, understanding temperance and prohibition as an attempt 
to garner respect and reward for women’s work in the household helps us see that its fail-
ure to do so rests in the political theory of its proponents. For these primarily upper class, 
educated and initially rural women, the problem was that men were working outside the 
home and failing to reward their wives’ work within it. But this was not the same prob-
lem faced by so many workingwomen, and the slowly growing cadre of single female 
head of households. It was especially not the problem faced by those working in the do-
 
 429. Sara Diaz, Rebecca Clark Mane, and Martha González, “Intersectionality in Context: Three 
Cases for the Specificity of Intersectionality from the Perspective of Feminists in the Americas,” in Inter-
sectionality und Kritik, ed. Vera Kallenberg, Jennifer Meyer, and Johanna M. Müller (Springer Fachmedien 










mestic industries, whose paid labor was devalued through it association with the free la-
bor of wives, and therefore would be untouched by Prohibition, even if it had been suc-
cessful in rewarding more women’s work in the home. Without thinking about work, and 
how the varieties of women’s work (and what was counted as work) mattered, an analysis 
of this event is impossible. Intersectional analysts should think about work, which brings 
together so much of their interests in incorporating situated knowledges because it is so 
central to identity and politics, as a component of the interlocking pieces that order op-
pression.430  
5.15 The Unique status of Women’s Work and Labor  
 
 This can be even more clearly if we examine that controversies over Muller v. 
Oregon (1908) helps illuminate why prohibition, and its end, was understood as a 
choice between moral absolutism and open sexuality; both approaches, while substan-
tive changes in gender roles, did not undermine the close association between white 
masculinity and work. Muller comes in the same line of cases as the famous Lochner vs. 
New York  (1905).431 Lochner and Muller were two attempts to curb state regulation of 
business. Three years after striking down hour limiting legislation in Lochner,  in Mul-
 
430. This is the approach, although she does not call it Intersectionality, taken by Iris Marion Young in 
her influential piece “The Five Faces of Oppression” Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Differ-
ence (Princeton University Press, 1990), 39-63.  










ler, the justices upheld an Oregon regulation limiting the hours that women could work. 
In the end, it turned out, the gender of the workers made a difference in the ability of 
the state to exercise its police powers. “[W]holesome bread…” Peckham wrote in one 
of the most memorable phrases of American constitutional history, “…does not depend 
upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week.”  
Wholesome babies, apparently, do. 
Gender was the deciding factor because the roles of women and men, not just in 
the labor force, but also in society as a whole, were seen as fundamentally different. 
This is the case in which Brandeis famously included his brief discussing the social sci-
ence research on women and health, and reflecting ungrounded assumptions about the 
natural role of women.432  
As described above, the paternalism of the state takes the form of banning 
women from dangerous work, such as that in factories and laundries, while allowing 
less formalized labor arrangements to stand. One might note the deep irony of concern 
for the labor of potential mothers given the history of working enslaved women in the 
South all the way to term. In the previous cases dealing with men, the fact that paid la-
 
432 But so too are the claims that:  “That woman’s physical structure and the performance of mater-
nal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true 
when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the 
medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends 
to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physi-
cal well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength 










bor was potentially dangerous or inimical to health (as much work was and is), did not 
invalidate the individual’s “right to contract” and to thus assume potential risks if he 
saw fit. Women were assumedly not allowed to take the same risks with their bodies, 
because these bodies belonged to the polity as a whole in their reproductive capacity. 
Women’s bodies are thus configured as fundamentally legislatable, and inherently 
(even without interest in pregnancy) suspect in the terms of constitutional law. That is 
to say that their protection served was seen as an acceptable use of the police powers of 
the state.  
Muller exposes the tension surrounding gender, class and labor. On one hand, 
women are working, especially in factory and laundry jobs that are increasingly indus-
trialized and dangerous. Part of this tension is class based; on one hand, women are cast 
as weak, nervous and prone to inexplicable medical problems. On the other, they are 
seen as tough and hearty, particularly lower class and working women. In Muller, these 
two conceptions of women are paradoxically both affirmed, and thus we end up with a 
law that still allows what one must conclude is a very long day indeed (ten hours) of 
working at a factory. The court is faced with the uncomfortable fact that many women 
do work, and much longer hours than ten, which suggests that the reproductive bodies 
of the poor as less valuable, although no less available to regulation, than the wealthy. 
If working for more than ten hours is bad for mothers, then no doubt eight hours is not 









That woman, of many classes, have been working ten hour days since (at least) the in-
vention of agriculture is conveniently forgotten. 
Muller suggests that the state struggled to manage and regulate the work of 
women, inside and outside of the home, and yet wanted to retain a normative model 
where women’s only work is the reproduction of children for society. This reproduc-
tion was more valuable when done by those who did not have to work; assumedly these 
women of leisure faced none of the hardships described in the case and would thus bear 
more healthy children. Aside from the general paternalism and perhaps start of the still 
prevalent tendency of the state to claim control of women’s bodies in the name of chil-
dren, this case shows the same tensions around women’s work exposed by prohibition.     
Muller denies the hard work that women do in the home, which is the same hard 
work that temperance activists help to reward in the form of the family wage funneled 
through a sober husband, and in theory bolstered by other progressive reforms in the 
areas of child labor, prostitution, pure food, sanitation and housing. At the same time, it 
expresses concern for the potential movement of women into the hard waged work that 
is reserved for men, and supposed to cement their commitment to families and the poli-
ty through its guarantee of masculine independence. Just as Lochner asserts this inde-
pendence in the form of the “right to contract,” Muller denies the same form of inclu-
sion and citizenship to women, whose “right to contract” is superseded by duties to 









Just as in my rereading of Lochner and substantive due process as potentially 
supporting a collective right to a network of support for meaningful work, which is not 
limited to paid labor, Muller’s reflection of tensions between family and work life is 
still pertinent. It is not acceptable to refuse an entire class of individuals participation in 
the workplace, however exploitative it may be to draw on their “special talents.” How-
ever, it may be reasonable to divorce Muller from its naturalized imposition of sexist 
gender roles and instead understand the importance of thinking work and family to-
gether when developing policy. Muller offends modern sensibilities, just as Lochner 
does, but the actual importance of families, if not defined in the limited sense of a male 
breadwinner and female homemaker, in relation to work is key. In particular, the link-
age of this sort of concern with Equal Protection language helps us to protect or advo-
cate on behalf of guardians and children, broadly defined, without limiting either by 
means of biology or custom. This might produce a work that would not be harmful to 
the raising of children, but supportive of this endeavor for anyone who wanted to un-










CHAPTER SIX MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY WORK BY 
REDEFINING WORK, LABOR AND POLITICS IN HANNAH ARENDT. 
 
6.1 Why Arendt?  
 
If Shays’ showed support for the work of citizenship as constitutional thinking, 
and Temperance the way that asking for recognition for labor entails the building of new 
public spheres, open to those who perform that sort of labor, we still need to think about 
how to apply these insights in the face of the contemporary challenges of precarity, the 
ubiquity of work, depoliticalization and the problem of reproductive labor.433  Each of 
these challenges place the worker outside of the privileged space of participatory, delib-
erative and agonistic citizenship, but the “who, what and where” of citizenship can be 
greatly ameliorated by developing a concept of constitutive citizenship, which focuses on 
how to build a shared public (rather than what to say within it), and recognizes the im-
portance of all people engaging in all sorts of labor and work, political and reproductive. 
This is still a version of a public sphere argument, even if the focus is on building the 
public sphere, and even if more types of speech than ideal or public reason are let inside 
it, but this sort of public sphere is derived from the work of Hannah Arendt, rather than 
Habermas. 
To understand how Arendt helps us confront these four challenges, a brief discus-
sion of how she is generally seen by commentators will help set up my unique reading; 
 









from there, I’ll discuss how her theory helps us with three of the four challenges, and 
leaves for us most pressingly the fourth. Arendt herself is dealing with these four chal-
lenges in other terms and through an engagement with the history of political philosophy. 
Precarity she understands as superfluousness, as discussed in the introduction, which 
leads us to the need to build a shared public space. She is explicitly concerned about the 
mutual penetration of public and private, which she labels the “social,” but it is often 
overlooked that this concern is not merely that the public space of action is eclipsed, but 
that the durable processes of work cease to exist. I read her concept of “privacy” as a rich 
and full one, indicating the resistance of sharp definitions between public and private and 
instead the type of constitutive citizenship the Regulators and temperance activists pur-
sued, which make work political.  
 
6.2 Why Arendt is considered a Theorist of Political Action  
 
 The dominant understanding of Hannah Arendt is as a thinker of boundaries who 
desires the separation of public and private life, while valuing the public and political 
over the private concerns of the household. This chapter offers a counter reading of Ar-
endt, arguing that we should also look at her other categories in The Human Condition: 
labor and work. Her public sphere citizen is defined by his or her ability to move between 
politicized and non-politicized spaces and to indeed create and nurture the capacity for 
politics. This examination gives us, on one hand, a fuller appreciation for the central im-









reprises persistent questions about the implications of Arendt’s thought when considering 
gender and class in terms of reproductive labor, which may ultimately push us beyond 
Arendt for projects of democratic citizenship. 
 The most influential commentaries on Arendt, despite varied perspectives and in-
terpretative strategies, generally agree that her theory is focused on politics on action. 
“Her heroic and agonistic conception” is foregrounded as the apex of political thought, 
grounding the rest of her theoretical framework.434 This framework seeks to map:  “the 
nature of political action, the positive ontological role of the public realm, the nature of 
political judgment, and the conditions for an antiauthoritarian, antifoundational democrat-
ic politics,” which might make it particularly attractive for contemporary life.435 Alter-
nately, Arendt can be seen as “reluctantly modern,” a characterization that highlights both 
the sense of nostalgic loss and critical theory edge of her work.436 This view to a certain 
extent counters the idea that Arendt is filled with “polis envy,” although even as a reluc-
 
434. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt, Politics, Conscience, Evil (Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 43.  
435. Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger (Princeton University Press, 1995), 13. 
436. Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Revised (Rowman & Little-
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Jew and as a student of German Philosophical Traditions, most importantly Heidegger. She is understood 
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tant modernist, Arendt is argued to privilege action to the detriment of all other life. 437 
Even when the focus is shifted to the “social,” as in the famous treatment of it as an “at-
tack of the blob,” we find Arendtian action politics unchallenged as the primarily space 
or mode worth promoting.438 While it is undoubtedly true that political action is im-
portant to Arendt, focusing too exclusively on the promotion of heroic deeds causes us to 
lose sight of the rest of her ideas, which may be required for action to be possible. 
6.3 Precarious Labor as Arendtian Superfluousness 
 
 Arendt gives us an understanding of why labor force precarity439 is inherently a 
political problem, rather than a private issue, although she conceives of the problem as 
the problem of the superfluous. Superfluousness, along with “loneliness,” “terror,” and 
“uprootedness” make up the “spring” or organizing principle of totalitarianism, although 
they emerge from industrialization and colonialism.440 To be superfluous means “not to 
 
437. This phallocentric pun has been credited to Jean Bethke Elshtain and also Bonnie Honig, but 
is defined as “a tendency to view modern political life as a precipitous fall from the glories of a highly my-
thologized Periclean heyday” Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans 
Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton University Press, 2003), 69.  
438. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2000), 475.  
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440. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), Ch. 
9.Arendt introduces this concept in the context of a critique of human rights at a pivotal juncture in the 
massive Origins of Totalitarianism, her exploration of the dynamics that allowed for the rise of the Nazi 









belong to the world at all” and in that it is worse that to be lonely or uprooted, and this 
non-belonging is a political lack. The perfection of a totalitarian system would have no 
need of human beings whatsoever, with their unpredictability and needs.441 Arendt ex-
plicitly links superfluousness with capitalism and unemployment, discussing throughout 
the text how large scale mining operations and imperialist projects required massive mo-
bile laboring populations who lacked basic protections and would be discarded if injured 
or after the project was complete.442 Today, unemployment is a central experience of 
rootlessness and superfluousness, and make the precarious vulnerable to domination and 
exploitation.443  
Arendt argues that superfluousness is established on a grand scale because the 
“Rights of Man...had never been politically secured but merely proclaimed and have, in 
their traditional form, lost all validity.”444 In other words, “rights talk”,445 particularly 
 
441. Indeed, she argues that “[t]otalitarianism strives not toward despotic rule over men, but to-
ward a system in which men are superfluous.” Ibid.,137 
 
442. “[I]n a period of political disintegration suddenly and unexpectedly made hundreds of thou-
sands of human beings homeless, stateless, outlawed and unwanted, while millions of human beings were 
made economically superfluous and socially burdensome by unemployment.” (Ibid, 446).   
 
443. This is true for Arendt, but also as I’ve discussed in Chapter Three. Today’s worker can be 
exploited or dominated because, except in their fleeting capacity as laborers, political regimes have no need 
for them and thus no reason to recognize or construct their rights. They are also without voice, because 
their value as workers keeps them in the economic rather than political spheres. This is why the problem of 
precarity is a problem for democratic citizenship.  
444. Ibid., 446. 
427. This is a term of Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
(Simon and Schuster, 2008). Her concern is not with the hollowness of rights talk, but with its ability to 












when it relies on a concept of natural law, covers over the political and constructed nature 
of human rights, which are only valid for individuals who are recognized and protected 
by a political body. Unless they are “politically secured,” rights are meaningless.  It is a 
failure of politics as well as theory that allows for the wide scale uprooting of human be-
ings, such that they lack, even if formally citizens, a political space in which to protest 
this status. 
For Arendt, the refugee is the paradigmatic figure of superfluousness of the 20th 
century. Lacking a formal place in which his or her voice can be heard politically, the 
refugee is reduced to bare humanity and, paradoxically, because this is when they are 
most needed, this is the state in which human rights are least existent. For a contemporary 
analysis, the refugee may still be important, but so too are figures like the economic mi-
grant or the unemployed.446 Both the undocumented and the unemployed push the 
boundaries of Arendt’s ideas, because they may be accorded status citizenship in either 
the country from whence they came or the one in which they live and therefore are not 
technically without a political space. However, they are rendered superfluous by the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
that: “[r]ights talk itself is relatively impervious to other more complex languages we still speak in less 
public contexts, but it seeps into them, carrying the rights mentality into spheres of American society where 
a sense of personal responsibility and of civic obligation traditionally have been nourished” (x).  
446. For an application to the status of undocumented workers in the United States, see Cristina Beltran, 
“Going Public: Hannah Arendt, Immigrant Action, and the Space of Appearance,” Political Theory 37, no. 










mechanisms that excluded the refugee from the human community, and part of this 
mechanism is the systematic devaluation of the type of work they do or lack of work. 
Once citizens have legal standing as members of the United States, their rights are under-
stood as guaranteed, enforceable by legislation or adjudication, and social barriers sur-
mountable, if not by sheer will, than by law. Arendt’s original development of the con-
cept of superfluousness works along these same lines, as she identifies the condition of 
the stateless refugee, without political home, as a condition of the superfluous. Because 
the refugee does not have standing in any political body, his or her status is below that of 
a criminal, who at least is legally present. It is in this context that she introduces the con-
cept of the “right to have rights” has been taken to mean the right to inclusion in a formal 
political body- a right to citizenship- and has been powerfully invoked by refugees and 
supreme court justices alike447. 
However, it is a mistake to assume in our contemporary context that “the right to 
have rights” is answered by status citizenship automatically. To see why, we should look 
closer at Arendt’s theoretical claims. First of all, notice that refugees are not de jure state-
less, but are made “essentially stateless” by their relationship to their county of legal 
membership. What is required is membership in “some kind of organized community;” 
 
447. Arendt, Origins, 296. For an argument that Arendt understands this to refer to the struggle of 
potential right bearers, see James D. Ingram, “What Is a ‘right to Have Rights’? Three Images of the Poli-









indeed, we might ask whether refugee camps can themselves develop this sort of com-
munity on their own, as in the cases of long term refugee camps.448 The refugee experi-
ence that Arendt herself underwent occurred not because no state would recognize her, 
but because Germany systematically stripped Jewish people and other “undesirables” of 
their status.449 While Arendt identifies the formal exclusion or loss of status citizenship as 
a key moment in the process of dehumanization, or reduction to bare life, she recognizes 
that the issue is not status, but rather having a name and voice: a place, from which to 
speak to a community who hears. 
Superfluousness is now experienced not only by the stateless, but also by the 
marginalized who are formally citizens. These exclusions cut along many lines, but in the 
liberal capitalist society of the United States, cut most firmly along lines of work. To be a 
good citizen is to be a productive member of society, which means to be integrated into 
the labor market, either as a wage earner or entrepreneur. The unemployed, underem-
ployed, part-time worker, welfare recipient, elderly job-seeker, black market worker and 
unremunerated worker in the home may also be citizens, but their work disqualifies them 
 
448. Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of Na-
tional Identity Among Scholars and Refugees,” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (February 1, 1992): 24–44. 
449. Note that this stripping was facilitated by the pariah/parvenus status of even assimilated Jew-
ish people, as explored in the first half of Origins of Totalitarianism and in Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnha-
gen: The Life of a Jewish Woman-revised Edition, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston, Revised 










for full political participation and takes them places which do not provide the political 
space in which to be heard.450 To not be heard is to be quietly superfluous. 
If work has become the most important aspect of politics, it has also become the 
most important piece of citizenship. Because waged work is a privileged form of social 
integration and provision for material needs, those without it or with too little of it are 
seen as lacking. Thus the unemployed are a frequent topic of discussion in the media, 
particularly in times when their ranks grow, but the discussion (and a great deal of the 
electoral politics) hinges on gaining employment. That there could be other ways of 
providing for oneself or building a political community is not considered. This is reflect-
ed in part by the widely shared assumption that the government, and the executive branch 
in particular, is responsible for ensuring that the economy is adding jobs. In terms of for-
mal powers, the president has relatively little direct ability (outside of a period of national 
emergency) to alter the economy; even the liberal use of executive orders is little substi-
tute for the broader “tax and spend” prerogative of the Legislative Branch.451 However, it 
is also possible that employment has come under his or her prerogative because it has 
been so closely linked to good citizenship and rights in the United States, and the Presi-
 
450. Patrick Hayden, “Superfluous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the Political Evil of 
Global Poverty,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 35, no. 2 (March 1, 2007): 279–300, 
doi:10.1177/03058298070350021001. This article also associates the concept of superfluousness with the 
banality of evil, and notes the way that global poverty renders individuals superfluousness, in part because 
of the world’s focus on political rights and abuses, via a process that is itself quiet and invisible. 
221. A plausible case can be made that the President is viewed as responsible for the economy due 









dent bears responsibility for political membership. Instead of questioning this move, we 
might instead ask what it means for work to be so important politically.  
To be without full-time waged work is not only to be potentially destitute, but al-
so to be without a social role or legitimacy. This is clearly shown in the tendency of indi-
viduals to work even as transfer payments and welfare benefits would pay more than 
minimum wage. The superfluousness of the non-worker, or the wrong sort of worker, 
cannot be fixed (even were it economically feasible) by giving everyone a job. Above all, 
this is because the formal market economy depends on ascriptive characteristics for inter-
nal segmentation (such as the tendency of women to accept lower paid and benefit less 
part-time work because of their familial responsibilities). It also depends on the “free” 
labor of those working outside of the labor market, who are rewarded for their time spent 
in care work through intangible goods or the shared wages of their family members. 
Aside from these problems, this superfluousness is housed in the problematic identifica-
tion of meaningful work with waged work. Work, waged or not, that builds a political 
space of possibility should be valued, while work that is not constitutive should not. 
Structural changes in how individuals meet their physical and social needs are required 
for this to be possible. 
 
6.4 Arendt & The Ubiquity of Labor and the Social  
 
 Arendt is also concerned about a situation where what she calls labor has overtak-









through the term of the “social,” which she identifies as a condition in which both the 
private world of the household and the public world of political action are overtaken by 
concerns of society.452 In this category she includes both the economy and mass publics, 
and argues that it is the amalgamation of the social that has taken up the space formerly 
understood as political. The ubiquity of work, discussed in the last chapter, is a similar 
sort of expansion of the economic and conformist, via self-surveillance, into all corners 
of life and might respond also to the curative Arendt provides in the form of the work of 
citizenship and a unique understanding of privacy. 
 The social is a famously frustrating concept in Arendt’s studies.453 Arendt first 
introduces the concept in the context of Aristotle’s formulation of humans as political 
animals, arguing that the common substitution of “social animal” betrays a problematic 
shift in society.454  She claims that “[t]he emergence of the social realm, which is neither 
private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coin-
cides with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the na-
tion-state.”455  The social is in essence substituting for politics, and intimately connected 
 
452. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958). See Book 1, 
Chapters 4-6 for the discussion of the “social” and its relationship to both politics and the household.  
453. Indeed, Pitkin’s formulation of it indicates both its importance and theoretically amorphous-
ness. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob. 
454. Arendt, Human Condition, 23.  
 












to the state form, carried out as a form of administration. The social is indicated by the 
dominance of economic logic and imperatives in all aspect of life, from work itself to 
time and education.456 
 Arendt’s idea of the social is another way to understand the ubiquity of work ex-
perienced by citizens today, as both their political and personal lives are shot through 
with economic imperatives and the force of necessity. The problem of the social is not 
easily solved in Arendt’s writing, which is perhaps why her association of the social with 
the mingling of public and private is assumed to mean that separation is required. There 
is little indication in the text that Arendt thinks that this would be possible. However, she 
does suggest openings for pushing back against the social, or the ubiquity of work, 
through her discussions of power and privacy. 
These come in part through linking the social to some of her other categories and 
arguments, such as the violence and revolution.457 Just as with the social, the separation 
of these categories from the rest of life is much trickier than Arendt initially suggests. 
Furthermore, the development of the theme of political foundings demonstrates that the 




456. Arendt even endorses Marx’s understanding of substructures/structures, as particular to the 
form of the social state 
457. Hannah Arendt, On Violence, 1st ed. (Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1970); Hannah Arendt, On 










key to understanding violence and revolution is s not related to physical harm, but to 
what sort of constitutional building and maintenance occurs. Violence is associated with 
the social, whereas power bridges both the political and work, providing the linkage and 
separation required for each activity to be meaningful. This insight is actually supported 
by a re-reading of the concept of “work” in THC, which is usually interpreted as glorifi-
cation of political action alone. Contrary to this view, the best Arendtian move is not pur-
suing novelty for the sake of its newness, but is cultivating the democratic habits and 
skills and created the shared spaces that make the spontaneous generation of power and 
solidarity of action possible. 
  Arendt presents a dichotomy between power and violence, although upon close 
examination this dichotomy is tenuous at best, both empirically and within Arendt’s own 
philosophical system.458  That this binary breaks down- and that this breakdown is 
acknowledged- in Arendt’s own work points to the likelihood that she is not as much 
confused as facing a confusing phenomenon, which may be only definable through a par-
adoxical binary. Her departure point is, parallel to her introduction of “the political” in 
The Human Condition, the innovations in scale and scope of the weaponry wielded by 
 
458. Arendt, On Violence. This text considers student social movements of the 1960s, aimed 
pointedly at the then recently translated Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1965), and 









nation states, particularly nuclear weapons.459  The destructive capabilities of the major 
world powers, as she wrote then and still applies today, are more than enough to destroy 
the earth several times over, both its living inhabitants and itself as material. For Arendt, 
there is no justification possible for such world-destroying power. Indeed, all justification 
requires an ability to understand the effects of our action. Thus she can suggest: “the very 
substance of violent action is ruled by the means/end category, whose chief characteristic, 
if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being over-
whelmed by the means which it justifies and are needed to meet it.”460  In other words, 
we can undertake violence in the service of some good, but the unpredictable nature of 
human activity means that we cannot ever be sure of attaining said good, undermining the 
case for violence.461 And she roots the rise of a misunderstanding of violence as predicta-
ble in the rise of social-scientific theorizing in the technocratic classes; in particular, she 
targets the set of theories emigrating from economics, which see human action as calcu-
lated. For Arendt, such rational choice thinking obscures all that is human about us. 
The heart of this obfuscation is the denial of human action, which Arendt sees in 
the confusion between power and violence. “Power springs up whenever people get to-
 
459. Thus she says: “the technical development of the implements of violence has now reached 
the point has now reached the point where no political goal could conceivably correspond to their destruc-
tive potential or justify their actual use in armed conflict.” Ibid., 2.  
 
460. Ibid., 3.  
 
461. Closely connected to this issue is the use of “implements” in violence; Arendt asserts that vi-
olence is closely related to the use of tools, which extends and also makes even more unpredictable our 









gether and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting-together ra-
ther than from any action that then may follow.”462 Power is the heart of politics itself, for 
Arendt, and always created between humans. It also cannot claim to know its own end, in 
that its action is fundamentally unpredictable. It is opposed to violence, as violence is 
about implements, and justified merely as a means, never in itself. She argues that vio-
lence is marginal to human life because it is silent, without speech, whereas human life in 
full is about action accompanied by speech.463 Equating violence and power, despite the 
fact that “though they are distinct phenomena usually appear together”, is a grave error 
made by the government, would-be revolutionaries, and intellectuals.464 
Yet, Arendt’s stark differentiation between power and violence is undermined by 
her own discussion.  In her claim that they usually appear together, we see an acknowl-
edgement that there have been good reasons for conflating the two. Furthermore, she 
openly states that, in the short term, violence may be the only way to enact justice and 
may be required by self-defense. Indeed, it she leaves us with an understanding of vio-
lence that is related more to its world destroying nature than to its connection to bodily 
harm. Power is what makes politics possible, whereas violence closes possibilities. While 
 
 
462. Ibid., 120.  
463. Arendt, On Revolution, 19.  
464. Arendt’s project, along with countering Fanon, Sartre and revolutionary Marxism, is also to 
dispute Mao’s famous statement about the germination of power in gun barrels. Arendt says that what 









the difference between the two initially seemed to rest on whether one was an end or a 
means; this too is uncertain at the time of activity, especially as some “violent” activists 
must have the goal of opening a space for politics. The relationship of violence (as com-
monly considered, i.e. harm) to the founding of a durable political space, which will be 
discussed below, further problematizes a traditional understanding of violence, which 
cannot be what Arendt is developing.  
Arendt’s unique definition of violence hinges on the notion of instrumentality that 
is also at stake in differentiating work from labor. Arendt introduces violence as connect-
ed to “implements,” “tools,” “the means-ends category” and “fabrication” in the space of 
a paragraph, linking it conceptually to work if not by name.465 Yet violence is not com-
pletely equated with work, because (although it is attempted with an eye to certain politi-
cal ends), it is unpredictable, and yet also link between work and politics. Work follows a 
blueprint, and the ends can be pursued and reached, even though they lack an ultimate 
justification outside of humans themselves. Arendt argues that violence is even less pre-
dictable than action, in a nod to Machiavelli and the role of Fortuna.466 While Arendt’s 
invocation of Fortuna might seem abstract for an analyst who sees clear causes for each 
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466. Lingering in this conception is certainly the Vietnam War, a conflict which displayed the un-
predictable nature of combat in a visceral way, as half of a small, “undeveloped” country either defeated or 









set of military surprises in the set of material and cultural conditions on the ground, it 
points to what the same analyst might call the “human element”.467 
  This reason also points to the interconnected nature of politics, work, violence and 
power.  In social contract narratives, the state of nature stands in for the pre-political, and 
its contours provide the raw materials from which the political is fashioned. In the Ar-
endtian story, the products of work maintain what she calls a world: the set of physical 
objects and more abstract tools such as language, custom, ritual and culture. Understand-
ing these elements of human life as products of work makes sense, given that she has 
specified that work is what gives us a common world and includes works of art and other 
products of thought.  When an artisan fabricates a product, such as a cheese or piece of 
furniture, the production leads to a tangible artifact that corresponds to the plan or recipe 
the artisan has worked from as a blueprint.  This seems initially to separate the artisan 
sharply from the political actor. Similarly, a military campaign seeks a particular target or 
goal and pursues that goal with the weapons (tools) available, and success can be meas-
ured by whether the hill, city or island in won (or defended, etc.). However, both the 
cheese and the military victory are potentially part of the establishment of the political 
space. The cheese may be just a cheese, or it may be the basis for a political movement, 
 
467. William Darryl Henderson, Cohesion, the Human Element in Combat: Leadership and Socie-
tal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel, First Edition 










as in the case of the growing politicization of food production and provenance around 
issues of human and animal welfare, cultural preservation and anti-capitalism468.  
Similarly, it is even easier to see how military action is tightly bound together 
with the political. Arendt’s use of Machiavelli, the greatest western theorist of foundings, 
is instructive. Arendt herself identifies the unique place of Machiavelli as a thinker of po-
litical beginnings, even if she ultimately thinks his project is overly contained by the vi-
sion, and partial invention, of the nation-state form. A military campaign is not merely a 
quest for territory, of course, and in recent history has nearly always sought a political 
outcome469. While the goal of these missions is often, in the short term, to enact a cease 
fire, its secondary mission, or sometimes primary, is often a transition into political sta-
bility. Military action is nearly always aimed at a political goal, and this cannot be under-
stood purely as violence in the Arendtian sense. 
 
468. A cheese is just a cheese, but it may also be an activist unpasteurized cheese produced in de-
fiance of the U.S Department of Agriculture’s ban on raw milk, sold in cow-sharing clubs or under the la-
bel of pet-food. Or the cheese could be stuffed in cappelletti in the late 19th century, where this pasta be-
came a symbol of grassroots political association in Italy, and bowls were served in underground trattorias 
alongside socialist tracts. Gillian Riley, The Oxford Companion to Italian Food (Oxford University Press 
US, 2007).It may be bound up in debates about disability and discrimination, as a 2003 case involving dis-
crimination against paralyzed workers which centered around who was qualified to cut and process cheese 
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory, Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, v.  Labor and Industry Review Commission 
and Susan Catlin, (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2003). 
469. This holds true to for the various proxy wars of the Cold War era, the hotter conflict in Vi-
etnam, and the attempts at “regime change” in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also particularly applicable for the 
various contemporary peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, most notably in Cambodia (1991-
1993), (former) Yugoslavia (1992-1999, ongoing in Kosovo), Rwanda (1993-1996), East Timor (1999-









One might argue that these uses of cheese are symbolic, and that it is human 
agency and creativity that transforms cheese as an object, or even a commodity, into the 
basis for political action. It is my argument that this “transformation” is still a type of 
work, and itself only a prelude to Arendtian politics, which in the form of pure natality 
must be rare indeed. The political actor may indeed draw on or respond to symbols in a 
powerful way, especially as Arendt’s connection between the political and speech is so 
strong. But these symbols and language itself must be built before political speech is pos-
sible. And while military action may aim at a political goal on the surface, there are plen-
ty of critiques in the style of realpolitik that might see such appearances as masking a 
deeper interest in amassing wealth or (non-Arendtian) power. It is thus puzzling that Ar-
endt does not differentiate between violence that is for the sake of politics from violence 
that is for the sake of something else, including gain. That is, unless we read (as I have 
above) her separation of violence from power as not mapping onto our commonsense 
conceptions of violence as force or relating to bodily harm, and instead as merely separat-
ing that which builds the political from that which destroys it. 
Arendt’s focus on the work of building shows that work is key to the maintenance 
of political regimes and freedom. It also helps us see that a rejection of the “social” or 
interest in politics is not equitable with a turning away from an interest in the flourishing 
of a wide variety of citizens. Arendt gestures to this in her critique of Fanon’s claim that 
“hunger with dignity is preferable to bread eaten in slavery,” noting that a more true (if 









slavery,” in that we must always choose sheer existence and metabolic life processes if 
we can.470 This claim can lead Arendt to oversimplifications, such as in her rejection of 
the Black Power Movement and her critique of calls for solidarity with the developing 
world.  Her worry is that identity politics based on group interests, seeking a specific end 
such as redistribution of goods or renegotiation of loan terms, fails to widen the political 
space or create a lasting institution that will house political action. This is also echoed in 
Arendt’s distrust of bureaucratic institutions.471 However, concerns with inequality and 
the place of work are not-excludable from her political work, given their role in building 
political spaces or, in Arendt’s term, their power.  
Arendt’s invocation of violence as tied to logics of necessity helps explain both 
her distinction here and in the more famous The Human Condition. If the problems with 
asserting private interest and using violence as a political tool are that both limit the pos-
 
470. Arendt, On Violence, 20.  
 
471. Arendt worries that bureaucracies are not only part of the conformist bent of mass society, 
but “rule by nobody” that emerges when the social overcomes the political. She writes, where life is at 
stake all action is by definition under the sway of necessity, and the proper realm to take care of life's ne-
cessities is the gigantic and still increasing sphere of social and economic life whose administration has 
overshadowed the political realm ever since the beginning of the modern age.” Arendt, The Human Condi-
tion, 28.  She even described the Nazi State as a “bureaucracy of murder” in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem (Penguin, 1963), 172. In counter to this, Michelle Rodriguez argues that Arendt’s work recog-
nizes both the promise and peril of the administrative state, and provides a guide to “spirit with which pub-
lic administration should be carried out if one's primary commitment is to freedom rather than to either 
limited government or collective will-formation.” This spirit is honored “to the extent that administration is 
not reduced to identifying and applying formal rules but to engaging different views of the world,  “ 
Michelle Rodriguez, “The Challenges of Keeping a World: Hannah Arendt on Administration,” Polity 40, 











sibilities for world building and a shared political life, then we should be evaluating civic 
projects on the basis of that criteria, rather than focusing on power understood in terms of 
domination or force. Finally, a critique of Arendt’s attempt to divorce violence from the 
violence of the state, or of liberalism’s exclusions, is very telling. It first should beg the 
question of whether so called “agonistic” or “radical” democrats, like Chantal Mouffe, 
can so easily connect Arendt and thinkers like Carl Schmitt. Second, if this distinction is 
so difficult to maintain, we can question whether Arendt can ground her preference of 
activities of power over activities of violence. Or, put a different way, whether this sort of 
preference is in any way associated with pacifisms or the Ghandian Satyagraha with 
which it is sometimes linked. Indeed, Arendt seems to say that violence is usually a poor 
choice in our shared life, not because of an inherent moral prohibition, but because it can 
destroy our world just as easily as create it. However, her discussion of revolution makes 
it clear that violence, as traditionally understood, is very often part of the development of 
power and action that she lauds. 
  For Arendt, Power is that which grows between individuals and is sustained 
“where people would get together and find themselves through promises, covenants, and 
mutual pledges.”472 We could think of it as a network, but only in the sense that a net-
work is a group of interconnected hubs based on the voluntary and mutual consent of the 
parties involved. In a way, power is a type of social contract for Arendt, akin to the for-
 









mation of a state in the thought of Locke, where each is bound to each. However, it is a 
contract that must be constantly, not tacitly, renewed. In Arendt’s version, this compact 
also creates the political space, but it is only created as long as the association between 
the humans holds. It is also not created for the sake of security, wealth generation or even 
democratic will formation, but rather for the sake of political association and public hap-
piness itself, which are elevated in Arendt’s thought. It is this creative act that resists the 
social and preserves both the public and private realms.Thus the privileging of violence 
over power is based in the fundamental hierarchy of human “goods” that underlies Ar-
endtian theory, where everything is for the sake of politics, action, and natality. However, 
this “political” world is not similar to the traditional use of the term to designate govern-
ment and related activities, just as the terms violence and power are reworked in Arendt’s 
idiom. Indeed, the political turns out to hold a great deal of activity occurring in what we 
might call civil society, or even the private household. Most importantly, it is itself de-
pendent on and submerged in the world created by work, and even sometimes by vio-
lence.  
Work and violence are strangely related terms; they are in some ways opposites, 
because work is bound up with power and world building, and closely interrelated, in the 
way that work often contains violence. To oppose the ubiquity of work, it is not sufficient 
to argue that the public and private need to be pulled apart, or that the logics of necessity 
and freedom can be separated. Instead, following the thread of Arendt’s understanding of 









property, we should shore up the ability of citizens to enact their own political foundings, 
moving easily between these related categories of life.  
  
6.5 Maintaining the Political through Revolutionary Institutions 
  
  The centrality of foundings leads to Arendt’s writing on the topic explicitly, in her 
comparison of the French and American revolutions, where we find more support for the 
countering of the depoliticalization of work. Arendt gives us a new narrative for political 
foundings that is neither the social compact narrative that underlies most modern concep-
tions of the state, nor a turn to a kind of Schmittian violence. As we will see, her new nar-
rative is not without its problematic exclusions, but it does link explicitly the central im-
portance of power as understood as created by individuals, and the requirement that each 
constitutional regime has for maintenance. This is carried through her work in general. 
  On Revolution considers the centrality of constitutional maintenance. In it, Arendt 
takes an already loaded term and attempts a redefinition that denies much of the com-
monsense understanding of revolution, just as she has with violence, above, and work, 
below.  Her central claim is that it is the American attempt at revolution, not the French, 
that is the exemplary model, despite its lack of influence over the world.473 She argues 
that the American experience is an authentic, if ultimately failed, revolution because it 
attempted to create a public space for political action through constitutionalization. The 
 









French revolution, in her view, instead hinged on the assertion of private interest and the 
failure to codify their experiences.474 She also suggests that each conceives of revolution 
as tied to “the social question” in a way that limits their ability to secure the freedom that 
regime change could enable.475 
  We might ask whether such a radical revision of a concept is anything more than 
semantic, in that Arendt’s adoption of the American model is idiosyncratic at best, ignor-
ing very real American experiences of conflict, violent and ideological. . Furthermore, 
she stops after a consideration of the revolutionary period, avoiding the question that is 
briefly hinted at of whether the problems experienced after the French Revolution, in 
dealing with the misery of the masses, were only solved in America due to the institution 
of slavery. Indeed, for Arendtian arguments about revolution and foundation to convince, 
we must account for the continued constituting which occurred since that first moment.476 
Arendt seems to take it for granted that the “pearl” of action and what she calls “the pub-
lic spirit” was lost in the succeeding generations since the founding; in fact, she critiques 
 
 
474. Her two theoretical targets are liberalism and Marxism; in particular, she problematizes their 
understandings of social change and agency.  She faults both theories for failing to understand the nature of 
“the political” and instead seeing political action as a means to other goods, outside politics. 
475 Ibid., 52.  
476. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1993). He argues that both professionals and citizens are too apt to imagine the founding as a 
period of profound creativity, and the rest of our constitutional history as decreasingly innovative. He ar-
gues that our constitutional regime has actually been altered at least twice since its founding through the 
transformative activity of citizens during the period of reconstruction and the New Deal.  While Ackerman 
disagrees with Arendt that no creative founding or refounding has occurred since 1789, he agrees that form-









“the failure of the revolution to provide [the revolutionary spirit] with a lasting institu-
tion.”477 It is clear that the problematic aspect of founding is not only the constitution of a 
political body centered on “freedom”, but maintenance and preservation. Arendt points to 
this problem, but this text gives few resources for learning how to maintain political free-
dom.  
  Arendt insists that the American founders, contrary to suggestions that they were 
protecting their own private interests or securing a place for the elite, developed such a 
liking for public life that its preservation was central to their political activity.478 Her dis-
cussion of revolution is not ancillary to her other thought, but necessary to retain the key 
concept of politics on which her entire theoretical apparatus hangs.  If revolutions are 
violent assertions of underlying social forces where individuals come together to create a 
society which meets their needs, either one which respects individual rights in the liberal 
view or a classless one in the Marxist, than Arendtian politics will never get off the 
ground. Instead, she must argue that revolution is properly seen as world making, and 
that we have at least one (failed) experiment in the “lost pearl of the revolutionary tradi-
tion” of the American founding. 
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478. She revives the thought of John Adams in support of this claim, as well as drawing on the oc-
casional localism of Thomas Jefferson. The latter’s ward system, as well as commonly quoted suggestion 










  Arendt consistently points to the absence of misery and wide scale poverty as key 
to the relative stability of the American revolution in comparison to the French, but only 
briefly notes that “the absences of the social question from the American scene was, after 
all, quite deceptive, and that abject and degrading misery was present everywhere in the 
form of slavery and Negro labor.”479 We should wonder whether foundation of political 
liberty and public happiness which Arendt lauds is only possible due to the exclusion of 
slaves, women and the disenfranchised. In the American example, the creation of what 
Arendt describes as an autonomous public space is made possible through the exploita-
tion of a large segment of the population. There are clear echoes of Aristotle’s discussion 
in The Politics of natural slavery and the necessity of certain types of labor to support a 
citizenry with the time and ability to participate politically. The question that develops 
throughout the rest of American history is whether the foundation of a political space, 
which allows for action, can be possible without the constitutive exclusions of entire clas-
ses.480 As this dissertation seeks to capture and expand on the insights of Arendt into ac-
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480 Perhaps even formally inclusive societies, such as contemporary western liberal democracies, 
function through the exclusion of groups such as prisoners Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish (Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group, 1995); the homeless Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and the Issue of Free-
dom,” UCLA Law Review 39 (1992 1991): 295; Kathleen R. Arnold, Homelessness, Citizenship, and Iden-
tity: The Uncanniness of Late Modernity (SUNY Press, 2004); Leonard C. Feldman, Citizens Without Shel-
ter: Homelessness, Democracy, and Political Exclusion (Cornell University Press, 2006); and guest work-
ers or “illegal” immigrant, Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern 
America (Princeton University Press, 2004); Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and 










tive citizenship in relation to American citizenship, which has historically been exclu-
sionary, the question of whether her solutions rest on exclusion and domination is key. 
However, it needs to hang in the air until my discussion of work, wherein I argue that her 
own theory cannot bear such built-in exclusions, nor the firm categorization of individu-
als or activities. 
  For now, it is clear that along with her claim that the American revolutionary 
treasure has been lost, or is being lost, through the elevation of representative government 
and the evisceration of local politics such as the New England township, we can also see 
that political spaces of action and natality are fragile because of the great costs to create 
them. In our contemporary democratic practice, the relationship of western public spheres 
to third world and often feminized labor- much of which occurs within the western coun-
tries through migrant, undocumented and temporary workers- is particularly problematic, 
and form the most problematic aspect of Arendt’s contribution to the problem of work in 
political theory.  
 
6.6 The Return of the Social and the exclusion of Labor from the Political 
  So where has Arendt’s linked discussions of violence, power, the social and revo-
lution landed us? On one hand, her elevation of a non-violent political action above all 
private interest and her advocacy of a world-making practice of citizen action (not limited 
to the nation state) is attractive to those thinking about citizenship as distanced from both 









ence that revolution is possible without shedding blood or worry about labor and exclu-
sion should concern us. We cannot easily replace the social contract story of the state 
with an Arendtian vision of citizen co-creation. But we can think about what an Ar-
endtian theory might look like which acknowledges the exclusions and contradictions of 
action and the importance of work. 
  Despite a much noted hostility towards “the social question” which has led to her 
dismissal in some quarters as a theorists with anything to say to those committed to social 
justice, is not necessarily hostile to the political action of the poor. She writes: “action, 
though it may be started in isolation and decided upon by single individuals for very dif-
ferent motives, can be accomplished only be some joint effort in which the motivation of 
single individuals- for instance, whether or not they are an ‘undesirable lot’- no longer 
counts, so that homogeneity of past and origin, the decisive principle of the nation-state is 
not required.481 Action is not limited by our subject positions, but by whether our person-
al motivation, or claims as bare life qua bare life, capture the joint effort. One contempo-
rary example where this concept is applied is the popular protests and revolutions of the 
Arab Spring.  It is too early to say whether the changes pursued in these movements will 
establish the sort of institutions that would qualify them as a revolution in an Arendtian 
sense. However, it is certainly true that her conceptions of power as that which is be-
tween humans, and not what is formal or vested in military might, is on display any time 
 









in which a seemingly unshakable regime is undermined by the public display of solidarity 
in the streets. Yet, there are plenty of participants in these demonstrations who are un-
doubtedly protested from their position in Egyptian society as poor or marginalized, and 
who seek economic redistribution or some other satiation of physical needs. Yet the pro-
test itself, even before any demands are made or governments fall, creates (with the aid of 
international media, both formal and via twitter, blogs and other social media) a political 
space. In this political space, the demands of the body (including those of looters) are de-
nied, and the demands to formally constitute an open forum are repeated. It is entirely 
possible that policies seated in social justice will be demanded or instituted following any 
change in government, but this will occur through the mutually sustained political space, 
rather than by the design of a leader who sees himself as architect or philosopher king. 
What Arendt offers in her separation of violence from power, and of revolutions 
from social movements, is a vision of the creation of institutions and actual spatial forms 
that are wholly formed by people–in–community. This is distinct from a concept of civil 
society wherein existing groups mediate the state and market, and also from ideas of 
cosmopolitanism that start from either individual moral comportments or world govern-
ment. Instead, it focuses on the capabilities of humans to act in their newness. What I 
have tried to show, however, is that Arendt’s compelling vision of citizenship is haunted 
by the very violence she wishes to banish from the public realm, even if this violence is 









have rights” be sanguine about the status of the worldless, and who is more worldless 
than illegal immigrants or citizens living behind levees, waiting to for them to break? 
  However damning her reluctance to equate or relate exclusion and domination 
with violence outright, Arendt is well aware that foundings are often violent. This is be-
cause, as she herself acknowledges, any use of material is a type of violence.482 The mis-
take is seeing humans as a material for fabrication, not because that violates Kantian mo-
rality, but because humans are unpredictable material. This is aligned with her interest in 
recapturing the use of the word constitution in relation to its verb form “to constitute” and 
its broader history of suggesting a regime as a whole instead of a paper document. The 
act of constitution is not to fabricate a state out of human material, seeing each person as 
interchangeable or as one number in a set of demographic statistics, but to recognize al-
ready constituted social bodies.483 This does not mean that one must accept what exists as 
given and normatively good. It does mean that the violence of foundings must be limited, 
in the sense that those that destroy the informal institutions of a society or fail to see the 
spring that characterizes it nature, will fail to establish anything “new.” 
 
482. She faults Robespierre for imagining himself a “fabricator” of a social state, and this permit-
ted to enact the violence which occurs in fabrication because “a given material... must be violated in order 
to yield itself to the formative processes out of which a thing, a fabricated object, will arise. Arendt, On 
Revolution, 200.  
483. “…Covenating and constitution making become matters of theoretical interest only insofar as 
the people whoa re doing covenanting and constitution making are doing so with the interntion of constitut-
ing a space withint public happiness, and not private security, can be enjoyed” Michael G. Gottsegen, The 









  Indeed, Arendt advocates for the promotion of the institutions that cultivate free-
dom and habits of democratic life, such as local political life in the American context and 
the doomed political societies that preceded the Paris commune in France.  In this, she 
updates and expands on the teaching of Machiavelli, whom she acknowledges as the first 
to theorize foundings. Part of her addition, however, is the claim that “foundation, aug-
mentation, and conservation are intimately interrelated” and that the last two are the tasks 
of the generations who follow the revolutionaries.484 The tendency to equate Arendtian 
natality with sharp breaks in the political and social fabric is somewhat misguided, or 
perhaps speaks to the desire to move her work solidly into the category of leftist revolu-
tionary. Instead, we should work on understanding how constitutional maintenance and 
conservation of political spaces occurs.  
6.7 Understanding Privacy as a precondition for Constitutive Citizenship  
But to speak more fully about Arendtian “conservation” and the work that this requires, a 
closer look at what she means by work and how it relates to this discussion is also needed. 
If power is about the building of the political, and it entails sufficient work as well as 
pure action, it provides the bridging term that also combats the dominance of the social.  
The idea that “separation” is key for preserving a space for the political comes out most 
clearly in Arendt’s oft-overlooked discussion of privacy. 
 









Privacy is in fact a better way to understand Arendt’s distinctions than private in 
the sense of owned by one person or off limits to state authority. She argues that the 
Greek understanding of privacy as linked to privation has been replaced by the contem-
porary sense of privacy as intimate shelter and this shift shows us even more clearly the 
dominance of the social.485 She wants to resurrect the idea that privacy is privation; that is, 
a lack of publicness from which we are drawn to emerge into political life. We might la-
bel her an opponent of privacy, but in fact she sees a renovated type of privacy as key to 
establishing the political public world. Indeed, she argues that the “hiddenness” of priva-
cy as experienced in relation to the social masks the importance of privacy, and a certain 
understanding of property, as the network of relations and resources from which people 
can act politically.486 Indeed, Arendt understands “private property” not as an individuat-
ed right to possession derived from a labor theory of value, but rather indicating the re-
sources each person needs (the hearth) to emerge into the public space. Along with the 
hearth, she identifies it with “the fences around the houses and gardens of citizens,” pre-
figuring her later discussion of the importance of a shared table for political action and 
power.487 These in-between spaces and paths connect people in networks wherein power 
 
485. Arendt, Human Condition, 58. 
  
486. “The non-privative traits of privacy should appear most clearly when men are threatened with 
deprivation of it,” says Arendt, who takes this importance to mean that the boundaries and pathways be-
tween the private and public need to be maintained. Ibid., 71. 
487. Professor Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt Peter R. Baehr, and P. R. (Peter R. ) Baehr, The 












also be developed and maintained. Privacy, properly understood, is the tangle of bounda-
ries and connections that makes human life possible. 
Private property is actually not private in an individualistic sense at all, given the 
intersubjective nature of Arendtian political space, and the key role of language and his-
tory for the continued interplay of human narrative. Indeed, it has more in common with 
the capabilities necessary for constitutive citizenship. Arendt’s understanding of private 
property is in no way the same as wealth or private property in the sense used in liberal 
democracies, and thus there is no reason to not read certain other goods (such as housing, 
healthcare, education) as built into the right to a common political space, as they are 
acknowledged as necessities before one can either work or act. Arendt is clearly a critic 
of the “ social housekeeping” that the redistributive welfare state takes on, but her entire 
scheme poses the problem of reconciling the paradox that as metabolizing bodies we 
must be sustained, even as this sustenance, in itself, cannot be the end of a good life. 
Each person needs a hearth from which to come into the political world, and the tools to 
maintain the common world in which the political is housed; these processes must be en-
gaged in in common. The enabling of schemes that develop these common spaces, and of 
the resources individuals need does not have to occur in the form of a welfare state. In-
deed, Arendt suggests that it explicitly cannot. 












The trick is not banishing government from the private sphere, or supporting po-
litical action at the cost of all else, but nurturing a world in which movement between the 
spheres is possible, and even easy. This is why the Paris Commune is of such interest to 
Arendt, as is the early labor movement. She identifies the latter as the most capable in 
terms of claiming and building political competency without succumbing to the fashion 
of the social. And citizenship, perhaps, is located in the world and work, not the “political” 
in the Arendtian sense, although it may still involve some of the structures that we call, 
informally, politics. Workers build the common world in which both privacy and action 
are possible; it is this “web of relationships” which allows for action to be “about some 
worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the speaking and acting 
agent.”488 She even says that the world is “overgrown” with the intangible non-products 
of action and speech- these constitute the web.489 And while in some places this web 
seems to be purely a product of action itself, the fact that is has a worldly character, and 
requires intersubjective meaning giving of spectators as well as the reification involved in 
the recording of stories and histories, connects it also to the worker.490 
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6.8 Co-Constitutive Citizenship as “Work” in The Human Condition 
 
 I have claimed that Arendtian citizenship is properly understood as part of work, 
rather than politics. This claim is central for meeting the challenge of the depoliticization 
of work in contemporary life. Unless the conditions under which we work, and under 
which our consumption connects to the work of others globally, are explicitly at issue, the 
ability of average citizens to build the sort of political movements democratic theorists 
long for will be severely limited. Arendt, in addition to the discussion of power, violence 
and privacy I’ve explored above, provides a theoretical linkage of work and politics even 
in her most action-glorifying work: The Human Condition. 
 In this work, Arendt employs Montesquieu’s method, categorizing human life (vi-
ta activa) in relation to its “spring” or energizing principle. She distinguishes between 
labor, work and action, and her text as a whole explores an historical discussion of how 
the relationship between these spaces of being has changed as humans have remade the 
conditions under which they live. Labor is the reparative and animal functions that keep 
us alive: consumption, metabolic activity and the push of necessity. It “corresponds to the 
biological process of the human body.”491 Work “corresponds to the unnaturalness of 
human existence” and is what produces a world outside ourselves in which we can live, 
adding stability to our existence.492 Action, finally, is what gives meaning to our lives and 
 











occurs in a political space of natality, guaranteed by the uncertainty represented by birth 
and the uniqueness of each human. It “corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to 
the fact that men and not man live on the earth and inhabit the world.”493  She develops 
nested claims; one is that the vita contemplativa, the ways of the philosophers or, worst, 
sophists and technocrats, have come to dominate the vita activa itself; the other is that 
labor has been elevated over work and action within this last category. In one sense, Ar-
endt is recasting the problem that Aristotle introduces of whether we can have citizenship, 
freedom and politics without slavery. Political action seems to be both dependent on our 
continued existence as animal bodies whose metabolic needs are met, yet also, in Ar-
endt’s terms, needs to be emancipated from necessity and its limits. She argues that the 
Greek polis was a temporary solution to this problem, including the implied threat of 
mortality, even as it relied on constitutive exclusions (and the labor) of women and slaves 
in the oikos. The public realm is a “space of appearance” in which individuals disclose 
themselves and are seen as individuals.494 No doubt she is well aware that it is practically 
and theoretically insufficient, and this her claim, “wherever you are, there will be a polis” 
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endt’s prescription for a contemporary world, as her text also contains sustain critiques of the Greeks and 









must be interpreted somewhat loosely as an evocation of the centrality of power as col-
lective projects in her world.495 
Arendt criticizes two related, but often confused, strands of thinking. First, she is 
concerned that philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes, attempted to substitute 
poesis, making, for the political.496 That is to say that they deny the frailty and contingen-
cy of human life, and instead see lawmaking as an exercise in technocratic certainty. This 
is part of her larger critique of the vita contemplativa and the harmful abstraction of intel-
lectuals. However, this concern about “politics as making” does not implicate work fully. 
That is to say that the problem is that ideas of politics as making have been elevated, not 
that work itself is privileged in the contemporary world. Instead, it is labor that Arendt 
argues has taken precedence over both politics and work. 
She diagnoses the problem as historic, emerging from the initial promotion, and 
then the corruption of the realm of work and of the Homo Faber, the human as maker, 
such that mere labor is substituted and the political world is lost. While much attention is 
lavished on politics and action, undeniably the privileged leg of Arendt’s triad, work is 
also abused by modernity and necessary for the substance and maintenance of the politi-
cal world. The common view of Arendt is that she is a theorist who valorizes the Greek 
polis is not supported by the lack of a stirring call to reverse the reversals that the text has 
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illuminated- particularly the layered reversals of thought (vita contemplativa) and action 
(vita activa), and, within the later category, the elevation of labor above work and action. 
Arendt sharply rebukes the philosophical tradition, in the guise of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard 
and Marx for attempting to respond to changing material conditions merely through the 
reversal- or turning on its head- of traditional categories, and therefore carrying the very 
experience they sought to escape into the realms they sought to protect.497 Surely we can-
not simply take Arendt’s own diagnoses of modern humans’ relationship to their own ca-
pacities and history and flip them- elevating action as a normative goal and rejecting life 
and necessity.  It is open whether “changes in the structural elements involved” might be 
possible for us, but certainly such a task could not be taken up on Arendtian terms as if 
the polis is a sort of blueprint to be followed, or if the reversal of our values is sufficient 
to found a political space wherein which action is possible. 
Instead, we can think about how the political space is founded by looking not only 
at action, but also at the much-maligned figure of homo faber. This move is welcomed by 
the place of the scientist, because Arendt claims that in the contemporary world only sci-
entists are “acting”, but that this is an action that is not action, because it occurs somehow 
outside the “web of human relationships” and therefore “lacks the revelatory character of 
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action as well as the ability to produce stories and become historical.”498 There is appar-
ently a type of problematic action that is lacking, and points us to the need for work. The 
need for a common world connects the political to the world of the worker, and indeed 
questions the possibility of going without the activity of either. 
Work, in her original exploration of labor, work and action in ancient Athens, is 
set against the metabolizing labor of the oikos, the household, the performance of which 
by slaves and women “solves” the problem that action (and work) presents. Action, hav-
ing no product, can similarly not provide for the biological needs of human life, and its 
performance requires the subordination of Aristotelian “natural slaves” in the household. 
However, work amplifies and supports the productive capacities of household labor and 
provides the “web” in which action occurs. She thus attempts to discharge her Marxian499 
debts through the addition of a third term to his understanding of labor and politics.  She 
writes, “[t]he work of our hands, as distinguished from the labor of our bodies… fabri-
cates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes the human arti-
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between her thinking and Marx. Arendt poses as a serious critique of Marx, in particular as Arendt saw his 
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other words, Marx has substituted inevitability and necessity for freedom, and elevating labor and life pro-
cesses, above other possibilities for human life. It is thus on two main counts that Marx is found guilty: 
first, by placing the species being above the individual being, and second, by postulating history as a force 









fice.500” That is to say, action, which properly political and the highest, requires work, 
which itself does not enslave the worker as labor does the slave or woman. This same 
problem will reoccur in contemporary society, where the dominance of commodity driv-
en labor precludes both work and action. 
The key words in defining work against both labor and action are: hands, fabrica-
tion, variety and artifice. Hands are key because Arendt is insistent that work, unlike la-
bor, is a human capability that is not shared with other creatures. We can understand this 
stress on hands through her argument (denying a gulf between at least the craftsmen and 
the intellectual), that the work of the mind is itself only made into a durable thing outside 
ourselves through our hands. Thus it does not mean anything to have thought about this 
thesis; I must use my fingers to produce an object that exists outside myself. Hands allow 
us to take raw materials, whether they are thoughts or wood, and fashion them into some-
thing more. Hands hold tools, the hallmark of homo faber, and the human as maker. 
Fabrication, as indicated by the more common translation (along with production) 
of the term Herstellen used by Arendt in her German version of her text, signals the fun-
damental activity of life in this mode. While fabrication and production carry a certain 
scent of a mechanized factory floor, Arendt is attempting to link them instead to the 
world of solitary artisans and craftsman, and to the idea that work is about making some-
thing- producing a work. Humans, in their capacity as homo faber, are creative beings 
 









who produce objects from blueprints, mental or otherwise. This creation is signaled, she 
argues, by the ability of these objects to exist, for a time at least, without constant human 
renewal. She calls this type of existence reification501. Thus she gives the somewhat puz-
zling example of the tilled soil, which would seem at first to be an object of work. Instead, 
she claims that it is merely a slow process of labor, and that, because it lacks reification, 
“it needs to be reproduced again and again in order to remain within the human world at 
all.”502 One might wonder if many objects can pass this test, but what is key is the atten-
tion to the continual maintenance required for work. This is tellingly akin to the processes 
of “augmentation and conservation” that Arendt connected to founding in her understand-
ing of political revolution.  What is key is that work is about fabrication of a durable ob-
ject that is of use. In some ways, the distinction seems to be about whether an object is 
designed to be consumed, as “…destruction, though unavoidable, is incidental to use, but 
inherent in consumption.”503  
What the worker fabricates possesses variety, unlike labor driven by biological 
necessity. While Arendt falls far short of suggesting that work contains the unpredictable 
range of natality that she reserves for action, work also has aspects of the new in its pro-
cess. While labor is a continuous, rhythmic process while has no end and no beginning, 
merely the constant flux of the human species, work’s end “comes when an entirely new 
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thing with enough durability to remain in the world as an independent entity has been 
added to the human artifice.”504 Work is not an end in itself, but seeks another end, which 
contains both its promise and problematic nature in Arendt’s understanding. 
Finally, work is about “the human artifice.” What is this strange phrase? In some 
places, Arendt uses “world” interchangeably with artifice, for example she notes that 
“homo faber, the toolmaker, invented tools and implements in order to erect a world, 
not,- at least, not primarily- to help the human life process.”505 Building a world, or add-
ing to the human artifice, is the key to the power of work, even if Arendt herself is wary 
of fully expressing this power. It is no accident that Arendt chooses the unlikely term “ar-
tifice” to exchange with “world.” As indicated in the overall premise of The Human Con-
dition, with its rejection of any conception of human nature save that of a being capable 
of natality and adaptive to the structures humans themselves create, the world is not natu-
ral for Arendt. The world is human made and malleable. When we create things, whether 
they are ideas or machines, it changes the conditions in which we live and, chillingly, we 
adapt nearly instantaneously.506 Thus work, as it creates the conditions for humanity’s 
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Work is set off from labor because of its divorce from biological processes that 
are cyclical and serve to maintain human beings as a living organism.507 Labor is charac-
terized by the nature of the task itself, whether the task is done for payment, as in the case 
of a factory worker or farm hand, or as part of household, as in the work of a Greek slave 
or housewife. In fact, it has more in common with the distinctions made by Beauvoir be-
tween activities of immanence and transcendence than most economic differentiations.508 
Yet the category of work, and indeed all Arendtian categories, are not exhausted by the 
psychological moods or attitudes, and should not be seen as representative of such.509 Nor 
is it possible to merely conceive of one’s labor in a new light to make it into work or ac-
tion, although there is more slippage between the categories than one might think. For 
example, a great deal of the politicization of consumption prominent in green movements 
in western countries, as well as anti-American movements in non-western contexts, re-
volves around linking consumption, a process of labor, with action or work, via artisan-
ship and speech. 
 
507. There is a clear link in labor to Marxism, at least in terms of understanding certain types of 
labor as problematic. The distinction between alienated and unalienated labor from the 1844 manuscripts is 
reformulated here, as one’s relationship to the means of production is of no consequence in the Arendtian 
schema. 
508. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (Vintage, 1989), esp Ch1. 
 
509. In other words, it is not because cleaning the bathroom feels cyclical and repetitive that it is 









Arendt is most disturbed by a trend, in Marxism but not only there, to glorify la-
bor and suggest that it can provide meaning for human lives. She writes: [o]ne can only 
hope that they themselves [factory laborers] will not accept the  social   substitutes for 
contentment and self-respect offered them by labor theorists, who by now really believe 
that the interest in work and the satisfaction of   craftsmanship can be replaced by “hu-
man relations” and by the respect workers “earn” from their fellow workers.”510 This is 
not denigration of the working class; in fact, Arendt is defending the dignity of human 
creation while questioning the ability of ersatz community centered on mechanized pro-
duction to substitute for the creative acts of work and politics. Arendt’s argument that we 
seek meaningful work, rather than mindless labor, is respectful of the capacities of indi-
viduals. The problematic aspects of Arendt’s work are in her seeming rejection of all 
work that is done with one’s hands; however, labor is characterized by its lack of a larger 
end, not by its physical nature. Indeed, her distinctions do not map onto manual vs. intel-
lectual labor, or onto Aristotle’s separation of the vulgar from citizens. 
6.9 The Remaining Problem of the Family or Reproductive Labor 
The fourth challenge of contemporary working conditions, that of reproductive 
labor or, in a more prosaic term, work/life balance, is both more central and more prob-
lematic for Arendt. This is a reprisal of the key question of this dissertation: how can po-
litical work be valued, if it depends on labor, without also denigrating this labor? On one 
 
 









hand Arendt’s entire schema is developed around the problem of freedom and necessity, 
and well aware that the ancient solution of slavery is impossible for a democratic world. 
Yet nowhere does she directly confront the problem of the reproductive labor that makes 
possible the entire system of labor that she indicates in part of the blob of the social. In 
fact, she is hostile to identity politics in any guise. However, we can use Arendtian ideas 
to develop a feminist argument about work and politics that avoids the traps of sectarian, 
interest-based identity politics, and indeed argue for basic provision of need that doesn’t 
devolve to the bureaucratic “housekeeping” of welfare that Arendt deplored. 
The feminist critique of Arendt’s work is damning. From the point of view of care 
feminists, the tendency to reject or undervalue the activities, persons and values of the 
home is a central aspect of patriarchal thinking. 511 Obviously, any generalization of these 
thinkers is somewhat reductive, but for the purposes of critiquing Arendt they speak 
clearly (perhaps in a different voice).512 Which each thinker does not centralize the figure 
of the mother in the same way, they connect the home to maternal values of fostering, 
 
511. For general background in care feminism, see: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain, Real Politics: 
At the Center of Everyday Life (JHU Press, 2000); Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, 
Global (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007); Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Equality, De-
pendency and Care (Taylor & Francis Group, 1999); Eva Feder Kittay, Ellen K. Feder and Ellen K. Feder, 
The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) and Julia 
Hanigsberg, Mother Troubles: Rethinking Contemporary Maternal Dilemmas (Beacon Press, 1999). 
512. One of the key early texts is: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development, First Edition (Harvard University Press, 1993). Gilligan argues, controversially, 
from studies of children that girls and women cultivate different moral sensibilities than men, opposing 









training, and concrete reasoning that considers the emotions of those involved, and the 
centrality of dependency and vulnerability to human experience. Some are careful to dis-
tance themselves from the essentialism that dogs this way of thinking gendered ethics, 
arguing for seeing these ways of approaching the world as connected to home, privacy, 
the experience of caretaking and dependency rather than gender itself. Even some friend-
ly feminist readers of Arendt are skeptical of her masculinist tendencies and devaluation 
of care.513 Care feminism tends to reject the metaphors of contract and contest prevalent 
in many liberal understandings of the public world of work and politics, asking what 
changes would occur if more humans approached each other and society with maternal 
care. From their perspective, Arendt elevates a masculine conception of the political, cen-
tered as it is on accomplishment, valor and a Greek virtue itself steeped in traditional bra-
vado514.  
 However, Arendt’s arguments do not have to result in the abandonment of the la-
borer, the slave, the woman in the private space of the household, doomed to follow ne-
cessity and the body. It does not have to, but at times Arendt herself allows this to occur. 
On one hand, action seems to be partitioned off from work in that it produces no product 
 
513. Bonnie Honig, Feminist Interp. Hannah - Ppr. (Penn State Press, 1995). Mary G. Dietz, 
Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, Politics (Taylor & Francis Group, 2002). 
514. In a representative comment on The Human Condition: “To read such a book, by a woman of 
large spirit and great erudition, can be painful because it embodies the tradegy of a female mind nursed on 
male ideologies” Adrienne Rich, “Conditions for Work; the Common World of Women” in Adrienne Rich, 










and operates without an instrumental logic. Yet, action is not only deed oriented, but ac-
companied always by speech, often the speech of the spectator, who sees the doer for 
what he or she is, even when this being is a mystery to the actor his or herself.  However, 
speech, like culture, history, or architecture, forms the common world within which ac-
tion is possible, and must in a sense be a product of homo faber.515 There is thus no good 
reason for placing much of the activities of the household, particularly related to the up-
bringing of children, in the sphere of “labor.” The reproductive labor which occurs as part 
of mothering shows us that, when we take language and culture seriously as products of 
homo faber, we can also see how problematic the distinction between labor and work has 
become, in that understanding any process as purely metabolic and therefore as labor 
seems facile. However, she notes that all of this achievement is meaningless without the 
stability of storytelling and the world-building nature of language, social practices and 
community. Arendt does not address the gendered nature of these sets of values (to her 
detriment), nor does she suggest at any time that any space or activity can be made off 
limits because of ascriptive characteristics. Indeed, a close reading of her early study of 
Rahel Varnagan suggests a deep consideration of the problem of those who are made into 
outsiders due to contingent, and yet immutable, characteristics like gender, race and 
class.516   
 
515. The understanding of language as a transparent bearer of human culture is a weakness in Ar-
endt’s thought, as it is unclear whether she takes seriously her own arguments that concepts/words are “ex-













For example, the work of motherhood is labor for Arendt, because as child rearing 
is directly tied to the survival of the species and focused on the messiest aspects of the 
human as organism. Yet, as we well know, child rearing also entails the day-to-day de-
velopment and nourishment of a common culture and language, and builds the capacity 
for action in the world, and could just as easily be reconfigured as a more political type of 
work, as in the example of temperance home protectionists.  In a less intimate example, 
even the production of a commodity in a factory cannot be easily disconnected from the 
maintenance and structure of the common world, particularly in the sense that systems of 
production- say the ring of free trade zones supporting Maquiladoras and the diasporas of 
domestic workers spread between individual homes- are themselves conditions of human 
existence, and can preclude or enable the creation of the political space in a particular 
way. They are, in short, institutions that help build the common world, at least in part. 
We can also explore the problem of work and identity through Arendt’s own 
highly problematic discussion of race in the context of desegregation. Another way that 
Arendt delineates violence from power, or labor and work from politics, is in terms of 
interest, particularly the interests of students and African Americans. “Interest” is a pejo-
rative in the Arendtian vocabulary because she equates it with the biological needs of the 
body and humans as merely human and fundamentally interchangeable. The cyclical and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 









biological aspects of humanity are fundamentally non-political for Arendt, and it is their 
introduction into the public space that leads to the decline of public life and freedom. Ar-
endt takes up the question of interest in relation to the student movements and flatly 
claims that African American students are pushing their material interests at the cost of 
the power of the movement.517 I have no interest in entering into the fray of whether she 
is “racist” or sharply misunderstand the nature of early integration in the universities. 
What is interesting is how her hostility to the claims of African Americans mirrors her 
hostility to the claims of the social, or of Marxism, in The Human Condition and else-
where- and how they are opposed to her lauding of the formation of People’s Park near 
the University of California’s Berkeley campus, or to the early successes of the Labor 
Movement. While it seems likely that some sort of racial bias, or refusal to recognize the 
world- building elements of the black student movement, clouded Arendt’s judgment 
here, her preference for one type of activity over the other- in her own presentation- 
makes sense.518 
 
517. She comments that “serious violence entered the scene only with the appearance of the Black 
Power movement on the campuses. Negro students, the majority of them admitted without academic quali-
fication, regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of the black communi-
ty. Their interest was to lower academic standards “ Arendt, On Violence, 96. These few statements are 
some of the more controversial in Arendt’s oeuvre, along with her discussion of school desegregation effots 
which drew such powerful critique from Ralph Ellison and other black leaders. Hannah Arendt, “Reflec-
tions on Little Rock,” Dissent 6, no. 1 (1959): 45–56. 
 
518. To support this claim, her appendix includes a reference to “James Foreman’s “Manifesto the 
White Christian Churches and the Jewish Synagogues in the United State and all other racist institutions”, 
which is a 1969 manifesto calling for monetary reparations from the above institutions to the black people. 
She also invokes a speech by Bayard Rustin, himself at the heart of the civil rights movement, wherein he 












Arendt is blind to, or even willfully ignores, many elements of the black student 
movement. But it also is clear that her objection to their claims lies in the easy connection 
of violence, biological necessity and race itself. She is also indicting identity politics for 
substantially closing down the shared public space. Later in the same essay, Arendt sug-
gest that “racism is an ideology,” without fully filling in this story or connecting this 
comment to her earlier critique of black student movements.519 Similarly, she argues here 
that racism, whether in the Black Panther party or in the white majority, allows for the 
assertion of necessity and the use of violence, as if violence were the only option. The 
call for money and for advancement without qualification (affirmative action) strikes Ar-
endt as steeped in a logic of self-interest and private gain, and grounded in violence un-
derstood as the shutting of the public. The ease with which these demands are met, she 
explains, has to do with the expediency of violence, and thus is in sharp contradiction to 
the deliberation and contestation that she prefers in her activism. This illuminates Ar-
endt’s later use of the language of Brown vs. Board of Education to oppose power and 
violence.520 This tips Arendt’s hand; she is not speaking against racial integration per se, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
taged white peers, instead of asking for alternative forms of learning and cultural education, such as Swahi-
li language. In essence, she reads the demands of the black students as purely redistributive and an attempt 
to assert the primacy of economic logic in the space of the university and the political. 
 
519. Ibid., 111 
 
520. She notes that “to act with deliberate speed goes against the grain of rage and violence.” Ar-










but contesting the methods of the black student movement and their willingness to em-
ploy violence when the results are uncertain. 
Of course, she follows her reference to Brown with the acknowledgement that vi-
olence may in fact be tied to justice, and this admission perhaps leads us back to her 
strange insistence that power is preferable to violence.521 Why is the black student 
movement, which seeks to gain access to the public realm for black individuals, derided? 
Indeed, there seems little support for her claim that black students turned the general tide 
of activism to violence, or that their claims were more redistributive than recognition 
based. Furthermore, Arendt seems to drift back into common definition of violence (as 
involving force, domination or harm) in this evaluation.  
It is just as possible to read either the school integration fights or the drive for af-
firmative action as an act asking for admittance to the space of appearances and the tools 
to excel therein. It is difficult to see why her counterexample to the black students, the 
creation of People’s Park in Berkeley, is really that different from the black student mo-
ment. Both are made and maintained by citizens. Keeping in mind that Arendt may have 
very much missed these traits in the black student movement, the emphasis on the crea-
tion of a shared space that can and will be maintained by human caring is notable.  
 
521. Arendt writes “under certain circumstances violence-acting without argument or speech and 
without counting the consequences- is the only way to set the scales of justice right again” Arendt, On Vio-
lence, 127. What a puzzling statement to make in a piece largely opposing the use of violent means in a 









 Thus Arendt is blind or resistant to much of the potential or actual politics around 
reproductive labor or the status of women. This is so despite her clear interest in the labor 
movement, which she lauds for coming into political salience, existing for at least a time 
to do more than promote the individual interests of its members. It is no less true that if 
formal labor issues can become political in that way, so too should the informal labor ar-
rangements of the household particularly if it is on this labor that the work of citizenship 
depends. If it is true that reproductive labor and the conflict between work and family is a 
central issue for democratic citizenship, this is an issue that must be attacked in a way 
Arendt does not, if perhaps still with Arendtian tools. Arendt’s treatments of gender, race 
and class are unsatisfactory, at least for practitioners who seek to move beyond identity 
politics and form a coalition of citizens committed to a more just workplace, including in 
the home. Her understanding of work as an activity of citizenship goes far in meeting the 
challenges of superfluousness/precarity, ubiquity/privacy, depoliticalization, but need to 
be extended to meet the challenges of reproductive labor and its conflict with paid work 
and the demands of citizenship. 
6.10 Work as the Location of Citizenship for Hannah Arendt 
 
So far, I have claimed that work is both more important and less clearly demar-
cated from labor and action that typically understood and this concept helps us. Support 
for this position comes from several readers of Arendt, if not her dominant reception as a 
theorist of civic virtue. However, Patchen Markell has been recently developing a line in 









in The Human Condition forms a conceptual bridge between the others, and connects this 
through an exploration of the “architecture” of Arendt’s work.522  Other useful commen-
tators for my project include Jeremy Waldron, while not interested in work per se, devel-
ops a constitutionalist reading of Arendt, focusing on the parts of her thought that cele-
brate humans as political animals.523 Linda Zerilli also theorizes the centrality of “the 
question of the world,” rather than the identity politics (for Arendt the social question) of 
the question of “what”, which in feminism rebounds as the question of what women 
are.524 Bonnie Honig’s long engagement with Arendt, while ultimately resulting in a sort 
of agonism that I read as hostile to the sort of world-building constitutive citizenship I am 
advocating, is also useful525. Finally, Roy T. Tsao’s rather underappreciated article takes 
 
522. P. Markell, “Arendt’s Work: On the Architecture of< I> The Human Condition</i>,” College Lit-
erature 38, no. 1 (2011): 15–44. Markell’s interest is in particular in reading the Arendtian triad as instead 
two pairs- labor and work, and work and action, and then in seeing how work itself, controversially, may be 
more important in Arendt’s writing than previously thought. His thinking is closer than any other commen-
tator to my interpretation of Arendt, however, he focuses more on recuperating the place of artwork in the 
Arendtian corpus, and reconsidering the aesthetics that Arendt turns to in her later work, and in her criti-
cisms of New York culture, as well as the spatial implications of Arendt’s work. I am interested in what the 
centrality of work and world building mean for political practice, particularly for those who seem to be 
initially silenced by the distinctions Arendt employs. 
523. Jeremy Waldon in Villa, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 201-219.  
524. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Zerilli’s target is feminism’s conception of freedom 
which fail to recognize the need for “disturbance” of existing orders of identity and political hierarchy, yet 
in terms of a reading of Arendt she advances our ability to think in an Arendtian manner even against Ar-
endt’s own refusal to see gender as anything but a facet of the social. 










on the issue of Arendt as polis promoter directly, arguing that there is a fuller apprecia-
tion for Roman Citizenship that usually appreciated.526  
These thinkers support a reading of Arendt that is attuned to work and gender, but 
they do not consider whether work may actually be the proper location and activity of 
citizenship, which has been reflexively associated with action/the political because the 
common use of these terms would include citizenship by definition. But citizenship is not 
an exceptional great deed, but the consistent maintenance and care for institutions and 
practices that all for the possibility of the political. Work, at least some work, is citizen-
ship. Note that the strongest invocation of a concept like citizenship in her work is the 
famous “right to have rights”, which seems in some ways to fall back on an understand-
ing of citizenship as formal membership in a political entity- as a synonym for passport 
holding. Certainly, within the failing comity of European nation states, the right to “be in 
a political community” is rightly equated to a passport, and the statelessness of the refu-
gee highlights this.  But the reason that the refugees needed states is not that juridical cit-
izenship is a good in itself, but that it is constructed as the opposite of a type of bare life 
(bios) which is, by definition, superfluous. The right to have rights is the right to mem-
bership that shores one up from superfluousness and cannot, particular in a world with 
many refugees who hold passports but cannot return due to violence, ecological disaster, 
 
526. His ultimate, and rather thrilling claim is that “Arendt’s theory of the public realm is considerably 
more expansive than her remarks on the polis would seem to indicate “ROY T. TSAO, “Arendt Against 









or systematic impoverishment, be seen as juridical citizenship. But nor can it be fully 
equated with action. Instead, it has to do with a “place in the world”, which ties directly 
into Arendt’s reading of private property as a type of hearth in chapter 2 of The Hman 
Condition, and with work. 
This hearth, which provides a hiddenness and depth to human life, is not a hidden 
place or void, but a positive place, analogous to a stage, where human activity can take 
place. It is thus seen from outside and forms a part of the durable “human artifice” so 
valuable to Arendt.  As such it is also a place where the difficult distinction between 
work and labor is most at issue, as is the feminist critique of Arendt’s acceptance of pub-
lic/private distinctions that blithely leave women and the oppressed in the private sphere. 
At times, Arendt lapses into a public/private distinction that seems adopted straight from 
liberal theory, with the private fundamentally pre-political and ruled by private emotions 
and an equality of sameness. However, the private in Arendt is the space from which in-
dividuals move into public action, and into work, and forms the basis for their politiciza-
tion. While she is constantly critical of the encroachment of private interests into the pub-
lic space, often characterized as administration or as identity politics, this does not negate 
her other comments that recognize the complex relationship between necessity and free-
dom (or private and public). It is movement between the spheres that political citizenship 
requires, in that it is this movement that differentiates individuals and opens up the possi-










In this reading, the actor on a stage is not more important- or more accurately, not 
a different person, than the builder of the stage. The individual of action is fundamentally 
someone who moves between public and private, and through the “different locations of 
human activities,” including, of course, into thought and judgment when appropriate. The 
actor is unexpected, and certainly privileged, but not the same as the citizen, juridical or 
otherwise. The citizen is the one who moves between the spheres, and yet is also able to 
“say what we are doing,” making he or she a spectator and perhaps also an historian. Per-
haps this notion of citizenship, as not juridical but involving the ability to move from 
sphere to sphere (note how Arendt connects freedom to mobility in Origins of Totalitari-
anism), could be useful politically, particularly if we think about how different the world 
might look if people were as free to move as capital is. It is also much friendlier to femi-
nist modifications than an Arendt of action, given that citizenship as work, maintenance 
and the ability to manage and protect one’s privacy are friendly to a wide range of femi-
nist thinking. 
There is also an overlooked bridge between politics and work in Arendt’s eleva-
tion of promises in Chapter 5 of The Human Condition Here she says that work and labor 
require miraculous intervention from outside to give them meaning; Action contains 
within itself “potentialities” which redeem. One of these is forgiveness, which Arendt 









edly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it.”527 While she says forgiveness and 
promise making are also rooted in Action, she begins with the “power of stabilization” 
inherent in promising making, which is also analogous to Roman Law (always a signal 
for borders, stability, constitutionalism). Why are promises properly in the realm of Ac-
tion and not Work, if their very purpose is to bind actors together and provide some limits 
on their action, particularly on the possible ramifications of this action which cannot be 
predicted? The answer Arendt seems to give is that the plurality of human existence, and 
the radical non-sovereign nature of human freedom (where one cannot even understand 
one’s own actions, much less foretell their consequences beforehand) are mollified by 
promise giving, which is intimately bound up with power, one of the strongest linkages 
between the political and work. Power is opposed to both authority and force, consisting 
of “acting together.”528 And while power supports the political, it (and speech) is fleeting, 
and cannot “last” without the preservation that occurs, for Arendt, in the work of those 
who build, including historians and artists. 
Thus promise making and forgiveness are properly part of work and power, just 
like citizenship. The powerful preserves the political, but it is created outside of it 
through the work of promise making. Thus she can say “sovereignty, which is always 
 
527. Arendt, The Human Condition, 241.  
 
528. Power seems to be a condition, or one of the conditions, for the political, in that it: preserves the 
public realm and the space of appearance, and as such is also the lifeblood of the   human artifice, which, 
unless it is the scene of action and speech, of the web of human affairs and relationships and the stories 










spurious if claimed by a isolated single entity, be it the individual entity of the person or 
the collective entity of a nation, assumes, in the case of many men mutually bound by 
promises, a certain limited reality.529 This helps us see how the concept of citizenship 
discussed above is more than a social capital argument, where all voluntary associations 
are good. Arendtian publics are built around political problem solving, not shared identity 
or mere territorial space. 
The worker who builds such a public is one who has and helps provide a place in 
the common world. This world seems to be the most prominent condition of the political 
and must be built and maintained by workers, who develop the skills for praxis through 
their attentiveness to the need to make the world hospitable to human life in its variety. 
Indeed, Arendt tells us as much in the claim “world alienation, and not self-alienation as 
Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern age.”530 Through the problem of 
world alienation and superfluity, Arendt addresses somewhat the fact that her entire text 
has been considering an “age” she thinks we have already left behind, but gives some 
hints as to where we stand after the event of atomic explosions.  It is one of the few plac-
es in THC where she discusses contemporary political structures, linking them back to 
 
529 Ibid., 245. Note that this Arendtian political subject is not bound together by ideology, or by Rous-
seau’s General Will, disparaged as magic, but rather towards “an agreed purpose for which alone the prom-
ises are valid and binding,” Ibid.   
 
530. Ibid.,255. This world alienation is directly connected to “naked exposed to the exigencies of life” 
caused by capitalism, which as we saw in Origins of Totalitarianism, was a key enabler of the totalitarian 










the section titled “Decline of the Nation State and the Rights of Man” in Origins of Total-
itarianism, where the phrase “the right to have rights” is found. She states that “just as the 
family and its property were replaced by class membership and national territory, so 
mankind now begins to replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces the lim-
ited state territory.531 This is not a call for return to nation state systems, but a claim that 
humanity elevated to a political principle cannot guarantee “a privately owned share in 
the world.”532 Only a supportive network can do this.  
What has happened today to these networks, and their builders, homo faber, who 
seems so important for both Arendt’s critique of capitalism and her charting of human 
activities? In the guise of Thomas Hobbes, he is guilty of attempting “to act in the form 
of making” in the political world which denies “the event itself.”533 The worker also is 
unable to justify his or her actions without an external measure, and thus, using humanity 
as a measure, erodes into the cycle of labor.534 The worker is also focused on tools rather 
than things- on happiness rather than use, and thus without a worldly reality.535 The prob-
 
531. Arendt, On The Human Condition, 257.  
 
532. Ibid.  
 
533. Ibid., 300.  
 
534. There is not much work being done in the modern world, per Arendt’s reading, because the 
elevation of process: deprived man as maker and builder of those fixed and permanent standards and meas-
urements… which have always served him as guides for his doing and criteria for his judgment.” Ibid., 307.  
 









lem is not that work is everywhere, but that it is nowhere, or the only place it is occurring 
in in a perverted politics that imagines that the future can be planned or constructed.          
If the worker is missing, and if as I’ve suggested earlier the realm of work is 
where to properly locate citizenship and the right to have rights, perhaps before we at-
tempt to act, or instead of focusing on action, we should build on Arendt’s analysis to 
think about how common spaces or powerful solidarities can be founded. This work 
would still need to be open to the possibility of an “event,” or the emergence of some-
thing new into the world, in particular because it needs to find a way to preserve and 
speak about these events without subjugating them to an overarching historical narrative 
or predetermined ideology. But the thread that connects the politics, as we commonly 
conceive them, with politics in Arendt seems to be related to work: world-building, pow-
er, web of relationships, human artifice, durability, permanence, art, history, culture. Par-
ticularly because action is itself fleeting and unpredictable, there is little to be gained 
from advocating directly that we act. We cannot “make” politics, but it does seem that we 











CHAPTER SEVEN: TRANFORMING WORK AND PROMOTING CO-
CONSTITUTIVE CITIZENSHIP 
7.1 Revisiting the Research Questions 
 
I came to this project with three central questions that needed to be answered in 
order to proceed towards a political theory of work. The first question is about the politi-
cal relationship of work to labor, or, put another way, of identifying a hierarchy of work. 
The second asks how work/labor hierarchies relate to political citizenship, in both a legal 
and normative sense. The third is whether political work can be valued without devaluing 
work that is not political, particularly physical or care labor that has been understood as 
its antithesis. It is the third that is still open, given that it asks us not only to understand 
theoretical and historical relationships, but also to undertake a political practice. Howev-
er, the idea of constitutive citizenship I am advancing, rooted in the interdependent nature 
of work, labor and action and also the contestability of these categories, would do a better 
job navigating this work/labor puzzle than the current American adoption of liberal pro-
ducerism.  
In terms of understanding how work and labor have been hierarchically defined, I 
have argued that political work, and the accompanying qualities that attend it, has been 
valued over labor- attendant on a distinction that is centrally about the independence that 
capital brings. While the distinctions between white-collar and blue-collar work may be 









It is important that it is not just labor itself, in its manual or care form, that is understood 
as non-political, but that this definition leaks onto the laborer or caretaker, such that their 
activities are suspect in the political space, or understood as promoting their economic 
“interest” rather than acting truly political. In Arendt’s words, the marginalized insert the 
social into political life as they advocate for redistribution. This advocacy should be un-
derstood not pejoratively as Arendt does, but as an attempt to gain the standing and meet 
needs required for fuller inclusion in shared projects of political renewal. When the mass 
publics Habermas discusses appear, and when those most positioned to undertake politi-
cal work (those with capital), are relieved from political obligation, we are in trouble. In 
this state, we end up in a world with all labor and no work or politics, much less a sup-
portive practice of building and sustaining political spaces through constitutive citizen-
ship.  
Thus the hierarchy of work relates to citizenship and politics directly, in that work 
that is seen as political is defined narrowly and in such a way that it is unattainable for 
most workers. This is most clearly evidenced in the work of democratic theorists, who 
debate the proper forms for thinking and talking within the public sphere without asking 
about how it can be created. Creating a public sphere takes the type of political work that 
I am arguing has not be recognized as work at all, but private labor. This is because pub-
lic spheres cohere around shared culture and texts, and are, in Arendt’s understanding, 
rooted in the ability of humans to produce solidarity through promise building. They re-









in my historical example of temperance and anti-temperance that suggests also that con-
testing reigning definitions of work can itself produce new publics that have political sa-
lience beyond identity effects, as well as make invisible reproductive labor visible.  
The challenge is to promote such activity for today’s laborer, who faces a depolit-
icized economic world whose politicization is seen as suspect. I have argued that, under 
Arendt’s schema, we are all laborers today. Thus we should support policies that A: ques-
tion or widen the definition of political work, centered on the co-constitutive ideal of citi-
zenship or B: make it so those whose work is not political have full access to the political 
sphere. This last goal comes directly from how I have interpreted Hannah Arendt: if la-
bor, work and action are all interrelated in complex ways and are all important, than the 
key to a good life is the ability to move between them. Indeed, mobility has long been 
associated with freedom, especially in the American context with its history of slavery. 
This only enhances Arendt’s odd redefinition of privacy as the spaces and paths between.  
 
7.2 Co-Constitutive Citizenship and the models of Shays and Temperance 
 
 Cultivating these paths requires redefining work. Neither historical event I have 
profiled suggests that it is easy to change either the way that work is defined or how these 
definitions carry over into the public spheres. They do, however, show that people have 
attempted both these projects simultaneously as part of protests and social movements in 
American history. The Regulators asserted a communal right to a political economy that 









up arms or occupy courtrooms when these demands were not met. In this, they also de-
manded that their work as laborers and soldiers was recognized as “counting” for citizen-
ship, as much as the work of bankers and lawyers. Even as this exclusion was overcome 
and suffrage and paid work was extended en masse, Progressive attempts to insure that 
laborers could also be citizens failed to recognize the labor of women, whether in the 
home or the factory. Thus temperance activists attempted to solve this problem through 
the roundabout means of a prohibition on alcohol, which was (perhaps wrongly) under-
stood as blocking both the political agency of laborers and the progress of women. This 
move did not work out as intended, but did make visible the labor of work, and prompted 
the creation of women’s public spheres to rival or replace the masculine public spheres of 
the saloon. While both cases should give us pause as to the unintended effects of any at-
tempt at redefinition, they do suggest that those whose labor is currently not considered 
political or valuable can act in a co-constitutive way.  
 
7.3 Co-Constitutive Citizenship builds Public Spheres 
The idea of co-constitutive citizenship emerges from the public work ideal of Har-
ry Boyte, as discussed in the introduction.536 Co-constitution means that citizens are able 
to and responsible for the political and social institutions under which they live. This 
concept is central for redefining what political work is, because it understands work 
 









broadly as anything that contributes to public politics. Co-constitutive citizens do not 
need to speak in terms of public reason or abandon the passions that animate them, and 
they can also engage in the sort of manual and care labor that has long been defined as 
opposite of democratic citizenship. Indeed, all that they need is to work together to create 
a public sphere, either for themselves or for the broader political community. This seems 
initially to be a suggestion that all shared projects are part of constitutive citizenship. Not 
so. The important limitation on this work is that constitutive citizens are seeking to create 
not just any public sphere, and not the bourgeois public sphere, but a democratic public 
sphere that is committed to keeping visible the labor that supports it, and (being demo-
cratic) to sharing this labor. In other words, it is a public sphere that is always aware of its 
own political economy.  
That the public sphere is democratic means, in my understanding, that it is forever 
open to revision. In particular, the public sphere is open to contestation on the topic of its 
own constitutive exclusions, whether they relate to its political economy (which I’ve 
foregrounded as a neglected element) or social relations. This is not the same thing as 
saying that anything can and should be understood as political work, merely because an 
individual claims that his or her labor is required for politics (or others) to exist. Instead, 
the assertion of groups of workers, united by their shared experiences of exclusion, 
makes labor that was once invisible, visible, as in the case of reproductive labor in the 
advocacy of temperance activists. In the contemporary political scene, attempts to make 









workers abroad or farm animals at home make similar moves. Without the attempts of 
workers to insert these questions into a public space, or without the existence of one in 
which they can be recognized and considered, work and labor become static concepts that 
reflect too fully existing power hierarchies. 
 
7.4 Recuperating Habermas with the help of Agonism  
 
In Aristotle’s conception, the division of labor in the city meant that the laborer 
would never be the same person as the citizen, because his or her way of life and skill 
preclude it. Whether this sharp division of labor was required in his own time or not, it is 
certainly not required in ours. There is no reason why every person cannot perform a 
share of labor, work and political action. This is the lesson we should take from Hannah 
Arendt, not the glorification of action that we usually do. And this lesson is less in con-
trast with Habermas than usually thought. In Structural Transformation, Habermas prem-
ises the creation of the bourgeois public sphere on the tension between advancing one’s 
own economic interest and the bracketing of this interest when one is engaging in public 
discourse.537 In mass publics, along with the disappearance of the space for this discourse 
thanks to the growth of public opinion as a mode of politics, this tension is lost, particu-
larly as few citizens have the capital they need to protect that would lead them to sustain 
a public sphere in the first place. For co-constitutive citizenship to work, citizens need 
 









this stable “hearth” from that allows them to develop such that they can move between 
their different concerns (those of labor/necessity, work/world, and action/politics) both in 
their internal dialogue and exercise of political judgment. This mobility, properly under-
stood, is freedom. Habermas is not optimistic that such mobility is possible, because he 
sees a world where “system”-economic thinking-has overtaken the “lifeworld” where 
politics and the shared world would be. However, my suggestion is that the ability to 
grow the lifeworld is in the hands of citizens, particularly if this work of growth is given 
both a freer rein and material support.  
A different way to put this point is to suggest that the type of public sphere I want 
to build and the type of co-constitutive citizen I want to promote is an engaged in agonis-
tic institutionalism. This is an amalgamation that would no doubt drive most agonists in-
sane, given their interest in a fluid politics of openness and contestation. I want agonistic 
institutions not for the sake of practicality, although it is also practical, but because one 
the key tasks of co-constitutive citizens is the maintenance of these shared institutions. 
Agonism is about opening the political space to sharp disagreement and rejecting the neu-
trality towards the good that characterizes liberalism, but there is no reason why space 
where contestation about the shared good life cannot be committed to sustaining this con-
testation itself.  
7.5 Agonistic Maintenance as Constitutional Theory 
 
The key institutional arrangement through which co-constitutive citizenship acts is a con-









of a particular nation’s constitutional “documents.” Constitutionalism is premised on lim-
itations on government, even on democracy, so it seems initially an odd choice to link 
with a politics that seeks to promote redefinition of key categories like work and labor, as 
well as the building of political spaces in which individuals can do this redefinition. 
However, in the United States and elsewhere, the law has served as a model for how ten-
sion over understandings of labor, work and politics can be explored and changed. In par-
ticular, the American common-law practice of judicial review has produced an inter-
generational dialogue, lay and scholarly, on how to understand and order labor, as well as 
almost everything else. This does not mean that criticisms of judicial review and suprem-
acy are off base; indeed, those looking to promote co-constitutive citizenship might find 
it particularly so, but they might also see a common conversation that needs to be at least 
a part of any public sphere.538  
 In terms of my argument, Lochner and Muller serve as a common set of texts 
around which we can discuss key questions important to any regime that seeks some sort 
of common good. Lochner requires us to consider the place of the market in a democratic 
society, the limits of federal power, the role of the judiciary, as well as substantive due 
process. Co-constitutive citizenship requires a conception of substantive due process, in 
the worlds of Supreme Court Precedent, or needs, in the work of Simone Weil. This 
means that Lochner is reformulated to be about need and what individuals need, not just 
 
538 This is a version of the argument of: Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith, Reprint (Princeton Uni-









to stay alive, but to fully take their place as governing members of the American political 
body.  The “right to work” is not understood as a negative right to make contracts, or a 
positive right to individual life, but rather a substantive and communal right that accrues 
to the needs of the community. Similarly, Muller and its problematic recognition and yet 
unrecognition of how expectations of women’s work are differentiated by class can be 
disconnected from its naturalized imposition of sexist gender roles and instead under-
stand the importance of thinking work and family together when developing policy. Mul-
ler offends modern sensibilities, just as Lochner does, but the actual importance of fami-
lies, if not defined in the limited sense of a male breadwinner and female homemaker, in 
relation to work is key.  
 It also means that people should have a larger role in the constitutional dialogue. 
They will not get this because legal elites, law professor or not, commit to it but because 
they demand it as a collective right. This will only happen when they engage in projects 
that push us towards the need to claim this sort of competency. For example, activism 
around Occupy Wall Street, which criticized the role of money in politics, led individuals 
to development a movement centered around rejecting the court’s ruling in Citizens Unit-
ed v. Federal Election Commission.539
 










7.6 Overcoming Contemporary Challenges to Co-Constitutive Citizenship  
 
If political theorists want to advance their democratic and Arendtian goals, they 
must attend to the challenges that the contemporary world of work, especially in terms of 
its precarity, ubiquity, depoliticalization and deeply troubled relationship with gender and 
reproductive labor. All of these challenges are daunting, and no doubt a fully developed 
political theory of work would attack them all. However, the core problem for this disser-
tation has been the status of labor and work, best epitomized in a contemporary sense by 
the incompatibility of wage labor and work in the home. If we are developing a politics 
that supports the ability of co-constitutive citizens to alter the conditions under which 
they live and work, the place to start is with work and the family. The other three chal-
lenges are all tied together in this problem. Precarity is part both of the pressure on fami-
lies to be dual-earner households and of the feminization of labor that insures that deval-
ued care work costs less to procure (or pays less if you are the one performing it). The 
spread of labor into the rest of life is only a problem is there is something, whether poli-
tics or families or both, that we want to do that is not labor. And if we politicize the in-
compatibility of waged work with secure family life, defined broadly, then we move 










 7.7 Making Careers and Jobs Compatible with Care  
           The relationship between gender, care labor and work is a particularly traumatized 
victim of work today, given the real effects on children and workers. Because the raising 
of children is the most time-consuming and costly of care labor, it has long been politi-
cized as a potential avenue of change. The most common approach is to advocate a more 
robust set of protections, such as parental leave, for new parents, expanding on the mini-
mal protections granted by the Family Medical Leave Act, which requires that employers 
retain workers and allowed them unpaid leave when they have children. Family Leave 
advocacy also seeks to alter the gendered responsibilities of parenting by making parental 
leave either widely available or mandatory for fathers as well, in hopes of altering divi-
sions of labor in the home and removing what is seen as a barrier to the advancement of 
professional women. We can follow the lead of New Jersey and California and develop a 
national family and medical leave insurance program that every worker pays into in order 
to fund this initiative. 
 These policies are admirable and necessary, but they will not challenge the domi-
nance of paid work over unpaid work in the home, and therefore also not aid those who 
perform unpaid care work from gaining economic, social or political standing. One ave-
nue would be to raise the minimum wage in the United States, although this has the 
drawback of being politically unpopular and not reaching those who work under the ta-
ble. This includes many who work in the domestic sector, especially those who are un-









gendered labor that keep domestic work such as cleaning and nannying so inexpensive. 
Immigration reform that includes a path to citizenship for such workers, because of their 
contributions, would ease some of these tensions and at least make it so that domestic 
workers can avail themselves of the same hard-won protections against harassment and 
fraud as workers who are “legal.”  
 If the problem were merely the lack of compensation, in a material sense, for 
work done outside the formal economy, than proposals to pay those who engage in care 
work directly from the state would be more compelling.540 Heterosexual couples with 
“two careers”, as distinguished from dual paycheck households by class markers, often 
solve this problem through engaging domestic workers either as house cleaners, or nan-
nies or both. This is not a solution for the broader problem, both because it is not availa-
ble to most families and is itself a problematic, and perhaps just outright unjust, practice. 
It is unjust not only because, compared to the intense demands they make on one’s time 
and skill, they pay poorly, but also because they are entail entering a family, construed as 
a private space, as an inferior member who must obey, even against his or her own values 
 
540. This was the platform of Selma James, Maria Della Costa and the other 1970’s feminist Marxists 
whose understanding of reproductive labor as what sustains capitalism was useful in Chapter 5. We could 
also derive this claim theoretically from a reading of John Locke’s original account of primitive accumula-
tion and the centrality of women’s bodies as their own capital.  Nancy J. Hirschmann “Johnny We Hardly 
Knew You” in Nancy J. Hirschmann and Kirstie Morna McClure, Feminist Interpretations of John Locke 









or beliefs.541 “We need to build communications mechanisms so that people under the 
scope of our power can raise any concern at an early stage, request or be offered infor-
mation they are entitled to, and be themselves to the extent that they are as well known as 
they should be. These kinds of things are not achieved by a pure heart and gritted teeth, 
but by sustained work.”542 Anyone can help alter these relationships. 
In terms of making employment compatible with care responsibility for all work-
ers, including men, part-time workers, and those in non-traditional relationships to chil-
dren or other dependents, there are many policies we can consider. We can expand on the 
recent gains in cities and states in the area of paid sick leave, such that those in hourly 
work have the same abilities as professionals to stay home when necessary. We can 
strengthen the ability of unions, public and private sector, to file grievances when em-
ployees are fired because they miss or leave work to care for children or other depend-
ents. Because unions are under attack in the United States, their historical position as the 
best protection for worker’s well-being and rights is at issue. Supporters of co-
constitutive citizenship should advocate not only for the importance and strength of un-
 
541. “One consequence of this greater freedom for women to become professionals has been to in-
crease social and economic inequality between households.” Milkman, Reese, and Roth 1998, quoted in 
Joan C. Tronto, “The ‘Nanny’ Question in Feminism,” Hypatia 17, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 34. Her broader 
argument is that the unjust nature of domestic employment is covered over by the ideology of competitive 
mothering, as well as a tendency to assume that domestic work is just like any other market exchange, de-
spite its intimacy 
542. Garielle Meagher, Friend Or Flunkey?: Paid Domestic Workers in the New Economy (UNSW 










ions, but to help unions advance past their connections to specific industries to a broader 
coalition of workers. This is in essence a revival of the Industrial Workers of the World 
and industrial unionism, except that the future of unions must be centered on more than 
just wageworkers. It must include wageworkers who work in the black market, or un-
waged workers in the home. It must include the unemployed, who are most marginalized 
by the association of good work with good citizenship. This does not mean that the future 
of unions is a rejection of the association of unionism with workers; rather, it is the 
recognition that limiting the idea of work to industrial or waged labor, as the IWW still 
does, does not capture the realities of work and in fact limits the union’s ability to organ-
ize.  
Unions are in part embattled because they are framed as part of what is preventing 
economic growth, when actually they are deeply embedded in the same sort of pro-
ducerism that characterizes their opponents on the right’s critique of unions and welfare. 
To combat this, unions need to not only work to politicize and improve the workplace, 
but to sustain and produce a politics in which public debate is possible. This means coali-
tion building, not only between different types of unions, but also with immigrant’s rights 
groups and feminist organizations who see work and its definition as key.  
 
7.8 Contingent Labor and the Family  
Can contingent and part-time work be made better, both in the sense of what it of-









changes. As any actual worker knows, substantive benefits such as health, life and other 
insurances, as well as retirement plans are linked to full-time work, and have been in the 
United States since their melding under WWII wage-stability measures. This aligns with 
the general association of a independent worker with good citizenship, which as we’ve 
seen is echoed throughout historical political struggles for inclusion. One possibility 
would be the gradual extension of the benefits usually associated with full-time work to 
part-timers, leaving behind the dream of the family wage and the often problematic ex-
clusions of women from the workplace it entailed.543 In this scheme, which is already in 
place in some unionized situations, part-time work would become much more expensive 
for employers and pay more to employees, given that benefits generally add about a third 
extra to wage costs. While part-time work already pays significantly less per hour or 
work unit, even without accounting for benefits, this would be a noticeable shift. We 
could also imagine a situation where some of the potential benefits, such as health care, 
have been shifted to the federal government, leaving employers with less incentive to dif-
ferentiate so starkly between part and full time workers.544 Both of these ideas are politi-
 
543. For example, black women lost out on paid work in the 1960’s as policies favored black male 
led households. 
544. Indeed, in Europe, part-time work is the primary source of job growth since the 1980s and a 
big explanation for the large welfare state’s ability to hold unemployment relatively low in relation to eco-
nomic growth. Chris Brewster, Lesley Mayne, and Olga Tregaskis, “Flexible Working in Europe,” Journal 
of World Business 32, no. 2 (Summer97 1997): 133–151. In Scandinavian countries, it is the situation in 
which most women workers and many men are employed part-time and bolstered by the “cradle to grave” 
welfare state, as well as aggressive union bargaining for wages. Richard Freeman, “War of the Models: 









cally difficult to support in the current ideological climate and given the prominent place 
of business in American political life. However, a renewed labor movement that consid-
ers all citizens potential workers might help push the government in this direction. 
There are, however, policy proposals for increasing the viability of part-time work 
in the United States, particularly in terms of its relationship to social status and percep-
tions of worth and dignity. We could, for example, raise the minimum wage significantly, 
provide universal healthcare coverage and preserve or expand the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, which supports those who work in jobs that pay little more, or sometimes less, 
than public assistance would. 545 
 If it is right that benefits are central for revamping part-time work, which of 
course is in turn central for supporting diverse families and those who care for children or 
other dependents, than the Patient Care and Affordable Care Act of 2013 could (have 
been or could still) be a basis for change. The ACA is a complex set of laws, credits, 
mandates and regulations whose power to shift the labor markets is as yet uncertain. In a 
certain way, the ACA is a response to the increasing prominence of part-time and contin-
gent labor, because its increase is accompanied by declining rates of health care coverage 
 
545. These proposals come from Charles Tilly, who details the problems with the part-time shift 
that has occurred since the 1970’s, arguing that its celebration on the part of some economic analysts miss-
es both the involuntary nature of this work, given its participant’s interest in full time employment, and the 
stark material and social costs to working part-time in America. He also advocates less work for everyone, 
full or part time, noting that studies show little drop in productivity when vacation hours are increased or 
days shortened. Chris Tilly, “Dualism in Part-Time Employment,” Industrial Relations: A Journal of 










as well as income inequality and disparity in health outcomes. The ACA requires that 
employers offer health care plans, or face penalties, for all workers who work 30 hours or 
more (its definition of full-time). On one hand, this is a lower threshold than often used to 
determine who receives benefits, so some employees who work hovers between 30-35 
hours may receive coverage they have previously lacked. However, the law is silent on 
part-time workers, or rather they fall into the vast category of individuals who may be 
subject to the “individual mandate”, recently interpreted by the Supreme Court as a type 
of tax, which requires individuals to purchase health insurance. To support part-time 
workers or non-workers who fall into this category, the ACA creates insurance “ex-
changes” which hope to take advantage of economies of scale to provide reasonably 
priced coverage for the otherwise uninsured. Insurance exchanges are a relatively untest-
ed, and their details have been largely left up to individual states who, when led be Re-
publican governors, have been reluctant to cooperate. If the ACA had only demanded 
health care coverage for all workers, part or full time, it could have had an even greater 
potential effect on precarity. It is unclear whether part-time workers will be more attrac-
tive, generally, to employers because they do not require benefits or whether the outside 
availability of health-care coverage will even the playing field somewhat and allow those 
who desire the flexibility of part-time work but need to retain health care coverage will 
shift to these jobs willingly. 
The drafters of the ACA missed a big opportunity to improve the lives of part-









people who have care responsibilities outside the workplace. While the insurance ex-
changes, and the end of existing condition restrictions, may be meaningful for these pop-
ulations, they do not create a world in which the decision to work less comes with finan-
cial and social consequences that are limited to the decrease in hours worked and propor-
tional pay losses. If employers had been required to offer coverage for employees who 
worked at least 20 hours, or even 25, millions more would have been covered. Alternate-
ly, the government (or states) could have developed a federal program, or expanded Med-
icare or Medicaid (the later perhaps constitutionally problematic given the recent ruling) 
to offer a clearly affordable alternative. Part-time workers who have the support of robust 
health coverage would not be as vulnerable, and may in fact be better off financially (and 
as a family) than if they worked full time and had to pay for child care. 
7.9 Recreating the Family 
 
An important caveat. When the word “family” is thrown around, it can easily be a 
code word for traditional gender roles and the privileging of the heterosexual pair. This 
symbolic entity has a great deal of rhetorical heft, as can be seen in the way that the Gay 
rights movement has used traditional symbols of love and family to advocate for gay 









pair-bonding becomes normalized for all.546 I am absolutely arguing that work and family 
need to be made more compatible, but this does not meet that the workplace needs to ad-
just to meet the demands of the pre-political and natural family.547 However, calls for re-
making work are calls for remaking the family, and they allow for more varieties of fami-
ly life and gender roles to be supportive. 
Most importantly, changing the pressures of work take the burden of shifting gen-
der norms away from individual men and women, who are upbraided for “choosing” to 
stay home or go to work, to hire help or send kids to daycare, when the incentive struc-
ture that privileges this or that choice is not under question. The Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) of 1993, while only providing leave for a limited number of employees, was 
successful in part because it did not limit leave to care of children, nor to only mothers or 
fathers. This openness can and should be extended, supporting all sorts of care, and ap-
plied to businesses of all sizes. It must also protect those in non-heterosexual paired rela-
tionships, be they gay, polygamous or multi-generation households.548 We also could 
 
546 For this argument, see: Michael Warner, “Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage,” 
GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 5, no. 2 (January 1, 1999): 119–171, doi:10.1215/10642684-5-
2-119. 
547. Indeed, Susan Moller Okin’s argument for considering the family as one of the central insti-
tutions under debate in a just polity is still dead right. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 
(Basic Books, 1991). 
548. We could consider moving “from marriage to kinship contracts” as suggested in a provoca-
tive argument for ending birthright citizenship and the state sponsored benefits of marriage to dissolve of 
gendered practices of care that conflict with work. Jacqueline Stevens, States Without Nations: Citizenship 









think more creatively about the possibilities for communal living, whether in larger, mul-
ti-generation, or cyborg assemblies.549  
7.10 Who’s afraid to seize the state? 
 
A coalition of immigration, welfare, working class and feminist activists and the-
orists need to recognize that the common source of their struggle is the organization of 
work and politics in relation to it. They also must argue that the choice between govern-
ment bureaucracy and the natural institutions of the market is a false choice; progressives 
who care about work and family must reject this dichotomy and use the state. This does 
not have to mean social control or bureaucratic nightmares. It does not have to mean wel-
fare as we know in. Instead it means inventive supports that allow citizens to create the 
institutions they want to be a part of, particularly support that creates meets the broad 
ranging needs. This sort of policy should be joined with assertions of constitutional com-
petency of individuals and groups, such that even these provisions are open to democratic 
revision. 
 
549. For an encounter with Toni Morrison and an argument for a new family See Nina Power, One 
Dimensional Woman (O Books, John Hunt, 2009), 71. For an even more radical approach, we might con-
sider whether “But we would have to discard it [the biological family] totally before we could  
hopeto eliminate the oppression altogether. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Femi-
nist Revolution (Macmillan, 2003), 97. For the cyborg who “is our ontology; it gives us our politics." Don-
na Jeanne Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs!: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s 










This is one way to understand the animus for both the Occupy Wall Street protests 
and the Tea Party movement in the 2000s. Indeed, the Tea Party movement makes more 
sense when read in the context of a devalued status citizenship.  The Tea Party comes out 
of an anti-tax movement with libertarian associations that gained traction in response to 
the Obama administration’s health care plans.550 While it has often been argued that the 
Tea Party is long on populist rage and short on policy prescriptions, this is not exactly the 
case. In general, the Tea Party espouses a modified Hayekian libertarianism, restricting 
the state to the operation of police powers and the sort of infrastructure that allows com-
merce to flourish, such as roads.551 They pick up on a tradition of arguments about free-
dom, government waste, the evils of socialism and the abuses of taxation that have ech-
oes throughout American history. But isn’t this precisely a signal that the traditional po-
litical aspects of citizenship in America have lost their luster? While the tea party has in-
stitutionalized to a great extent, in fact become a piece of the republic party hoping to 
dominate electorally, it at least purported at first to be a movement against representation 
 
550. Perhaps the Tea Party is rooted in “ the deeply held fiction of individual autonomy and self-
sufficiency that are intrinsic parts of Americans’ collective self-understanding” and anger when this is 
shown to be deeply dependent on government assistance. Perhaps this is just another way of seeing the 
movement as a class-bound reaction, both to the losses of jobs and wealth and, perhaps, to the symbolism 
of the election of a black president. Jay Bernstein, “The Very Angry Tea Party,” Opinionator, July 13, 
2010, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/the-very-angry-tea-party/ 1 
551. While Sotoris Barber has done a masterful job arguing that any admission that provision of 
public goods are necessary logically leads to support of a welfare state, tea party candidates have not read 










and, even, institutionalized democracy. It is this aspect that is interesting, and mirrors the 
theoretical bent of activists on the anarchist left. 
Occupy Wall Street and related movements, which take their bearings in part 
from the same traditions of anti-capitalist protests, anarchist thought and activist tradition 
as the Zapatistas, are also critical of the state apparatus, although like the Tea Party this 
general orientation has exceptions. For OWS theory, the most likely space in which a less 
critical stances towards government emerges with calls for regulation of the financial sys-
tem. These calls are often accompanied by claims that suggest that the government itself 
is responsible for construction financial markets in certain harmful ways, although market 
naturalism is also present. Like the Tea Party, OWS has a particular interest in American 
constitutional law and jurisprudence, although their orientation is not towards original-
ism. Instead, the animating principle of their admittedly nascent jurisprudence seems to 
center around a rejection of the concept of corporate personhood that they see as reflected 
in the Citizens United case. 
While these populist social movements have understandably generating a great 
deal of interest, in no small part because of their at least reflection of the energy of the 
popular protests of 2011 and into 2012 in the Middle East and North Africa, their tenden-









in a more social space, such as union activity, may be problematic.552 The desire to use 
the state to solve problems seems, at best, passé and at worst, terribly dangerous. Yet, we 
should not be afraid of the state. The shadow of Stalin and state led communism, as well 
as the noted failure of so many attempts to make society more healthy and productive, 
should give us pause. But not all types of policy required that the state monitor its citi-
zens or create a vast management system. This situation, or perception, is of course en-
hanced by a discourse of globalization that frames national domestic politics as less vital 
than global trade. However the state may be declining in importance, we should not jetti-
son with it the hope of a public space in which democratic activity is possible- and the 
first job of citizens is to build this space. 
 
7.11 Combating the Marginalization of Non-Wage Workers 
 
        One of the largest reasons for supporting full employment is the social integration 
that occurs as part of work; it is no accident that those who do not work outside the home 
(with exceptions for certain segments of the population who perform socially acceptable 
 
552. Jodi Dean argues that this has occurred, particularly on the left, out of a fear of failure and a 
tendency to assume that the social aspects of the internet and communications will function politically in a 
way they have yet to. She argues that the vast majority of Internet communication is not communication at 
all, but endless circulation. Her attack on capitalism comes from a Lacanian and Zizekian framework, fo-
cusing on the way that desire in capitalism is configured in an unobtainable fashion. But her analysis, per-
haps absent some of the focus on object petit a, is also applicable to citizenship. Jodi Dean, Democracy and 










alternative forms of labor, such as mothers and caretakers for the elderly) often report 
psychological distress and tend to have higher rates of crime, suicide and lower of politi-
cal participation.553 Both groups are excused, in a sense, from labor, yet with this excuse 
comes a lack of connection to the world in which most communication and socialization 
takes place. Marginalization is also a central facet of life for many immigrant communi-
ties, especially when these communities are in a country where they lack citizenship or 
legal resident status. 
        This marginalization (and the changing demographics of the global north) suggests 
that the "full employment" vision for the future will need to be modified, or at least un-
derstood differently.554 Given the growth of older populations, it makes sense for such 
programs to focus on creating alternative systems and centers where people of different 
ages, classes and working situations interact. These programs have typically centered 
around voluntary associations and the movement of the young into the private space of 
the elderly, such as in the Meals on Wheels and similar programs. More community-
based efforts, however, have shown greater efficacy in connecting elders to their commu-
nity and political systems. One of the more promising angles is the involvement of older 
citizens in community organizing efforts, such as the Tenderloin Senior Outreach Project 
 
553. This is one reason why Young includes "marginalization" as one of her famous five faces of 
oppression, noting that it is the most dangerous, and linking this concern in particular to women and the 
old. Young, Five Faces.   
 
554. Claus Offe has argued as much, suggesting that the welfare state must consider how informal 









(TSOP) in San Francisco, which puts the interests and agency of older people at its cen-
ter, while still involved other age demographics.555 This would change our current ap-
proach to social gerontology, which erases the agency of elderly people, who navigate 
their aging amid social understandings of old age as a time of decrepitude and dependen-
cy, where the individual bears full responsibility for hardship.556  Similar projects have 
been tried elsewhere, often focused on community-generated issues of access to housing, 
healthcare and technological advances. These efforts counter the understanding, gleaned 
from social science survey data, that elderly are apolitical, or at least unlikely to do much 
more than vote.557 Similar programs could be developed for other types of marginalized 
unwaged workers.  
7.12 Basic Income 
 
           This brings us to the central option in severing the connection between paid labor 
in the marketplace, citizenship and care labor: basic income. Basic income schemes have 
been under discussion since the first hints that the welfare states of Europe as well as the 
more market oriented United States might struggle to provide full employment for their 
 
555. Meredith Minkler, Community Organizing and Community Building for Health (Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 1997). 
556. Emmanuelle Tulle, Old Age and Agency (Nova Publishers, 2004). 
557. M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, “Political Involvement in the Later Years: A Longitu-










citizens. The general concept of basic income is easy to understand: each person receives 
a wage from the government sufficient to maintain his or her life, of course the devil is in 
spelling out who counts as a person (citizen? man? child? elderly? ski bum?), at what 
government level this payment would be created, administered and overseen, and of 
course in what form and at what level payments would occur. These problems exist even 
without the larger issue of defining the philosophical defense of this policy, which itself 
should be situated in relation to the political challenges that would face such a proposal, 
particularly in the United States.558  We also would need to accompany basic income 
proposals with the above insurance that currently marginalized workers are integrated 
into community projects, rather than merely drawing a paycheck. A promising approach  
recognizes the limits of such models in thinking about employment in an age of transi-
tional work and shifting employment schemas and therefore proposes renovating welfare 
state policies to provide additional security for workers in transitional and part-time jobs, 
allowing them to move freely throughout the labor force.559  
The goals of this dissertation are partially met with a basic income scheme, in the 
sense that all, regardless of what type of work they perform or if they “work” at all, are 
 
558. However, in considering these political difficulties it is important to realize that a guaranteed in-
come movement was a real possibility in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and was supported by a 
diverse cast including Milton Friedman, Martin Luther King Jr. and Richard Nixon. Matthew C. Murray 
and Carole Pateman, Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
559. Günther Schmid, Bernard Gazier and Bernard Gazier, The Dynamics of Full Employment: Social 










afforded the same material benefits. However, the broader configurations of work and 
political membership may not flatten out so neatly with the introduction of a basic in-
come. In households where education and income are equal between partners, heterosex-
ual pairs still show a marked difference between care work done by each gender. In ho-
mosexual relationships, this difference is no longer statistically significant. The social 
norms related to carework are not reducible to the difference in a paycheck. Similarly, 
whatever inequality effects currently exist of gendered occupational segregation, which is 
present at all levels but nowhere more starkly than carework, would not disappear. In-
deed, it is unclear how the labor market would respond a basic income at all; some have 
argued that minimum wage supports would be lowered to compensate, and certainly the 
cost of labor would change significantly. Cost of labor is presumed to increase because it 
is reasoned that many workers take unpleasant, low-status or minimum wage jobs be-
cause they have no other options for maintaining themselves physically. While there are 
many who work in these jobs despite the fact that they could make around the same from 
collecting state benefits, the arguments it that a basic wage for all would remove the 
stigma from receiving benefits and force low-wage employers to attract these otherwise 
secure workers with higher wages. Still, basic income is a powerful policy in that it un-
dercuts the market evaluation of labor and work, and puts this act of definition squarely 
back in the hands of citizens.  
Concerns about the effects on the labor market, in that a pure basic income guar-









ative tax” policies which instead leave the current market system intact and function 
much as the Earned Income Tax Credit does in the United States.. Of course, this 
amounts to a means test for this benefit, and erodes its universal character. Indeed, de-
spite the support for such an approach politically, a negative tax or partial basic income 
guarantee, despite its potential to change poverty, lacks the transformative nature of a 
universal basic income. The very point is to disrupt the labor market’s near monopoly on 
meeting of basic needs, which is supplemented currently with the family for some and the 
welfare state for others. Indeed, the point is also to lessen the ability of these other enti-
ties to extract labor from either family members or would-be welfare recipients with 
threat of bodily harm. 
Instituting a policy like Basic Income would not be easy and it would not work 
well without broader transformative support. It would take the combined efforts of many 
groups who do not currently work together, and some, like my union of domestic and 
household workers, paid and unpaid, that do not exist. In particular, progressives will 
need to move away from identity and social politics and partner with the working class 
and working poor, as no other set of policy reforms has as much potential to improve the 
working and social lives of such a broad range of people. For cultural elites, this will 
mean leaving behind the elitism that has long divided the left from its former base. For 
working classes, it will require a willingness to leave behind a failing image of independ-









parents and children are supported as workers, thinkers and family members. Basic In-
come helps in all these areas. 
The Basic Income Guarantee is an attempt to meet the theoretical challenges of 
Arendt’s superfluousness and Weil’s understanding of human needs. Arendt recognizes 
that the ability to take part in a political community, through central, does not equate to 
formal political membership (even if this is required in the current system of nation 
states). The first step towards exclusion of people from the political community is to 
make them superfluousness through the exploitation of their labor and eroding of their 
dignity. The same broad need for inclusion that does not presume that the poor have no 
needs beyond material ones, and the combination of income and inclusion fostered by 
basic income schemes and the other supports for ungendering and revaluing care labor 




 Of course, developing co-constitutive citizenship and democratic public spheres 
will require more work beyond transforming the status of carework. However, given the 
relationship between hierarchies of work and political membership, this transformative 
should be a powerful first step. It will then be up to the stronger and more diverse public 
spheres that I think workers, including the unemployed and the care worker, can build 
together to determine how best to continue to develop this sort of citizenship and to tack-









a capitalism radically different from our own, and perhaps an end to capitalism altogeth-
er; this would be a product of the struggle and advocacy of actual citizens, not the impo-
sition of such an idea from democratic theory. I have showed that we need to attend to 
work as part of our political theory, and that we need to share both work and labor as part 
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